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Prosecutor Reports on Labor Camp Investigation

AU3105142290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 31 May 90

["Announcement" issued by the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office; place and date not given]

[Text] In connection with the high level of public interest in the investigation case started against Mircho Spasov, Nikolay Gazdov, and Tsvyatko Goranov, the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office announces that the case is being investigated by a group of military prosecutors and investigators from the Main Investigation Department as speedily and objectively as possible.

A considerable amount of work has been completed on the case. Over 198 witnesses have been questioned, inspections have been made, and expert examinations and other investigations are being carried out. Some 400 former camp inmates and their relatives have yet to be found and questioned. Some of them have died since their release, so it is necessary to track down and question their relatives. Some of the witnesses are deliberately concealing or do not wish to give evidence. Some of the former camp inmates have kept secret their imprisonment in the camp to this day, the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office announces.

A considerable time has elapsed since the events, which affects the reliability of the witnesses' evidence. From the evidence gathered so far on the case, it has been established that during the 1959-61 period a total of 1,501 citizens were imprisoned under administrative procedures, without being sentenced, in the camp near Lovech and in the settlement at the village of Skravena, Sofia Oblast. The conditions for the men were exceptionally severe. They were subjected to excessively hard physical labor, received poor-quality and insufficient food, and were deprived of practically all medical services. Physical violence, practiced by camp officials on the inmates and occurring among the inmates themselves, was an everyday event. The conditions for the women, also following their transfer to the village of Skravena, were milder by comparison. The unbearable living conditions were established to have been imposed by oral orders from officials at the national and regional levels, the announcement of the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office points out.

In the camp near Lovech, 145 men and three women died. After the women were transferred in September 1961 to the village of Skravena, no further deaths occurred. To date, eight cases of death caused due to rape [iznasilvane] have been established. Investigations are being carried out to establish the specific persons responsible in each individual case. Cases of suicide and work accidents have also been confirmed, the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office announces.

Charges have been filed against the accused Spasov, Gazdov, and Goranov, relating to the deliberate murder of more than one person. The Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office does not share the views expressed by certain mass media that the preliminary investigations in the case are proceeding slowly. Such published reports are unsubstantiated, and do not serve the interest of an objective and comprehensive elucidation of the facts, the announcement states.

It is evident that there is a likelihood that charges will also be filed under articles of the Penal Code against other persons, who are being tracked down and identified. The public will be informed through the mass media on the results of the investigation, states the announcement of the Armed Forces Prosecutor's Office.

UDF Warns of 'Provocations' Before Elections

AU0106141190 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 26 May 90 p 8

[DEMOKRATSIYA report: "Attention, Union of Democratic Forces Supporters"]

[Text] Our newspaper has had numerous warnings submitted to it, which are a cause of serious concern. We are citing some of them as follows:

"Be careful, the Communists are preparing provocations before the elections, which they intend to attribute to the UDF."

"A tank unit in Gorna Banya has been observed engaging in unusual movements, which presumably means military interference."

"An assassination attempt against Petur Mladenov is expected to be staged. It will not be successful, of course, but the opposition will be accused of being involved in it."

Let us hope that these warnings do not bear any relationship to the truth. However, we appeal to you, UDF followers and supporters, to be careful, to resist provocation. Try to assert the strength of democracy in the face of possible violent methods that the ruling party intends to apply.

Condemns Government Actions

AU0206165690 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 28 May 90 p 1

[Union of Democratic Forces Declaration: "Do Not Sell Out Our Homeland!"]

[Text] These days, in which all our Bulgarian people are involved in the election campaign, it has come to our knowledge that the present one-party government has established contacts and is currently conducting negotiations related to a possible sale of industrial, tourist, and other economic institutions and installations to foreign

companies and investors. According to its long-standing tradition, the government is taking all precautions not to disclose this extremely important fact.

It is not our country which is isolated, but the currently ruling party and its government. Considering that the flow of international financial credits has stopped, the present rulers are apparently forced to search for alternative sources of hard-currency income. Excessive haste, however, has never been a good adviser. In any case, we would not tolerate, nor permit the cheap sale of all our country's national resources. We could also never accept the fact that our government should be entitled to sign binding long-term agreements likely to face any other future government with a fait accompli.

The outdated, traditional methods of adopting one-sided and secret decisions related to crucial issues of our national economy have long since confirmed their destructive nature directed against the people's interests. The recently announced moratorium on the country's payments is a natural result of these methods of taking decisions.

The Union of Democratic Forces, in its election platform, categorically declared itself in support of involving foreign capital likely to assist the construction of a national economy based on new, rational foundations. We even went a step further in our views that without sufficient financial assistance from abroad our transition to market economy, and the overcoming of the crisis would be much more difficult, or even impossible. Along with this, however, in expressing our deep concern of our country's future, we insist on our refusal to accept that a question of such crucial importance for our national economy should be resolved by the present-day government. It can be resolved only by a democratic government which has been confirmed by the confidence vote of the Grand National Assembly.

It has become known, in the meantime, that some of the party and state functionaries (the so-called nomenklatura cadres), who until recently enjoyed unjustified privileges, and some of their family members, are engaged in activities related to the establishment of companies abroad with financial capital and assistance coming from unknown sources. Having been relieved of their former posts, the nomenklatura cadres are being appointed to new positions, thanks to which they may more comfortably await the expected changes, despite their lack of any adequate qualifications for their new jobs. As a democratic organization, the UDF [Union of Democratic Forces] has repeatedly declared that it does not intend to engage in "witch-hunting," but we now urge the government and the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leadership to halt such actions at once and to refrain from any assistance and cooperation with the aforementioned individuals. This is the only method of creating prerequisites for a normal transition to a truly democratic government in our country following the elections.

Refuses To Sign Agreement

AU0206161390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] The UDF held a news conference in Sofia today with Bulgarian and foreign journalists.

Ivaylo Trifonov, deputy chairman of the Federation of Glasnost and Democracy Clubs, pointed out that during the last few days there has been a sharp increase in political tension across the country.

Following the talks between President of the Republic Petur Mladenov and Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, the UDF Coordinating Council originally adopted a decision to sign the agreement on the nonuse of violence, on condition that the UDF declaration of 27 May should form an integral part of this agreement, and that the agreement should first be signed by the ministers of national defense and internal affairs.

However, because of the escalation in tensions, which reached a critical point with the murder in Shumen and the death of the local UDF chairman in [word indistinct], the UDF leadership had informed President Mladenov of its repeated refusal to sign the agreement.

In connection with the meeting held last night in the Lozenets Residence in Sofia between President Mladenov and the leaders of the political parties, which was attended by Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov and Ministers Dzhurov and Semerdzhiev, it was pointed out at the news conference that the UDF had prepared a draft appeal for nonviolence, which was also publicized at today's news conference.

The main points in the appeal to the Bulgarian citizens are the following:

—the firearms distributed to civilians by employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs should be confiscated as soon as possible;

—officers and military servicemen should be prohibited from carrying weapons outside their places of duty until the end of the elections; and

—citizens and mass media organs which incite people to violence and vengeance should be prosecuted by the courts.

These clauses were not signed because Minister Dzhurov and the representatives of the Bulgarian Socialist Party made use of their right to abstain.

At the news conference, attention was also given to a message received by the UDF on 30 May from Giscard d'Estaing, the former president of France.

The above information was provided by our reporter Aglaya Shamlieva.

Further on Refusal

AU0206190690 Sofia BTA in English 1650 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 2 June (BTA)—The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) [UDF] will not sign the agreement for non-violence, proposed by President Mladenov, said today Ivaylo Trifonov, member of the Coordination Council.

The opposition would have signed it yesterday after applying its declaration from May 27. But it gave it up due to announcements for escalation of tensions which brought to two murders; an officer in Shumen killed a young man, a SDS activist died in Rakitovo under obscure circumstances.

After the opposition has stated its refusal to sign President Mladenov's document there was an agreement for meeting of the three major political forces, Trifonov explained. At this meeting which was held yesterday were present President Mladenov, Prime Minister Lukanov, Minister of National Defence Dzhurov, Interior Minister Semerdzhiev; Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev and Dr. Dertliev from the SDS, and Viktor Vulkov from the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]. The SDS presented, according to agreement the document which had to be signed. The document insists that the weapons be taken away from the civilians, that the military should move without weapons outside the barracks, that responsibility be sought from the citizens and the mass media which incite violence, that the bodies of order and justice should firmly oppose all infringements of law.

The document was not signed. According to Trifonov the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is to blame. There was a dispute concerning the question about the militaries' weapons. The BSP set conditions stating that it will sign if the opposition signs the president's document. The BZNS, on its part said it will sign if the BSP and the SDS sign, as Trifonov who was not present at the meeting explained.

The opposition stand is that now every political force should assume its own responsibility. The SDS is preparing its own document for non-violence until the elections and after them.

Zhelev Speaks of 'Tension' at Rally in Varna

AU0206201290 Sofia BTA in English 1755 GMT 2 Jun 90

["SDS Stands for Ideological Struggle"—BTA headline]

[Text] Varna, 2 June (BTA)—Over 10,000 people, supporters and followers of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces, UDF], participated today in a pre-election rally.

Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev expressed his concern over the growing political tension in the pre-election campaign and over the threat of tensions escalation in the country. He appealed to his adherents not to succumb to provocations as the SDS is not interested to use the arguments of force.

"Our understanding of the pre-election campaign," the speaker said, "is a campaign of ideology, of pre-election platforms and programmes, by which every political force will make itself legitimate before the Bulgarian people and seek its confidence."

An address was read by former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing to the SDS who wishes that the spring of 1990 will turn for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people into "that new spring of freedom which the Bulgarian people deserves so much."

U.S. Delegation: Voting Can Be 'Free,' 'Honest'

AU0106213090 Sofia BTA in English 1751 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 June (BTA)—We believe that the elections will be free and honest, said at a news conference Mr. Harvey Chalman, leader of the delegation of the American National Democratic Institute of International Relations.

The American observer noted that the political campaign in Bulgaria is remarkable for its frankness. The election law is very consistent in its basis, although there are some matters which should be further elaborated by the Central Electoral Commission. The delegation is going to present its proposals and remarks to the Electoral Commission.

The guests have come across some mistakes and discrepancies in the electoral lists. They expressed their regret that they did not understand very well how the electorate would cast their votes abroad, especially the Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin who left Bulgaria last year.

They appreciated the initiative of the Central Electoral Commission to show on television the mechanism of voting. It was also pointed out that if the rules for the voting of military men are observed, Bulgaria can become an example to follow in this respect.

The guests noted that compared with Romania, the election campaign in Bulgaria is better, but compared with Hungary it is worse. The elections will be a difficult process, but if there is goodwill, they can be free, honest and without any violence, they said.

Commenting on their visit to some military units in Sofia and Burgas, the guests said that for the first time military bases are visited by foreigners. They were impressed by "the decoration" in the units which was old and abounding in slogans such as "forward to socialism and communism." They were told that "it would take a long time to replace the decoration and its replacement would be rather expensive."

Mr. Harvey Chalman announced that another delegation of the American National Democratic Institute was

expected to arrive on 7 June. It will be led by Iceland's prime minister and will comprise senators and congressmen from Australia, the United States and some other countries. The delegation will attend the elections on 10 June and will visit a number of towns and villages.

Poll Shows People Displeased With 'Recent Past'

AU0106212090 Sofia BTA in English 1635 GMT 1 Jun 90

["Bulgarians Displeased With Their Recent Past"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, 1 June (BTA)—One-fourth of the supporters of the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (the former Communist Party) hold the opinion that the Bulgarian society in the period before November 10, 1989, when Todor Zhivkov was ousted was worse than the Western societies. Almost a half of the supporters of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party (BZNS) make a negative evaluation of the country's recent past. 82 per cent of the sympathizers of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) [UDF] disapprove of the characteristics of the past period. These are the results of a survey carried out by the Centre for Democracy Researches.

The respondents who said that they preferred the Bulgarian society to a Western one, i.e. that the rule of the Communist Party was a successful one, account for 45 per cent of the BSP supporters and 22 per cent of the supporters of the BZNS. 30 per cent of the respondents orientated to the ruling party said that the past had both advantages and negative aspects; 29 per cent of the Agrarians and 19 per cent of the SDS sympathizers share the same opinion.

The arguments most often adduced by the apologists of socialist society are "there was no unemployment" and "there was order in the country." A great part of the electorate supporting the BSP consider that "equality existed more in word than in deed." In general the opposition-orientated respondents criticize the lack of freedom and the lack of lawfulness. They admit that "people live better in the West."

According to 64 per cent of the SDS supporters, 30 per cent of the Agrarians, and 7 per cent of the BSP-orientated respondents, the fault for the present crisis lies with the Bulgarian Communist Party (the present BSP). "The main fault is we were bound to the USSR," said 35 per cent of the SDS supporters and 8 per cent of the sympathizers of the BSP. The answer "Todor Zhivkov and his Mafia are to be blamed for it" seems to be the most popular: It was given by 60 per cent of the BSP supporters, 64 per cent of the SDS sympathizers and 69 per cent of the Agrarians.

60 per cent of the BSP supporters, 34 per cent of the SDS supporters and 44 per cent of the BZNS sympathizers are inclined, to a different degree, to share the responsibility for the present crisis.

Soviet Ambassador Discusses Relations, Reform

AU0206203690 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 30 May 90 pp 1,2

[Report on meeting with Soviet Ambassador Viktor Sharapov by Editor in Chief Lyuben Gotsev, international affairs commentator Vasil Asparukhov, domestic political affairs editor Nasko Mandadzhiev, commentator Vasil Dzherekarov, and assistant Yani Boychev at the OTECHESTVEN FRONT editorial offices; date not given: "I Believe in the Processes of Renewal in Bulgaria"]

[Excerpts] [Gotsev] Meetings with the Soviet ambassador are always interesting because he is also a journalistic colleague. I am sure that he will regard us as his colleagues. I now give him the opportunity to tell us what in his view is especially important for the Soviet Union and for our mutual relations.

[Sharapov] I realize that you, as professional colleagues, are interested in the restructuring under way in the Soviet Union. If we are speaking about the period which our country is experiencing at the moment, it must be pointed out that it is one of the most difficult and, to a certain degree, even critical times. All the problems—political and economic, international and social—have erupted like a volcano. All of these "burning" problems must be solved quickly together. [passage omitted]

[Asparukhov] Will Bulgaria and the Soviet Union continue their bilateral cooperation in the field of timber production? The situation is serious; for example, in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the local population has been protesting against the Bulgarians working in that area.

[Sharapov] The question of the Bulgarians developing the forests in Komi is organically connected with the entire system of Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation. In itself, the timber production is of mutual benefit to both states, and I stress, the states. The inhabitants of Komi have no sense of any benefit for themselves. It is no accident that this issue was discussed at the meeting between Nikolay Ryzhkov and Andrey Lukanov. Certain measures were outlined, but it is clear that their implementation is being delayed.

At present both sides are looking for ways to ensure that economic cooperation is directed so as to stimulate production and ensure that it is mutually beneficial. The present forms of cooperation are outdated. The time has passed when all trade deals were concluded between the states themselves. Now it is not the states, but the enterprises and collectives which must decide whether they need this or that type of output. To conclude a trade agreement now, it is not enough merely to say that it is necessary because one of the enterprises is Bulgarian and the other Soviet. It is necessary to base oneself on the economic realities, and on the interests of the collectives themselves. The state must assist in making this transition toward new relations painless. Now, in fact, ways

are being worked out for a transition to global prices and to payments made in convertible currency. This will stimulate the development of production and will raise our economic cooperation to a new level. Then the Bulgarian Pravets computer and the Soviet Volga car will become better and cheaper. [passage omitted]

[Mandadzhiev] I will ask you a question which you may not wish to answer. What is the attitude of the USSR, and your own personal attitude, toward the events in Bulgaria on 10 November 1989? Is it true that one of the motivating forces which coordinated all the changes was the meeting between Petur Mladenov and Mikhail Gorbachev, when our foreign minister returned by way of Moscow?

One further question: What is your personal opinion of the policies and actions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin?

[Sharapov] The question concerning some sort of interference by the Soviet Union in the events of 10 November in Bulgaria is often asked. However, it should not be forgotten that Bulgaria, itself, had become ripe for these events.

By starting restructuring, the Soviet Union clearly announced to everyone: If you want, study our experience; if you do not want to, that is your business. In doing this, basing our actions upon our own unique experiences, we added that any delay in beginning restructuring may lead to serious consequences. We declared this at all levels, including to Todor Zhivkov. Can this really be assessed as interference? I think not.

As far as Petur Mladenov is concerned, even the West has known for a long time that he did not visit Moscow at that time, but, rather, returned to Bulgaria via the FRG. All the flights and their exact schedules are well known. Despite this, a disinformation was fabricated and circulated worldwide. This, of course, was done with a certain purpose in mind.

[Mandadzhiev] Did you, personally, know beforehand of the 10 November changes?

[Sharapov] I was informed of the Politburo meeting. After it ended, Todor Zhivkov telephoned me and said that he would like to inform the Soviet Government of the planned changes in the Bulgarian leadership.

Life itself, not the "hand" of Moscow, forced the Bulgarian leaders to make these changes. If you have read Petur Mladenov's letter, if you have heard of Stanko Todorov's letter, it is not difficult to understand what ideas are embodied in the basis of the changes that have ensued in Bulgaria, and who is responsible for them. The contents of these letters express the attitudes held by a certain section of the leadership, the Bulgarian Communists, and various strata of society. The Bulgarian Communist Party found the strength within itself to effect a decisive and radical change from totalitarianism to democratic socialism.

Regarding your second question, I will say that I accept and approve the policy of renewal of socialism and, accordingly, the course adopted by Mikhail Gorbachev. I believe that without such a leader, it is uncertain when restructuring would have begun, and who would have initiated it. It is quite another question, that in the course of restructuring, errors have occurred which have been insufficiently taken into account, as occurred, for example, with the adoption of the law against alcohol. However, Mikhail Gorbachev himself has spoken openly of such mistakes.

My attitude toward Boris Yeltsin is based both on the development of restructuring and on what he proposes. I did not agree with many of his statements, but take joy in the fact that the time of real pluralism of political opinions has come. His bold criticism was a new phenomenon in our society. This signified that the struggle between different views and positions was a real one.

[Dzherekarov] Do you not agree that since 1985 and 10 November 1989 there have been no real anti-Soviet feelings in Bulgaria?

Apart from this, I am alarmed by the manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. Nothing else is more indicative of sickness in a society. It is, of course, a good thing that all this was discussed in the Soviet press, but I am worried by the fact that there are no good explanations for these phenomena.

[Sharapov] For a number of historical reasons, our countries have been closely linked economically, politically, and militarily for four and a half decades. Anti-Sovietism has not existed in Bulgaria. Naturally, isolated cases have occurred, and they do exist now, but these do not determine the times.

Much is being said about anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, both inside the USSR and in the West. The position of the CPSU on this issue is crystal clear: No excesses, no actions by extremists will be permitted. Anti-Semitism is precisely such an extremist manifestation, and it will never be supported either by the party or by the Soviet Government. However, I believe that the issue of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union is being deliberately instigated.

[Boychev] How does Bulgaria look today in the eyes of the Soviet ambassador, and how will it look tomorrow?

[Sharapov] It is easier for me to say how Bulgaria looks today, but it is much more difficult to say how it will look after 10 June.

At present, Bulgaria is a country which has entered a period of radical transformations in the political and economic fields which will substantially alter the country's image. The country is in motion. Much has already been done to develop democratization. Political pluralism and the appearance of an opposition, an entire Union of Democratic Forces, have become realities. This, incidentally, proves that the Bulgarian Socialist

Party has remained true to its policy of democratization and renunciation of totalitarianism. Now the Bulgarian people have to make their choice, and decide which political program is more comprehensible and more closely meets their needs. I believe in Bulgaria's process of renewal."

Daily on Military Service Discussions

AU3105092590 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 29 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Colonel General Vasil Zikulov article: "Bulgaria's Security—Above All Things"]

[Excerpts] The questions related to our Army's organizational system were recently repeatedly discussed on the pages of our military newspapers and journals. The televised election debate that took place on 17 May 1990 prompted us to resume this subject.

In submitting their parties' programs on military affairs, the spokesmen of the Union of Democratic Forces [UDF] and the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS], despite minor differences of opinions, both expressed their unanimous view on the issue by advocating a "small, but strong army," and "a one-year Army training period." These two requests, submitted in a combined form, suggest to the unprejudiced television viewer that our Army today is large in number and that opportunities for its further reduction by restricting the term of military service but simultaneously strengthening its power, really exist.

It is a well-known fact that the People's Republic of Bulgaria announced that its military doctrine is totally defensive. We are not striving for attack, and we do not threaten anyone. Basing ourselves on this fact, it is correct to assume that the required size and strength of our Army should guarantee our country's reliable defense in case of attack. Without dwelling on unncessary details, it is enough to point out that Turkey, one of our NATO- member neighbor countries, is maintaining an approximately 300,000- to 350,000-man strong army in peacetime that is directed against us. After the recent, unilateral reductions, the People's Republic of Bulgaria can rely on a 107,000-man Army, a fact that should convince even nonspecialists that our People's Army has reached its minimum size and that any further unilateral reductions would seriously jeopardize our national security.

Basing ourselves on the restricted number of our Army personnel, the idea of introducing a professional army may seem acceptable, but only at a first glance. [passage omitted]

The supporters of a "small but strong army" should know that the concept of a "strong army" can hardly be combined with the requirement for a short military service. During the aforementioned television debate, one of the participants excitedly pleaded that one year or even six months are sufficient for the soldiers' training and that the second year of the compulsory military service is nothing but "drudgery." [passage omitted]

If we should introduce a one-year term of military service, which seems to be the opposition's project, only 50 percent of the soldiers would be sufficiently trained for combat, considering that the other 50 percent would not even have completed their six-months basic training period.

We cannot fail to observe and take into account the methods according to which our neighbors cope with the problem. Without regarding anyone as our enemy, we should point out that military service in the Turkish Army, where the conscripts' contingent is rather large and considerably exceeds the requirement for remanning the armed forces, the length of the military service was reduced from 24 to 18 months only a few years ago. We should by no means allow our soldiers' training to be inferior to that of the Turkish Army.

In the era of democracy and glasnost, no issue whatsoever should be considered "off limits," and this also applies to the problems of defense and security. It is natural that they should be discussed by the political parties and included in their programs. It is natural that military subjects should be the focus of heated debates and controversies. However, such discussions require a necessary sense of responsibility and competence. Military issues should not be subject to erratic solutions and should by no means be taken advantage of in competing for votes. The military personnel are sensitive to the question of the term of service, and manipulation of their feelings in this respect is really likely to win their votes, but what about the price of such votes?

Guided by election campaign considerations, it should not be difficult to inspire a negative attitude toward the military service, to incite soldiers against officers, and subordiantes against their superiors. Nevertheless, this leads to a weakening of discipline, it undermines combat readiness, and affects our motherland's security in the long run. No serious political party that claims the right of ruling Bulgaria in the near future should ever admit such a careless attitude in discussing the questions related to our country's defense. Only a strong and disciplined Army is capable of protecting Bulgaria's national interests and its security.

Defense Ministry Spokesman Interviewed

AU0106213590

[Editorial Report] Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian on 31 May on page 2 publishes a 1,400-word interview with Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, by correspondents Rumyana Georgieva and Tsvyatko Belenski, entitled "What Is Changing in the Army." The place and date of the interview are not stated.

Asked to comment on the proposal by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the Bulgarian National

Agrarian Union to reduce compulsory military service to one year, Minchev dismisses the suggestion as completely impracticable, since it would not give time for the required specialist military training.

Minchev also rejects out of hand the suggestion that Bulgaria could rely on a professional army. He points out that "only a few states—the United States, UK, Portugal, and certain Arab states...with great economic possibilities and a high standard of living," can afford this expensive luxury, adding that "a U.S. soldier, for example, receives $620 per month after six months of training, which is much more than my own pay." Because of the difficult conditions of army service, Minchev also doubts that enough volunteers could be attracted, but his main argument is that "the professional army cannot provide the necessary wartime contingent of troops," without which a small country like Bulgaria could not defend its sovereignty.

Asked his opinion on allowing alternatives for military service, as suggested by the UDF, Minchev baldly states: "Under our Constitution, military service is a supreme duty and an issue of honor for every citizen.... Any deviation means a failure to fulfill the Constitution." Michev also summarizes practical reasons why Bulgarian conscripts cannot complete their service in their home districts.

Minchev is questioned the "distortions in the Army and, more paticularly, cases of older soldiers committing outrages against the young ones." He first comments that "distortions are not confined to the Army, but begin in the kindergarden, acquire more grotesque forms in the schools, and are extended, and sometimes made more cruel in the barracks." He admits that such incidents occur in off-duty hours, sometimes involving conscripts with criminal records for hooliganism and violence, but adds: "That is why an order has been issued for individual officers to be present in the evening after training exercises have been completed." Pressed further, he admits that "in many cases we learn of these incidents from parents, relatives or through other channels. Some commanders are unaware of such phenomena. This is because the victims fear that if they report the incidents, they will suffer the more." He stresses that severe measures are taken against those guilty of such bullying.

Regarding the progress of the election campaign in the Army, Minchev states that the Army is strictly fulfilling the instructions of the Central Electoral Commission by granting the soldiers leave to attend the prescribed two meetings with election candidates and to vote. His questioners note that "the first meetings have already taken place, but according to our information the soldiers are not showing much interest," to which Minchev replies: "We carry out the prescribed instructions—the soldier is given leave. We are people who carry out orders. The soldier is a free man, and it is his right to decide how to act."

Mladenov Appeals for 'Self-Control,' 'Soberness'

AU0206192490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1705 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Speech by President of the Republic Petur Mladenov at a ceremonial meeting and military exercise in Aleksandur Nevski Square, Sofia, on Khristo Botev Day—live]

[Excerpts] Dear Fellow Countrymen:

Every year on this day Bulgaria bows in silent homage to the memory of Botev and to the courage of the thousands of her sons and daughters. It is impossible to list them all, it is impossible to list all their services. It would be a mistake to distinguish among them according to social class, profession, or any other characteristic. They are Bulgaria's dear children; they perished in Bulgaria's name, in the name of Bulgaria's ideals, for Bulgaria's freedom, and to deliver Bulgaria from tyranny.

Today we interpret their actions in a new way. We attempt to draw from it unchanging values, which are a moral support for our existence as a people and a state. [passage omitted]

Comrades, citizens, brothers! During the present days Bulgaria faces an immense historical challenge. Will we be able to put an end to the internecine struggles and advance along the road of freedom and concord, of progress and democracy? We are situated at a watershed between the past and the future. The tension of the political struggles is approaching a dangerous point. The shadow of violence hangs over our everyday life.

At this moment, let us retain our self-control and soberness. It would be disastrous for all of us, and disastrous for Bulgaria, if, led by political ambitions, we start accusing one another of responsibility for the common ills, if we call for retribution and a day of reckoning, instead of seeking the moral and intellectual remedy for the sickly state which affects our society.

A man may be killed, he may be crippled, or terrorized with firearms or cold steel, stones or iron bars, with fists, with persecution, or with physical outrage. Hatred is bred from violence, from the depraved view that he who does not agree with us has no right to exist, and should be driven away and destroyed.

Surely a call to [words indistinct] of someone is no less terrible than an instigation to physical murder.

Today, a single spark is sufficient to cause an explosion. What is needed is to swear a common and sincere vow in support of peace and consensus in front of the memorial to those who perished for Bulgaria, because a vow of this kind can achieve a great deal in the conditions of seething passions, which recognize neither laws nor political orders.

This is why, on this day so beloved by our nation, I appeal to all Bulgarians, for us to create an public atmosphere of intolerance toward violence, whether in

the form of an attempt on someone's life or security, or in the form of a threat, insult, or provocation.

I appeal to the patriotism of our citizens, so that we help the state institutions to effectively exercise their powers in the interest of the Bulgarian people's public order and peace.

I appeal for us to display unity as people loving their fatherland, who not only deeply respect and esteem those who sacrificed themselves for Bulgaria, but are also firmly resolved to prevent new sacrifices, who truly cherish their children, and who care for the future of our dear fatherland. This, my dear fellow countrymen, is the only road for us to be worthy heirs to Botev and the testament of those who perished for our liberty and national welfare. [applause]

Kremikovtsi Workers Begin Hunger Strike

AU3005135090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 30 May 90

[Text] Metallurgists from the Kremikovtsi Steel Plant began an indefinite hunger strike in front of the Council of Ministers building in Sofia.

According to strike committee spokesman Tsvetan Aleksov, who talked with one of our reporters, the strike is related to the demand that a 35-hour work week be introduced instead of the existing 42.5-hour work week.

The strike participants stated that they will continue the hunger strike in front of the Council of Ministers building until their demand is met, however, only workers who are not on shift will participate in the strike.

Issue Declaration

AU3105195290 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1900 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Today is the second day of the hunger strike by workers at the Steel Works of the Kremikovtsi State Company in front of the Council of Ministers building in Sofia.

The trade union section at the works, which is a member of the Trade Union Federation for Geology, Metallurgy, and Chemical Industry attached to the Podkrepa Independent Labor Federation, issued a declaration on 31 May that recalls the circumstances that led to the strike. The agreement signed with the management of the Kremikovtsi Company on the plant workers changing over to a 35-hour work week has not been kept, nor have the workers' demands been met, the lawfulness of which was confirmed by the Committee on Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare, but which was rejected by the Council of Ministers.

The declaration emphasizes that the metalworkers have refrained from holding an outright strike but, bearing in mind the state of the Bulgarian economy, resolved merely to hold a hunger strike. What is more, the strike committee members holding the hunger strike in front of the Council of Ministers building are using their paid annual leave for this purpose.

According to the statement, it is announced that at 1015 on 31 May, Council of Ministers Chairman Andrey Lukanov met with the strikers and told them: I am very well aware that you are engaged in an election campaign, but the government and I would rather resign than give in to pressure.

The strikers declare that they do not agree with this accusation, which is completely unfounded. At the same time, we have received a declaration from the delegate assembly of workers from the steel works who are members of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria:

The assembly has decided to support the hunger strike of the Podkrepa Independent Labor Federation and resolved that their independent trade union should join the side of their striking colleagues.

Ethnic Development Research Recommended

AU3105105590 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 May 90 p 2

[Text] The birth and development of the Bulgarian nation should be analyzed without prejudiced ideas serving the interest of a specific political force. This was declared at yesterday's meeting of the Scientific-Coordination Council on Problems of the Bulgarian Nationality and the Nation's Development by council Chairman Strashimir Dimitrov. The meeting, which was held at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, dealt with the state and tasks of ethnic-nationality research studies in our country.

The question of examining the ethnic culture of the Turkish-speaking Bulgarian population and of its future role in our country's history is a major, topical issue. The underestimation of this question led to numerous problems. Despite the existing efforts of linking the current research on the ethnic origin of the Bulgarian people to the so-called "national revival process," numerous other subjects are awaiting their scientific analysis.

A special program has been adopted, part of which includes research on the general features of the Bulgarian Turks' everyday life customs, on the population with Turkish national awareness [turcheeshtoto se] and on the Slavonic population, on the development of national doctrines in the postliberation period, on the role of religion and language in the nation's development, on demographic problems of the Bulgarian people in the Middle Ages, and on the Islamization and assimilation processes in the Balkans.

Lukanov Meets European Union Delegation

AU3105161590 Sofia BTA in English 1529 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Sofia, 31 May (BTA)—Mr. Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, today [31 May] received a delegation of the European Democratic Union led by its secretary general, Mr. Andreas Kohl. The delegates are visiting Bulgaria to familiarize themselves with the situation in the country before the elections and with the conditions for holding free and honest elections. The guests showed interest in the political processes which are in progress in Bulgaria and especially in the preparations for the election of a Grand National Assembly.

It was underlined that it is to the interest of the Bulgarian society to hold the elections in a normal and peaceful atmosphere because it would make it easier to achieve national consensus on the country's key problems after the elections and would be an important prerequisite for the activation of Bulgaria's cooperation and integration with the European countries and their multilateral political and economic organizations.

Need for Belene Nuclear Plant Questioned

AU3105184890 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 30 May 90 p 2

[Tsvetan Tsekov article: "Can We Do Without the Belene Nuclear Electric Power Plant?"]

[Text] Many arguments, both pro and con, have been put forward regarding the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant. It is evident that nuclear power engineering suffers from a number of technical imperfections, which, as is known, conceal dangers for ecosystems and man. In 1989, for example, 110 unscheduled shutdowns of generating units were recorded in Soviet nuclear power plants. Of these, 55 were caused by equipment failures and 55 by human error. At the same time, the degree of loading of the reactors had to be reduced on 100 occasions.

Experts from the United States, the UK, Japan, and Finland, and representatives and consultants of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), after detailed investigations, have established a number of shortcomings in the operation of Soviet nuclear power plants: the confusing and complex system of control, lack of modern training aids for personnel, poor provision for their operation on the part of the planning and design organizations, and outdated forms of operational documentation.

The assessment of the VVER-440 reactors by the IAEA commission is highly critical. At the moment, 14 reactors of this type are still in operation: four each in the USSR and Bulgaria, and the remainder in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In the view of the experts, the 1,000-megawatt reactors, generally speaking, meet world standards, but need a number of improvements to enable them to cope safely with unforeseeable emergency situations, to increase their fire safety, and to improve the reliability of the equipment. Among other things, the commissioning of the No. 5 reactor at Kozloduy was delayed by two years because of the hundreds (some say 3,000) of alterations found necessary during the installation work. The same story is being repeated with the No. 6 generating unit.

No rational solutions have been found for certain problems connected with nuclear power engineering, such as the transportation and storage of radioactive waste, which has a half-life of thousands of years. At present, the radioactive waste from the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant is being transported to the Soviet Union. There is information that the Soviet Union has raised the question with Bulgaria that in the future the latter should pay thousands of dollars for each kilogram of waste! Yet here the problem concerns tens of tonnes.

Accordingly, the construction of the Belene Nuclear Plant, equipped with the controversial VVER-1000 reactors, will expose our country to heavy risks. In any case, nuclear electric power is much more expensive that energy produced by classic methods.

The question arises whether we have been overcome by the giganto-mania instilled by totalitarianism with regard to nuclear energy. The United States, with a population of 260 million, possesses 111 reactors, that is, one reactor for every 2,350,000 inhabitants. The Soviet Union has one reactor for every 7.5 million inhabitants. Bulgaria, with a population of less than 9 million, has six reactors, or one for every 1.5 million inhabitants; yet we want more! And this at a time when mankind is making a speedy reappraisal of its strategy regarding the utilization of nuclear energy.

In 10 years time, Sweden will no longer produce nuclear electric energy. Japan, the USSR, and many other countries have substantially limited their programs for building new nuclear power plants. The construction of the Crimean Nuclear Power plant was halted at an advanced stage; in March 1989 the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant was shut down; in October 1989 the second generating unit at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Station was closed down; and this year the No. 2 unit at the Novovoronezh Power Plant is going out of service. It has been announced that construction work is being halted on nuclear power plants in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and near Yalta. As long ago as 1978, Austria completed a nuclear power plant near Zwentendorf to the commissioning stage, but the plant never came into operation because of the insistence of the population, expressed in a special referendum. The opponents of the nuclear power plant won by only 30,000 votes, but their will was respected. Did anyone ever ask the Bulgarian people whether they wanted to have a nuclear energy industry?

According to official statistics, at the moment 30 percent of industrial enterprises, including most of the giant

concerns, lose money. The critical state of the economy, as well as the requirements of the market mechanisms, demand that these enterprises, or at least a large proportion of them, should be shut down. They will, naturally, also disappear from the scene as the most insatiable consumers of electric energy.

There is a further alternative. Our present thermal power stations cause large amounts of pollution. They even discharge much greater quantities of radioactive particles than a nuclear reactor if it is operating normally. However, other types of thermoelectric power plants also exist. To take another example from Austria, after the shutdown of the 750-megawatt nuclear power plant at Zwentendorf, the 750-megawatt Duerenrohr Thermoelectric Power Plant was constructed 30 km from Vienna as the "last word" in thermal power engineering. Its novelty lies in its completely waste-free operating cycle. With the aid of Danish and Japanese technologies, the sulfur and nitrogen are extracted from the waste gases, and all waste products are processed for reuse. At the same time, the power plant is quieter than a moped. It is true that Austria obtains 70 percent of its electric energy from hydroelectric plants, but in any case the energy industry is responsible for only four percent of the atmospheric pollution, whereas in Bulgaria it causes 30 percent. The construction of such thermoelectric power plants is substantially cheaper than a reactor of the VVER type!

The above facts indicate, and even prove, that we can do without the expensive and sometimes dangerous services of the possibly even more accident-prone nuclear power plant. If this problem is not settled by a referendum, then it should be resolved by the future Grand National Assembly.

Agrarian Daily Criticizes Agriculture Minister

AU2805190890

[Editorial Report] Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian on 27 May on page 2 publishes, under the title "Reincarnations of Scientific Ideas, or an Academic Lesson in Political Demagogy," extracts totalling 1,300 words of past and present statements by Professor Todor Pandov, currently minister of agriculture and the food industry, with 200 words of comment.

Under the subhead "Yesterday," the newspaper publishes 1,000 words of "extracts from an article by Prof. Dr. Todor Pandov in the journal IKONOMIKA NA SELSKOTO STOPANSTVO in Bulgarian, Issue No. 3 for 1986, entitled "The April Agrarian Policy—Motive Force and Accelerator of the Comprehensive Development of Agriculture." The article supports the scientific correctness, consistency, and farsightedness of the agricultural policy developed by the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] since the April 1956 plenum. The tenor of the article is reflected in the final paragraph of the quoted extracts: "In conclusion, it may be said that the BCP's April agrarian policy, as developed and correctly implemented, has not only withstood the test of time, but also created solid foundations and conditions for new, even greater advance and progress in implementing in practice new, even more difficult, and responsible tasks in the field of agriculture."

Under the subhead "Today," the above is contrasted with 300 words of "extracts from an interview with Minister Todor Pandov in Issue No. 98 of the daily KOOPERATIVNO SELO, entitled "We Have Real Possibilities for Modern Farming." Here Pandov is quoted as saying: "...I know that one of the main reasons why our country and agriculture have fallen into such a serious economic condition is the failure to respect the views of agrarian scientists and economists. Although the latter offered and defended a number of solutions, views, and proposals whose implementation would have averted a large proportion of the mistakes committed, they were not heard." Pandov is also quoted as saying: "...Today no one has the right to seek solutions to these (agrarian—editor's note) issues through political demagogy and attempts to turn the wheel of history back 50 years."

Under the subhead "Tomorrow...," the question is asked: "What positions will Todor Pandov defend on agrarian issues if he is elected as a people's deputy to the Grand National Assembly?"

In a box insert entitled "Comment from the Editor," Veneta Karavelova makes the following commentary:

"The reader can already understand what political demagogy means. However, it is more complicated when one has to answer the question who will turn the wheel of history back 50 years, and how. If the supporter of these primitive ideas is the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, which is campaigning for ownership to be sacred and inviolable, one wonders how we should define the parties in the civilized European states. How many years have they turned back the wheel of history since they do even not attempt to further develop and provide reasons for new forms of ownership in agriculture."

Family Demands Zhivkov's Release on Bail

AU3005122390 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 22 May 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Complaint of Todor Zhivkov's Heirs"]

[Text] The Editorial Board has received a complaint by Vladimir Zhivkov and Evgeniya Zhivkova, addressed to the Supreme Court of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and dated 16 May 1990.

It is stated in the complaint that the heirs have appointed Sofia lawyer Aleksandur Dospevski as their father's attorney. However, so far he had been denied an opportunity to meet Todor Zhivkov.

After listing various grounds, a request is made to release Zhivkov on bail.

Zhivkov's relatives have also sent an open letter to President Petur Mladenov, with copies to the chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council and the Union of Democratic Forces chairman, in which they appeal for support of their request addressed to the Supreme Court.

In conclusion the letter reads: "After the completion of the investigation, we are prepared to cooperate with the mass media with a view to fully clarifying the truth and informing the public about the forthcoming open trial."

* Text of Grand National Assembly Election Law

90BA0113A Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT in Bulgarian 16 May 90 pp 3, 4

[Text]

Law on Grand National Assembly Elections, Published in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK No 28, 6 April 1990

Chapter 1: General Stipulations

Article 1. The present law settles the procedure for the election of people's representatives to the Grand National Assembly as well as the procedure for the termination of their plenary powers.

Article 2. Elections will be based on universal, equal, and direct electoral rights with secret voting.

Article 3. Every citizen of the Bulgarian People's Republic, 18 years of age or older, regardless of race, sex, nationality, social origin, property status, education, and religious faith, with the exception of individuals under judicial disability and serving the penalty of deprivation of freedom, have the right to vote and be elected.

Article 4. (1) Elections will be held in accordance with a mixed system.

(2) Two hundred people's representatives will be elected on the basis of the majority principle in single-mandate electoral districts.

(3) Two hundred people's representatives will be elected on the basis of the proportional principle in multiple-mandate territorial districts, with party tickets.

Article 5. Every voter will have two votes: one for the election of a candidate in the single-mandate electoral district, and the second for a choice based on the party ticket in a multiple-mandate electoral district.

Article 6. Elections for people's representatives will be held during a single nonworking day for the entire country.

Article 7. Every people's representative will be answerable to the voters for his activities.

Article 8. (1) The cost of organizational-technical preparations for the holding of elections will be assumed by the state.

(2) No fee will be charged for any documents, petitions, complaints, certificates, and other documents as per the present law.

Chapter 2: Electoral Lists

Article 9. Elections will be held on the basis of electoral lists.

Article 10. (1) Electoral lists will be drafted by the municipal people's councils and the mayoralties which keep population census records and will be signed by the chairman and secretary of the executive committee or, respectively, the mayor and the mayoralty secretary.

(2) The electoral lists of military conscripts will be drafted by the respective military unit under the control of the commanding officer, who will sign them. All other military personnel will be entered in the electoral lists of their place of residence. If a military unit is outside the seat of the garrison, they will be entered in the electoral list of the municipality or mayoralty on whose territory the unit is located.

(3) The electoral lists of Bulgarian citizens employed abroad will be drafted in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the Central Electoral Commission, coordinated with the minister of foreign affairs of the Bulgarian People's Republic.

Article 11. (1) Bulgarian citizens permanently residing abroad will be included in the electoral lists if they personally declare their wish to participate in the elections, no later than one week prior to the elections. The voting rights will be noted in their passports.

(2) Bulgarian citizens who have remained more than two months abroad and have not returned by the day of the elections will be deleted from the electoral lists of the country.

Article 12. (1) Electoral lists will be drafted separately for each electoral section.

(2) The electoral list will include the names of the voters who are permanent or temporary residents on the territory of the municipality or the mayoralty. It will include also the names of citizens who will be 18 years of age on election day.

(3) The electoral list will include, alphabetically, the three names, place and date of birth, and accurate address of the voter.

(4) The name of a voter can be entered in no more than one electoral list.

(5) The names of citizens who have lost the right to vote or have died before election day will be deleted from the electoral list.

Article 13. (1) A voter who, during the period from the publication of the electoral list to the day of the elections changes his place of residence for more than 10 days or because of official assignment, has the right to demand of the executive committee of the people's council or the mayoralty in which his name is entered in the electoral list a certificate entitling him to vote elsewhere.

(2) A voter who has been issued a certificate to vote elsewhere will be deleted from the electoral list in which he was entered initially and will be entered by the section electoral commission at his place of residence on the day of elections in a separate list which will be signed by the commission chairman and secretary. This entry will be

made on the basis of the voting certificate issued elsewhere and an identity document. The voter is not allowed to vote elsewhere strictly on the basis of an identification document.
(3) A certificate for voting elsewhere will not be issued on election day.
(4) The municipal people's councils will draft a list of individuals who have been issued a certificate entitling them to vote elsewhere. The certificate will be added to the list.
Article 14. Electoral lists will be made public by the executive committees of the respective municipal people's councils and mayoralties 30 days before election day.
Article 15. (1) Any voter may request a correction of the electoral list by entering the name or deleting the name of the voter, and correction of other errors or incomplete parts in the list.
(2) Petitions may be addressed, in writing or verbally, to the executive committee of the municipal people's council or the mayoralty. The executive committee or the mayor will consider the petition within no more than three days and pass a resolution.
(3) The petitioner may appeal the decision to the rayon court which, within no less than three days, at an open meeting, having summoned the petitioner and the representative of the executive committee or the mayoralty, will consider the petition and make a decision which will be announced immediately. The court's decision will be final.
(4) In military units, petitions as per paragraph 1 will be submitted to the commanding officer. The commander's decision will be final.
Article 16. The original copies of the electoral lists will be preserved until the following elections by the authority in charge of their drafting.

Chapter 3: Electoral Districts for People's Representatives
Article 17. (1) For purposes of elections based on the majority principle, the territory of the country is divided into 200 equal single-mandate electoral districts of equal population size.
(2) For purposes of elections based on the proportional principle, the territory of the country is divided into 28 multiple-mandate electoral districts.
Article 18. The chairman (president) of the Republic will determine and announce the electoral districts, ratify the electoral documents, and determine the number of people's representatives in the multiple-mandate electoral districts, after consultations with the Central Electoral Commission, no later than 55 days before election day.

Chapter 4: Electoral Sections
Article 19. Voting and vote counting will take place by electoral section.
Article 20. (1) Electoral sections in cities and villages will be set up by the executive committees of the respective municipal people's councils.
(2) The executive committee will assign consecutive numbers to the electoral sections.
(3) Electoral sections will be formed no later than 45 days before election day.
Article 21. (1) An electoral section may not include more than 1,000 residents. Settlements with more than 1,000 residents will set up as many electoral sections as the figure 1,000 is contained in the number of residents. If the surplus is higher than 500, a separate section may be set up; if the surplus is under 500, the voters will be distributed among neighboring sections.
(2) By decision of the executive committee of the municipal people's council sections with under 500 and no more than 1,500 residents may be set up.
Article 22. In military units electoral sections may be set up in settlements with no less than 25 and no more than 1,000 voters.
Article 23. In hospitals, maternity homes, sanatoriums, rest homes, homes for the handicapped, and homes for the elderly, individual electoral sections may be formed with no less than 25 voters.
Article 24. (1) A separate electoral section must be set up in a ship at sea, containing no less than 20 voters on board, on the election day.
(2) In foreign countries electoral sections are set up for no less than 20 voters.
(3) Voters in sections as per paragraph 1 will vote for candidates in the electoral district in which the ship is registered and, as per paragraph 2, for candidates of electoral districts as defined by the Central Electoral Commission.

Chapter 5: Electoral Commissions for People's Representatives

Article 25. The following electoral commissions will be formed for election for people's representatives:
1. Central, for the entire country. This commission shall be elected for the term of the Grand National Assembly;
2. District, for each single-mandate and multiple-mandate electoral district;
3. Section—for each voting section.
Article 26. (1) The membership of the district electoral commissions will be defined by the executive committee of the respective oblast people's council after consultations with the leaderships of the political parties.
(2) The membership of the sectional electoral commissions will be determined by the executive committee of the municipal council after consultations with the managements of the political parties.
Article 27. The Central Electoral Commission will be set up by the chairman (president) of the Republic no later than 60 days prior to election day. It will consist of a chairman, two deputy chairmen, a secretary, and 40 members representing political parties and nonparty people. The commission deputy chairmen and secretaries must be lawyers.
Article 28. (1) The district electoral commissions consist of a chairman, two deputy chairmen and a secretary, all of whom must be lawyers, and as many as 10 members, representing political parties and nonparty people.
(2) The commissions must be set up no later than 50 days prior to election day.

Article 29. The section electoral commissions consist of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and from two to five members and must be set up no later than 45 days prior to election day.

Article 30. (1) The sessions of the electoral commissions will be considered legitimate if attended by more than one-half of their membership. Resolutions will be passed by simple majority vote.

(2) The commission sessions may be attended by the sponsors of their respective candidates, in an advisory capacity and with the right to submit objections.

Article 31. (1) The Central Electoral Commission:

1. Supervises the precise implementation of this law on the territory of the entire country and in the electoral sections abroad and provides methodical guidance and control over the activities of the other electoral commissions;
2. Reviews complaints filed for illegal rules and actions committed by district electoral commissions and issues final resolutions on them within 30 days;
3. Registers electoral party coalitions and the colors of the voting ballots;
4. Establishes the results of elections in multiple-mandate electoral districts;
5. Announces the elections results for the entire country;
6. Submits the materials related to elections for people's representatives to the Grand National Assembly to the Electoral Control Commission.

(2) The resolutions of the Central Electoral Commission may be appealed to the Supreme Court which, within no later than three days, at a public session, in the presence of the parties and the participation of a prosecutor, considers the complaint and passes a final decision which is announced immediately.

Article 32. (1) The district electoral commissions:

1. Supervise the precise implementation of this law on the territory of the electoral district and supervise the activities of section electoral commissions;
2. Supervise the prompt and proper setting up of voting sections;
3. Supervise the prompt and accurate drafting and announcement of electoral lists and the issuing of certificates for voting elsewhere;
4. Supply the section electoral commissions with ballot boxes, envelopes, ballots, and record lists;
5. Consider complaints of illegal and improper resolutions and actions of section electoral commissions and pass resolutions on the same;
6. Register candidates for people's representatives and party tickets and announce them to the population;
7. Register sponsors and issue them certificates;
8. Determine electoral results in single-mandate districts, based on the records of the section electoral commissions;
9. Issue certificates to the elected people's representatives in single-mandate electoral districts;
10. Submit the election materials to the Central Electoral Commission.

Article 33. (1) The section electoral commissions:

1. Ensure the free development of the voting in the electoral section;
2. Accept the ballot envelopes;
3. Count the votes and submit the minutes of the results of the votes to the respective district electoral commissions.

(2) In the course of the elections, the instructions issued by the chairman of the section electoral commission are mandatory for all citizens in the voting premises. Such instructions may be annulled by the commission.

Article 34. (1) Members of electoral commissions shall be relieved from their official obligations for the time needed for work in the commission. They will be granted official paid leave for that time.

(2) In the course of the implementation of their functions, individuals who are members of the electoral commissions are considered officials in the sense of the Penal Code.

Chapter 6: Candidates for People's Representatives

Article 35. (1) Anyone entitled to vote may be nominated and registered as candidate for people's representative.

(2) A member of an electoral commission, registered as candidate for people's representative, can no longer be a member of the respective commission.

Article 36. (1) Each electoral district may nominate and register an unlimited number of candidates for people's representatives.

(2) Any Bulgarian citizen who meets the stipulations of Article 3 may be a candidate for people's representative in an electoral district, regardless of his place of residence.

Article 37. (1) The candidates for people's representatives will be nominated and submitted for registration by the leaderships of the parties or the electoral party coalitions.

(2) The stipulations of this law concerning the parties will also apply to election party coalitions.

(3) Should organizations and movements which are not parties wish to participate with their own candidates in elections for the Grand National Assembly or to participate in electoral coalitions, they must register in accordance with the stipulations of the Law on Political Parties. In that case they will be subject to the stipulations of the Law on Political Parties.

Article 38. An individual may be nominated candidate for people's representative by no less than 500 voters of the corresponding electoral district. In that case a written proposal is drafted, signed by them, including the names and the uniform civil number of the voters.

Article 39. (1) In single-mandate electoral districts the parties will register individual candidates; in multiple-mandate districts, they will register electoral party tickets.

(2) A candidate may be registered only in one single-mandate electoral district and one electoral party ticket.

(3) The parties will determine the sequential order of the candidates in the electoral party ticket.

Article 40. If the parties set up an electoral coalition, they present a common ticket in the individual electoral district. In such a case they cannot have their own independent ticket as well.

Article 41. (1) The management of the parties will submit their candidates on electoral party tickets for registration with the district electoral commission.
(2) Candidates for people's representatives nominated by the voters will be registered with the district electoral commission on the basis of a written suggestion signed by the corresponding number of voters.
Article 42. (1) The candidates for people's representatives will be registered in a special registration book after submitting the following documents:
1. A motion by the party leaderships or the voters of the respective electoral district, signed by the number of voters stipulated by the law;
2. Declaration by the candidates that they agree to be registered by the nominating parties, electoral party coalitions or voters.
(2) A candidate must be registered no later than 30 days prior to election day.
Article 43. (1) In the case of violations of the stipulations of the present law, the district electoral commission will refuse to register the candidate, by providing a written explanation of its decision and immediately informing the candidate, the party leadership or the voters as per Article 38.
(2) The refusal as per paragraph 1 may be appealed to the Central Electoral Commission.
(3) With a final refusal, the parties, electoral party coalitions, and voters who have nominated candidates can, within a period of 10 days form the day of the refusal, but no later than 20 days before the elections, nominate another candidate.
Article 44. A candidate for people's representative may have as many as 10 sponsors who assist him in the electoral campaign, represent his interests in dealings with the state authorities, public organizations, voters, and the central and other electoral commissions.
Article 45. (1) During the electoral campaign the registered candidates for people's representatives and the sponsors may not be detained or criminally indicted unless caught red-handed in committing a severe crime.
(2) In the time between the registration and the announcement of electoral results, the candidates of people's representatives and sponsors will have the status of officials as per the Penal Code.

Chapter 7: Electoral Campaign
Article 46. (1) Citizens, parties, and candidates for people's representatives and their sponsors will have the right to campaign for or against the election of a candidate. They may present their electoral programs and ideas verbally or in writing at electoral meetings or mass information media.
(2) The electoral meetings will be held publicly. The organizers will be responsible for maintaining order at such meetings.
(3) People's councils, mayoralties, and other state authorities may not distribute electoral campaign materials of candidates or engage in other campaign activities.
Article 47. The minister of national defense, together with the Central Electoral Commission, will formulate the procedure for the holding of electoral campaigns among military personnel, providing equal conditions for the presentation of the programs of the parties and the candidates.
Article 48. Candidates for people's representatives and parties will have equal access to the sources of information needed for the electoral campaign.
Article 49. (1) All candidates and parties will have equal access to the mass information media.
(2) The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, Bulgarian Radio, and Bulgarian Television, under equal conditions and no less than on one occasion, free of charge, will present the electoral platforms of the parties which have nominated candidates. Any other electoral campaign or advertising for a party or individual candidate through such media will be paid for in accordance with the stipulated procedures.
(3) In the final 30 days preceding the elections, in their broadcasts, Bulgarian Radio and Bulgarian Television will, under equal conditions, in accordance with the number of registered candidates, cover the electoral campaigns of the parties.
(4) During the final day of the electoral campaign, Bulgarian Radio and Bulgarian Television will broadcast electoral appeals on the basis of equal programming conditions and equal time for all parties.
Article 50. (1) During the electoral campaign political parties and candidates may prepare and use campaign materials, posters, placards, advertisements, notices, appeals, addresses, etc.
(2) Campaign materials may be placed at stipulated areas and on walls of buildings and fences by permission of the respective owner or manager.
(3) The municipal people's council will determine the areas where posters and other campaign materials may be placed.
(4) The destruction of campaign materials legally placed is forbidden.
(5) Campaign materials which threaten the life or health of citizens, personal or public property, and traffic safety, as well as materials of immoral content or which violate the honor and good name of the candidates will be removed or confiscated.
Article 51. (1) Results of public opinion surveys concerning the elections may not be made public later than eight days prior to election day.
(2) Campaigning and distribution of ballots may not be allowed 24 hours before and during election day.
Article 52. (1) Candidates for people's representatives will make extensively public the financing of their electoral activities among the voters and to the corresponding electoral commissions.
(2) In connection with the financing of elections, the candidates may not receive assistance, gifts or payments made by foreign countries or foreign juridical or physical persons.
Article 53. In financing electoral activities, the amount of an individual contribution may not exceed 100 leva; contributions made by juridical persons may not exceed 2,000 leva; the sum total per candidate may not exceed a total of 20,000 leva.

Chapter 8: Voting

Article 54. At 0700 on election day, in the presence of the members of the commission, the sponsors and voters, the chairman of the section electoral commission will check the electoral list and the ballot box. This may be done also in the presence of representatives of parties, journalists, and guests. The ballot box will be closed and sealed with the seal of the municipal people's council or the mayoralty, after which the voting may begin.

Article 55. The voters will vote from 0700 to 1800. If at that time voters who have not cast their ballots yet are in the premises, the voting will continue until 1900.

Article 56. The voter will prove his identity with a passport or any other identification document.

Article 57. (1) Voting booths will be set up on the electoral premises. The booths will contain an adequate number of ballots and envelopes. The ballots may be supplied to the voters ahead of time.

(2) During the time that the voters mark the ballots, the presence of other individuals in the booths, including members of the electoral commissions, is forbidden, with the exception of cases in which a handicapped voter is unable to perform the necessary actions in the voting and requires the help of any other voter indicated by him. In that case permission will be given by the chairman of the section commission.

(3) Voting outside the electoral premises and the voting booths will not be allowed.

Article 58. (1) Two types of ballots according to a model approved by the Central Electoral Commission will be used in the voting.

(2) The first type of ballot will list the name of the candidate for a single-mandate electoral district.

(3) The second type ballot will include the names of candidates in a multiple-mandate electoral district, placed in order in an electoral party ticket.

(4) Each party or electoral coalition will participate in the elections with the same color for the two types of ballots. Candidates for single-mandate districts, nominated by groups of voters, will have white ballots.

Article 59. (1) The voter will cast his ballot by entering in the booth and inserting one of the two types of ballots in the voting envelope, sealing it and dropping it into the ballot box.

(2) The electoral commission will record the casting of the ballot in the electoral list.

Article 60. The unit commanding officer, together with section electoral commission, will draft the distribution and schedule for the voting of military personnel.

Chapter 9: Determining Electoral Results

Article 61. When election day comes to a close the chairman of the section electoral commission will proclaim the voting ended. Unused ballots will be wrapped and the packages will be sealed, after which the ballot box will be opened.

Article 62. Representatives of the parties, the candidates for people's representatives, and their sponsors, journalists, and guests may be present at the opening of the ballot box and determining the results of the vote.

Article 63. The section electoral commission will check the number of ballot envelopes in the box against the number of voters based on the electoral list and will enter the results in a protocol, after which it will open the envelopes and put in separate piles the valid and invalid ballots, by candidate and party ticket.

Article 64. (1) The ballots will be considered invalid in the following cases:

1. They do not correspond to the approved model;
2. They include additionally entered names, words, or marks;
3. The ballot envelope contains more than one ballot for different candidates or for different party tickets;
4. The ballots are torn up or entirely defaced.

(2) Any controversy on the validity of a ballot will be resolved by the commission on the basis of a simple majority. Any member may make remarks and enter objections on the resolution. The resolution will be marked in the protocol.

Article 65. (1) When two or more identical ballots have been put in the envelope, they will be counted as one. Surplus bulletins will be destroyed prior to the count.

(2) When the envelope does not contain a ballot it will be considered that the voter has participated in the elections.

Article 66. The ballot count will take place separately for each ticket and each candidate within a single-mandate district.

Article 67. (1) The section electoral commission will draft two protocols: for balloting in a single-mandate electoral district and for balloting in a multiple-mandate electoral district. The protocols will be drafted in two copies each.

(2) The protocols will indicate the following:

1. The time of the opening and closing of the voting;
2. The number of voters based on the general and the additional voting list;
3. The number of registered candidates;
4. the number of voters who voted;
5. The number of invalid ballots and empty envelopes;
6. The number of votes cast for each candidate in a single-mandate electoral district (in the first protocol);
7. The number of votes cast for each party ticket in the multiple-mandate electoral district (in the second protocol);
8. Filed petitions, objections, and complaints and the resolutions on them;
9. The nature of the situation in which the ballots were cast.

(3) After the protocols have been signed by the members of the commission, the commission chairman will announce the voting results.

Article 68. (1) The chairman of the section electoral commission will give the protocols to the respective district electoral commissions.

(2) The second copy of the protocols with all electoral materials will be sent to the respective municipal people's council or mayoralty.

Article 69. (1) The district electoral commission in the single-mandate electoral district will determine the

results of the vote on the basis of the protocols submitted by the section electoral commissions and will make them public.
(2) The district electoral commission in a multiple-mandate electoral district will check the protocols of the section electoral commissions and address them to the Central Electoral Commission.
(3) The representatives of the parties, the candidates of people's representatives, their sponsors, journalists, and guests have the right to be present at the counting of the ballots and the determination of the results.
Article 70. (1) The rayon electoral commission in a single-mandate electoral district will draw up a protocol in two copies on the results of the vote for the district, which will be signed by the commission members. A copy of it will be sent to the Central Electoral Commission.
(2) The protocol will indicate the number of:
1. Section electoral commissions;
2. Section electoral commissions which have submitted voting protocols;
3. Voters in the electoral district;
4. Registered candidates;
5. Voters who have voted;
6. Invalid ballots and empty envelopes;
7. Votes cast for the individual candidates;
8. Submitted statements, objections, complaints, and resolutions passed on them.
(3) The second copy of the protocol, together with the election materials, will be submitted for safekeeping by the executive committee of the respective oblast people's council.
Article 71. (1) The district electoral commission in a multiple-mandate electoral district will draw up a protocol in two copies, which will be signed by the commission members.
(2) The protocol will indicate the number of:
1. Section electoral commissions;
2. Section electoral commissions which have submitted protocols;
3. Voters in the electoral district;
4. Registered party tickets;
5. Voters who have voted;
6. Invalid ballots and empty envelopes;
7. Votes cast for each separate electoral party ticket;
8. Filed statements, objections, and complaints and decisions made on them.
(3) The protocol will be sent to the Central Electoral Commission together with the protocols of the section electoral commissions. The second copy of the protocol, together with the election materials, will be sent for safekeeping by the executive committee of the respective oblast people's council
Article 72. The candidate who has obtained more than one-half of the valid votes cast in the electoral district if more than one-half of the voters recorded in the electoral list have participated in the vote, will be considered elected people's representative in a single-mandate electoral district.
Article 73. (1) If less than one-half of the voters of the electoral district have participated in the balloting and if not one of the candidates has garnered the necessary majority, the Central Electoral Commission will set a new election date within a period of one week.
(2) If more than two candidates have been registered in an electoral district and neither has been elected, the second round will involve the first two candidates who have obtained the largest number of ballots in the first round.
(3) If a single candidate has been registered for an electoral district and has not been elected, new candidates may be allowed to participate in the second round.
(4) In the cases stipulated in paragraphs 2 and 3 the candidate who has garnered the largest number of votes will be considered elected.
Article 74. The election of candidates for people's representatives based on the majority principle will be certified by the respective district electoral commission.
Article 75. The Central Electoral Commission will total the votes cast for each party and party coalition in a multiple-mandate electoral district and make them public.
Article 76. Parties which have garnered no less than four percent of the actual vote in all electoral districts will have the right to participate in the allocation of seats by party ticket.
Article 77. A party or party coalition will be given seats in proportion to the valid votes cast for it in accordance with the computation method approved by the Central Electoral Commission.
Article 78. (1) All complaints concerning illegal actions by state authorities, officials, parties, and citizens related to holding the elections will be addressed to the Grand National Assembly within two months from the announcement of the electoral results.
(2) The commission in charge of investigating the elections for the Grand National Assembly will study the complaint and report its conclusions to it.
Article 79. Within two months after the elections, the newly elected people's representatives will declare to the Commission on the Investigation of Elections for the Grand National Assembly the sources of their financing and their electoral campaign expenditures.

Chapter 10: Partial Elections

Article 80. (1) When a seat of a people's representative in a single-mandate electoral district of the Grand National Assembly becomes vacant, partial elections must be held within two months.
(2) No partial elections may be scheduled in the last six months of the mandate of the Grand National Assembly.
Article 81. Partial elections for people's representatives will be held in accordance with general procedures with the following differences:
1. The Central Electoral Commission must set the day of the election no later than one month before it;
2. The election will be based on the electoral lists which will include the names of citizens who have completed 18 years of age on election day and delete the names of citizens who have lost their voting right or have died;

3. The electoral lists must be made public no later than 20 days before election day;
4. A certificate for voting elsewhere will not be issued;
5. Candidates must register no later than 15 days and announce their candidacy no later than 10 days prior to the election day;
6. The voting sections will be set up no later than 25 days prior to the election day. Within the same deadline district and section electoral commissions will be established;
7. The voting may end even before 0600 if all the registered voters have shown up and have voted.

Article 82. In determination of the mandate of a people's representative elected on the basis of a party ticket, the representative will be replaced by the next candidate on the list. If no more candidates are listed the seat will remain vacant.

Chapter 11: Terminating the Plenary Powers of People's Representatives

Article 83. The plenary powers of people's representatives are terminated with the expiration of the term for which the Grand National Assembly was elected.

Article 84. The plenary powers of the individual people's representatives will be terminated ahead of time in the following cases:
1. Release;
2. Refusal to swear the constitutional oath;
3. Enactment of a court sentence;
4. Death.

Article 85. (1) A people's representative may demand of the Grand National Assembly to be released of his plenary powers should he determine that he is unable to exercise his rights and perform his duties.

(2) The Grand National Assembly will consider the request of the people's representative for release from plenary powers and will make a decision within seven days, if it is in session, or at the next session.

Article 86. A people's representative who refuses to swear the constitutional oath will lose his plenary powers. The refusal must be confirmed by the Grand National Assembly.

Article 87. The plenary powers of the people's representative are terminated if he is sentenced to deprivation of freedom, the execution of which has not been postponed because of a probation sentence or else if he has been sentenced to a more severe penalty.

Concluding Stipulations

1. The present law replaces the stipulations of the Electoral Law (DV, No. 54, 1973; corrected, No. 61, 1973; amended and supplemented, No. 88, 1973, No. 22, 1976, and No. 97, 1978; corrected, No. 98, 1978; amended, No. 91, 1982 and No. 98, 1987) in the section pertaining to the election of people's representatives.
2. The present law will be enacted as of the day of its publication in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK.

The present law was passed by the Ninth National Assembly, 16th session, fifth sitting, held on 3 April, 1990 and was stamped with the state seal.

Government Raises Minimum Pensions to 120 Leva

AU0106214090 Sofia BTA in English 1911 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 1 June (BTA)—The Council of Ministers has adopted a decision to raise the minimum pension rate for some categories of pensioners to 120 leva per month. A draft law amending the Pensions Law has been also approved; it will be presented for adoption to the future Grand National Assembly. The amount needed for the implementation of this project is 248,200,000 leva and 1,239,400 will benefit from it.

It has been decided to work out a system for updating the previously paid pensions which would ensure more social justice in this field. The purpose is to adjust the already granted pensions to the pensions formed on the bases of the wages received for the respective category of work now.

By 30 June a system for the periodical revision of the pension rates will be proposed, the purpose being to make up for the rise in the cost of living and to guarantee a living pension.

The government adopted a decree on granting medicines to out-patients free of charge and on amending the normatives regulating the monthly rate of social relief. Some categories of out-patients will pay 25 per cent of the cost of the medicines they are treated with. Thus the amount allotted by the state for free-of-charge medicines will be increased by 70 million leva. Out-patients suffering from 40 types of diseases, all invalids and, to a great extent, all socially disadvantaged citizens, including children from six to 14 years of age, will benefit from it.

'National Reconciliation' Foundation Formed

AU3005120390 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 22 May 90 p 4

[Text] A "National Reconciliation" [Natsionalno Pomirenie] Foundation has been founded. Its basic goal will be to cooperate in disseminating the ideas of democracy and political tolerance. All political forces that would like to join the foundation can become cofounders. The primary goal of the foundation is to erect at an appropriate place a memorial to the victims of political oppression before and after 9 September 1944.

The daily DEMOKRATSIYA is the coordinator of the foundation until its organizational structure is formed.

The Union of Democratic Forces is contributing 5,000 leva to the foundation.

The "National Reconciliation" Foundation provides all constructive political forces, regardless of their size and political orientation, with an opportunity to participate in deed in the reconciliation process in our country.

Internal Conflict Within Youth Daily Viewed

AU2505145190 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 21 May 90 p 1

[Ekaterina Popova report: "Newspaper Divorce—Bulgarian Fashion"]

[Text] The split within the daily NARODNA MLADEZH is only a matter of days away. Two new papers—the daily MLADEZH, body of the Bulgarian Democratic Youth [BDY] and the nationwide DIALOG—are expected to appear in the near future. The specific cause of the split was the conflict that broke out between the NARODNA MLADEZH Editorial Board and the BDY over a month ago. After the interference of the Parliamentary Commission for Youths, Sports, and Tourism, an agreement was signed according to which the two new publications will be morning dailies and their first issues are expected to appear simultaneously.

The funds, property, and resources of the so-far-only existing youth press body are now being divided. The journalists of the editorial staff already expressed their preferences—85 percent of them will work for DIALOG and 31 percent has decided to join MLADEZH [numbers as published]. A circulation of 125,000 copies is envisioned for the BDY paper. For the time being, the youth daily is supplied with paper sufficient for a circulation of 13,000 copies in the first four days of the week. However, it retains the present Friday edition of DIALOG with a circulation of 300,000 copies. An agreement was signed to divide the subscribers: They will receive MLADEZH from Monday through Thursday and DIALOG—on Friday.

MLADEZH editor-in-chief Valentin Kolev pointed out as follows: "We support the basic BDY principles and are willing to remain the newspaper of this organization as long as our newspaper will be a partner, and not a subordinate of the BDY."

Evgeni Petrov, editor in chief of DIALOG, stated: "We will adhere to one, main line of policy, without supporting anyone's political passions. All youth formations, the BDY included, should have the opportunities of expressing their views on the pages of our newspaper. To begin with, the Sofbulkoop trade cooperative is expected to take over the publisher's rights for DIALOG.

BSP 'Road to Europe' Movement Launches Paper

AU2905114290 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 May 90 p 2

[Text] The first issue of the EVROPA newspaper has appeared on sale. It is a publication of the "Road to Europe," the reformist ideological tendency within the Bulgarian Socialist Party. The paper is a 16-page tabloid, containing a wide range of materials in different genres: topical domestic and foreign politics, humor, European business affairs, literature, European traffic routes, and so on.

In connection with the forthcoming free parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, EVROPA recommends to its readers: "Vote for the party that is keeping to European criteria! You will make the choice yourselves!"

Vietnamese Workers To Leave by 'End of 1992'

AU0206135590 Sofia BTA in English 1231 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Sofia, 2 June (BTA)—The Vietnamese citizens who are working in Bulgaria will have to leave this country by the end of 1992. There is a special schedule for the receiving of the Vietnamese workers' luggage and their processing by the Bulgarian customs officers as well as a schedule for the forthcoming charter flights of the Balkan Airways.

As many as 2,000 people will leave for Vietnam in the first five months and in June another 1,000 people will leave, too. There is a plan that by the end of 1990 other 2,000 Vietnamese workers are to leave for their native land.

This agreement was reached between the Committee of Labour and Social Insurance and the Ministry of Labour.

Bombing in Prague; Political Motives Suspected

'Approximately 20' Injured

LD0206163290 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1600 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] In response to the numerous telephone inquiries we have received from you, we will now give more details on the explosion that occurred in Old Town Square in Prague shortly after 1600 [1400 GMT] today.

An explosive device went off there, placed by an unknown perpetrator in a platic bag along with pieces of lead. According to preliminary reports provided by Dr. Bohumil Sefrna, chief doctor of the emergency service of the capital city of Prague, the explosion in Old Town Square caused slight injuries to approximately 20 people. Six ambulances have taken 11 patients who suffered lacerations from the site of the explosion to the Na Frantisku Hospital, and four children were taken to the hospital in Motol. The most serious injury was suffered by a woman foreign national, who had to be hospitalized at a hospital's eye department. According to Dr. Bohumil Sefrna, another three people were treated at an outpatient clinic of the First Aid Medical Service in Prague First District, and one child at the Na Frantisku Hospital.

Detonated 'Electronically'

LD0206201590 Prague Television Service in Czech 0730 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Here is another CTK report: Federal Deputy Interior Minister Andrej Samel told newsmen the following: The origin of the explosive substance is not yet clear, but it is being investigated by bomb disposal men. I think it is fortunate that the metal pipe was so strong that it did not shatter, he said. If it had done so, it evidently would have acted like a bomb. Thus the explosive device, which was apparently remotely detonated electronically by wires, blew up only in two directions—toward the building of the Czech Minister of Trade in one direction, and toward Zelezna Street in the other, he added. There were several hundred people on the square at the time.

Deputy Minister Samel added that this was the first explosion not only during the election campaign, but also since 17 November last year. It is likely to be connected with the coming elections [next Friday and Saturday, 8-9 June], and therefore an appropriate reaction needs to be made to this effect.

No one has claimed responsibility for the explosion yet, nor was any threat received beforehand.

Loudspeaker Summoned People Before Blast

LD0206203190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1930 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpts] As we have already informed you, a thus far unidentified explosive substance went off in Old Town Square in Prague this afternoon. [passage omitted]

Mrs. Hulikova from Prague, an eyewitness, spoke to the Czechoslovak Press Agency. As she said, she went to Old Town Square on the basis of an announcement which she had heard in the late morning in the town. A female voice from a loudspeaker called on the citizens to come with their children to Celetna Street—we remind you that it is just off Old Town Square—today between 1400 [1200 GMT] and 2000 [1800 GMT], where there would be various attractions and surprises. Nevertheless, when she arrived with her grandchildren in the square, she saw that there was a normal weekend rush there, without the promised attractions. At the time of the explosion she was sitting in the front garden of a restaurant opposite the medieval clock [of the town hall]; an unknown woman who suffered the eye injury was sitting at the neighboring table. The witness confirmed that this woman had spoken in German.

Civic Forum: Attempt To Harm Democracy

LD0206203890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2000 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpts] A so far unidentified explosive device went off near the Hus monument on Old Town Square in Prague after 1600 [1400 GMT] this afternoon. [passage omitted] The coordinating center of the Civic Forum in a statement on the explosion claims that this is an attempt to harm the newly born democracy. It emphasizes that democracy in Czechoslovakia cannot, however, be halted, and calls on all of us to reply in the spirit of what linked us together during the critical days of last November—with human solidarity between people and a resolve not to allow ourselves to be intimidated. With this awareness, we should go calmly and with self-assurance to the elections.

Havel Comments

LD0306140590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1247 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Statement by President Vaclav Havel "via telephone" on 3 June; place not given—recorded]

[Text] I was phoned immediately by General Samel, deputy federal minister of interior, who informed me in detail about everything. Then at 0200 today I also received the federal minister of interior. Therefore, I have a certain picture about everything that was discovered about it and I assume—and said so to the minister and deputy minister—that we should understand this as a kind of test. Somebody is simply trying the strength of democratic power, democratic government in our country.

What matters now is to show to everybody that we are capable of passing this test, that we do not wish to make our country a haunt of terrorists of every possible kind, that we will keep order in our country. And this sort of thing that has happpened in our country for the first time is, at the same time, the last one and everybody will thus lose an appetite for such things.

There are certain circles of people under suspicion, and the entire security apparatus has been working on it really very intensively. I consider it very important to show a strong hand, show that freedom and democracy do not mean in our view that everybody can do whatever pleases them—murder children at random at Old Town Square or make our country a sort of crossroads of international or domestic crime. The fact that it was carried out so close to the elections clearly indicates that one of the probable culprits is somebody from the circles hostile to those in power, and we have to indicate clearly to such enemies that they do not stand a chance.

Officials Condemn Bombing

LD0306150290 Prague CTK in English 1357 GMT 3 May 90

[Text] Prague June 3 (CTK)—Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament's House of Nations Ladislav Lis expressed his conviction today that the perpetrator of yesterday's blast in the centre of Prague, whether a mad individual or a group of people opposed to freshly gained freedom, will be caught and punished.

In a statement, delivered to CTK, Lis said "We must not let ourselves be intimidated by any crazy act. Let us prove that our democracy can defend itself against all senseless acts."

A statement from the Civic Forum coordinating centre said that nothing else but malice and the effort to harm rising democracy are behind this base act. "Let all of us answer in the way that united us in the critical November (1989) days—by human solidarity, calm and determination of all of us not to let ourselves be intimidated."

Vasil Mohorita, the Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, said in his statement he was deeply shocked at Saturday's act of terrorism at Prague's Old Town Square. In his opinion, "the aim of the insidious act was to bring fear, uncertainty and other emotions into the climaxing election campaign." On behalf of the Communist Party Mohorita expressed indignation at the inhumanity of this appalling act.

Preelection TV Roundtable Discussion Program

AU0406103490

[Editorial Report] Prague Television service in Czech and Slovak at 1845 GMT on 3 June begins broadcasting a live "Preelection Meeting" involving 21 representatives from the political parties and movements participating in the elections. The program is presented by Czechoslovak Television's parliamentary correspondents. The main issues to be covered concern the economy, ecology, and social affairs.

The parties' representatives are each given an opportunity to state their party's views on the issue under discussion. Each representative has a maximum of five minutes to state his case. The announcers have the right to intervene if the debate's participants exceed the time allotted to them.

The participants in the debate are: Jozef Kucerak (Public Against Violence—VPN); Vladimir Dlouhy (Civic Forum—OF); Ivan Carnogursky (Christian Democratic Movement—KDH); Peter Lukac (Democratic Party—DS); Vitazoslav Moric (Slovak National Party—SNS); Vaclav Benda (Christian Democratic Union—KDU); Boris Zala (Social Democratic Party—SDS); Vlastimir Medek (Green Party); Jiri Machalik (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—CPCZ); Dalibor Cerny (Movement for Civil Liberties—HOS); Pavel Smutny (Czechoslovak Democratic Forum—CDF); Jiri Kotas (Free Block); Bohumil Tichy (Movement for Self-Governing Democracy—Society for Moravia and Silesia); Miroslav Sladek (Popular Democratic Party and the Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia); Kovac Gusta (Freedom Party); Jaroslav Klouda (Electoral Alliance of Special Interest Groups in the Czech Republic); Jiri Vyvadil (Czechoslovak Socialist Party—CSS); Vladimir Cech (Movement for Czechoslovak Understanding—HCP); Martin Hesoun (Party of Beer Aficionados); Josef Matula (Alliance of Farmers and the Countryside); and Sebok Zoltan (Coexistence, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement).

The bulk of the program is given over to a debate on the Czechoslovak economy. The participants are asked to air their views on the pace of Czechoslovak economic growth. In his statement Vladimir Dlouhy (OF) says, among other things, that reform began with a "restrictive monetary policy" and that it will continue with "changes in ownership" and the "liberalization of prices." Ivan Carnogursky (KDH) says that initially the new government should not talk about the pace of economic growth but, instead, "should initiate a fundamental clean-up in enterprises, organizations, and departments" and only after this has been done should it consider the pace of economic change. According to Carnogursky, the competence of people is most important for the implementation of economic policies. Jiri Vyvadil (CSS) states that, in his opinion, the most burning issue after the elections will not be economic reform but "issues concerning politics and democracy." He wonders if a monopoly on power of one type is not being replaced by a monopoly on power of another. He feels that the next government, which may be of a very different composition, should not be bound by the policies and measures adopted by the current government. Vitazoslav Moric (SNS) states that his party unequivocally asserts "a

republican economy." He continues by saying, for example, that a cow reared on Slovak pastures should be milked in Slovakia and a cow reared on Czech pastures should be milked in the Czech lands. To illustrate his party's case, Vaclav Benda (KDU) cites the example of West German economic growth under the Christian Democrats after World War II and Great Britain's slide toward the verge of economic crisis under the socialists. Jiri Machalik (CPCZ) states that the issue of the conversion to a market economy is just a matter of taking one step because "to think that the market mechanism will have a miraculous effect" is shortsighted. When this new system is established, a system of social "buffers" should be set up to protect the weaker sectors of society from all the "shocks" that will result.

During the course of the discussion, the announcers remind the participants that approximately five to seven million people may be watching, that is, 50 percent of potential voters. As many voters have not yet made up their minds about whom to vote for, the party representatives should be more specific in their replies and should attempt to put across their party or movement's point of view.

Many of the participants address their remarks to Vladimir Dlouhy (OF), because he is the only government member present. He replies that it is relatively easy to criticize him on this account. He states that the task of the Government of National Consensus was to lead "this country toward free elections" and that this task has been fulfilled. He declares that the country must move as quickly as possible toward a market economy. He adds that this "transition will hurt, will mean a certain amount of inflation, and will mean a certain amount of unemployment in the economy." The Civic Forum (OF) is "enthusiastic" about the market economy because there is no other choice. Ivan Carnogursky (KDH) states that the conversion to a market economy has been under discussion for four months, but, in the meantime, the economy is still based on the classic socialist structure with 95 percent of people dependent on the state.

The discussion on the economy lasts for approximately two hours. Each participant awaits his turn to put across his party's viewpoint. Many of the representatives digress from the topic under discussion and have to be reminded by the announcers to keep to the point.

The Green Party representative complains that one of the topics that is supposed to be discussed is the country's ecological situation. After two hours of discussion on the economy, the participants turn to ecology. The format is the same. Each representative takes his turn to state his party's views on the subject. These views mostly converge. Everyone would like to see economic projects being implemented without harming the environment, more resources should be made available for ecological projects, and more money should be spent on reducing the amount of pollution.

The program comes to an end at 2130 GMT with each participant being given the opportunity to make a few concluding remarks on ecological issues, essentially repeating the aforementioned issues.

Havel on Elections, Forming New Government

LD0306184190 Prague CTK in English 1655 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 3 (CTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has said the most difficult task after the elections, due the coming Friday and Saturday [8-9 June], will be to form a new government.

In Sunday's regular radio program, President Havel said that in accord with the Constitution his duty will be to charge someone with forming a new government, adding that he felt great responsibility also because the government will be the main product of free elections of which he is a guarantee. He said the government must be a working body, composed of experts with a clean record, personalities who can work together though they might have different opinions on many things and belong to different parties. He said he saw the forming of a good and strong government as his political test which will show whether or not he holds this post by right and whether or not he should run for the presidential post in the future.

President Havel further said he regretted that a solution to the question of returning part of the property seized from the Church and monastic orders to their former owners was postponed by the parliament, adding he hoped that the new government and parliament would discuss the matter as soon as possible after the elections.

He also said that after the elections he intends to hold a press meeting to inform newsmen of the new structure of the presidential office.

On June 5 President Havel will deliver a pre-election address reviewing the election campaign and summing up developments in society.

Communists Hold Election Rally

LD0206195790 Prague Television Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] An election rally of the Communists took place at the sports hall in Spisska Nova Ves [east Slovakia] today. Vasil Mohorita, first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Executive Committee, was present. Among other things, he stressed that the Communist Party had the right to share in future decisionmaking about our country's fate.

CP Documents on Foreign Currency Found

LD0106201190 Prague CTK in English 1825 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 1 (CTK)—Communist Party spokesman Josef Hora told CTK here today that some incomplete documents concerning the foreign currency economy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ) till 1989 were found.

These documents, found without any connection to the check-up of the People's Control Committee, were not part of the transfer protocol after the new Communist Party leadership took over after the party's emergency congress in December 1989. The CPCZ Central Committee dissociates itself from such practices of the past and therefore these documents were handed over to the prosecutor's office, Josef Hora said.

'Secret' CPCZ Documents Revealed

AU0306151390 Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech 31 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Karel Hvizdala and Libor Sevcik report: "Looking Into Czechoslovak Communist Party Secret Documents"]

[Text] We had a chance to look into files of secret documents from the meetings of the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] Central Committee. These files contained, among other things, a document which may indicate the composition of the real control center since 1989. This center has been looked for—without success—for a long time. As far as we know, the activity of this center has never been officially abolished. We also know that the documents published for the first time today have also been made available to the prosecutor general. Therefore, the prosecutor general is familiar with the names of those who were responsible for controlling the interventions against those citizens who expressed their disagreement with the Communist Party's totalitarian policy.

On 26 January 1989 at the meeting of the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, the contents and orientation of the work of a special group was approved. This group was supposed to help the party in liquidating the increased activity of various civic initiatives. These initiatives were called "illegal structures." The group was established on the initiative of Jan Fojtik and Karel Hoffman. The group consisted of Frana, Hora, Jenik, Kvacek, Pazler, Rias, and Silhavy. They were high CPCZ Central Committee officials. Some of them are still working in this body. This group was created in order to fight against—according to the terminology then—the so-called "anti-socialist forces." It was established as an "internal party aktiv of party and state organs."

The group was obliged to follow and to evaluate hostile activities by illegal structures and to propose efficient countermeasures. In this sense, the group was supposed to make recommendations to the National Front: "To develop its own activities in advance of the activities developed by the illegal structures (self-administration, economy, ecology)." The state organs were supposed to "amend legal normatives in such a way as to make the criminal prosecution of the aggressive antisocial behavior of hostile elements possible; to promote National Security Corps intervention if the situation arises; to order the mass media, particularly television, to organize discussions in which the pertinent officials would—indirectly or directly—react to questions which are the object of the ideological confrontation with illegal structures; to develop an active propaganda and other activity in the international sphere; and to actively participate in bilateral relations between the CPCZ and other fraternal communist parties in West European countries and other political parties."

In the CPCZ Central Committee resolution it is stated, among other things:

"The task of the group is to issue political standpoints regarding the permission or prohibition of public actions organized by illegal structures, or to define specific conditions which must be met by the organizers, as the case may be. The group is also supposed to issue principal political standpoints on foreign travel by illegal structures and by other persons engaged politically in a negative manner."

Based on the resolution made by the Presidium on 20 January 1989, draft measures on "paralyzing the appearances of illegal structures" were presented and approved on 23 January. They were prepared by Jan Fojtik and Karel Hoffman for all areas—mass media, social organizations, etc. This included, of course, state administrative bodies, that is, areas under the jurisdiction of the 13th department of the CPCZ Central Committee, which included the Army, the Interior, the courts, arbitration, the prosecutor's office, the Presidium of the federal government, and also the Castle. After the document had been approved by the CPCZ Central Committee Presidium, Fojtik and Hoffman issued the following tasks:

1. To present a draft amendment to the federal law, or a Federal Assembly legal decree, on the right of assembly and association. Responsibility: Adamec. (As is known, this Federal Assembly legal decree was actually passed later and was known as the "truncheon decree." Some of the deputies who voted for it are running in these elections without getting red in face, despite the fact that the decree was a gross infringement of human rights—editorial note) Deadline: 28 April.

2. To amend the law on the press in order to prevent the spread of illegal printed material. Responsibility: Calfa and Cermak.

3. To amend the codification of administrative procedures and regulations on misdemeanors. Responsibility: Pjescak (CSSR prosecutor general) and Jirecek and Lazar (Ministers of the Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic).

4. To ensure the coordinated activity of organs dealing with criminal activity against the organizers of antisocialist appearances. Responsibility: Pjescak, Kincl (CSSR minister of the interior), Jirecek, Lazar, Kaspar, Cic (justice ministers of the Czech Socialist Republic and Slovak Socialist Republic).

5. To adopt a provision regarding the strengthening of Public Security action units and to provide the necessary technology for them. Responsibility: Adamec, Pitra, Knotek (CSSR, Czech Socialist Republic, and Slovak Socialist Republic premiers).

6. To ensure that employers, schools, and national committees are informed and that they apply the pertinent measures against participants in antisocial appearances. Responsibility Pitra and Knotek.

That is all as far as the first peek into the CPCZ Central Committee secret documents is concerned.

Communist Party of Slovakia Election Broadcast

LD0106134990

[Editorial Report] Prague Domestic Service in Slovak at 0315 GMT on 31 May carries a five-minute election broadcast on behalf of the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPSL). Peter Weiss, member of the Slovak National Council Presidium and chairman of the Executive Committee of the CPSL Central Committee, is interviewed by the CPSL Central Committee press spokesman.

Asked about his view of the difference between a member of the Communist Party before and after November, Weiss says that a post- November communist found that his future orientation was difficult. He goes on to say: "I think that in the post-November party there are simply no career-minded members, since the membership is more likely to result in uncertainty and requires a great deal of civic courage."

The next question concerns the topics in the forthcoming elections, which must be either acknowledged by the communists or from which the communists must clearly dissociate themselves. Weiss says: "As a ruling party, we cannot relinquish our responsibility for the way we have ruled—that is obvious. However, we must resolutely dissociate ourselves from the principle of collective guilt that is being imposed onto us. Thus, from the generational and legal perspectives, it is simply impossible to lump everybody together. In the party there very many brave people who were active in it only because they wanted to contribute through the party to solving social problems. We have parted very resolutely with the former bearers of deformations, both in political and organizational terms. For them there is simply no way back to our party. Those who do not wish to understand what happened and the fact that changes are unavoidable will sooner or later have to voluntarily leave the ranks of this party, because its policy and the ways of its inner life will simply radically differ from that we have known for many years."

The interviewer asks: I will now ask you a slightly provocative question. Where does your certainty that we shall succeed in changing the party spring from?

Weiss replies: "It is not a fatal certainty; it is a conviction based on certain political prerequisites, on the mood in the membership base and on its structure and mainly on the political situation in Czechoslovakia, where a strong left-wing party is now absent, and society does need this kind of a left-wing party. It was precisely this reason that led me to take on the burden of this post, and despite the disapproval—especially from my surroundings, from our political partners, who suggested that we should disband ourselves and thus simply put an end to all this affair—we are attempting to change ourselves, in an appropriate length of time, to the kind of left-wing party which will be a worthy partner to other left-wing forces active at present in Europe."

Asked if he is certain of success, Weiss replies: "No one can be 100 percent sure of anything today. But if I did not believe that we have both external and internal chances to carry out this kind of change, I would not have gone into politics."

CPCZ First Secretary on Links With Past

LD0306135690 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0750 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Election broadcast of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCZ), ballot list No. 10, including a studio interview with Vasil Mohorita, first secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, by unidentified correspondent; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] What was the relationship between you and the former CPCZ leadership in the November days? Briefly, what was Vasil Mohorita's position at that time?

[Mohorita] There are different views about it: One view has it that I belonged through my work above all to the Union Youth; another that I was also active within the party leadership, attempting to introduce very necessary changes in our party—the changes to which I drew attention many times before. I never had a political mentor, and neither did I ever politically follow anybody, because I really tried to do my work, which I liked and was very much interested in.

[Correspondent] By the way, why do you think a conflict between the democratic reform forces in the party and the former conservative leadership is being concealed nowadays? It had such a significant impact on the consequent development.

[Mohorita] My personal view is that it was because the reform forces in the party—and their existence is a reality—were not strong enough to find their way much earlier—especially during those November days—to find their precise and specific way in order to be able to

assume the initiative within the party, to keep it firmly in their hands. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Another question was sent by a reader from Otrokovice, and I have to say that it is quite a frequent one. I quote: I like your election program but, I am sorry to ask, why did you not strive for the same earlier? You had 40 years to do it.

[Mohorita] This is understandable; it is always possible to say to any political party what it did in the past or to advise it what it should have done in the past. What we are saying is that we find ourselves in a new historically specific situation in which we want, as one of the political parties, to attempt to have our own certain realistic influence and share in the processes under way in the republic. This means not to build our program as something which the party will fulfill after assuming power. We are in no way striving for this, and we do not wish to strive for it in the future. This is the substance. [passage omitted]

[Mohorita] I think that the party can be changed and renewed, and that is what I am doing. Understandably this will be a process, and therefore it is not possible to plan that the party will be different as early as next week. What our party needs most is a wide spectrum of views, stances, assessments, analyses of the past and plans for the future to contribute toward forming the party as a new party in new conditions. A much wider differentiation of views within the party would be beneficial.

I also think that a number of unforeseen events can take place, a split of the party can take place, and perhaps even much worse situations can occur. Nevertheless, I subscribe to the view that we have to support all these processes leading to different views in order that the party can really change itself.

Chnoupek on CPCZ Incidents, Past

LD0306172290 Prague CTK in English 1606 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Prague June 3 (CTK)—The decision to elect Milos Jakes Czechoslovak Communist Party general secretary in December 1987 was made by the central committee presidium whose seven members suggested to then party leader Gustav Husak to resign, former Communist Party central committee member and foreign minister Bohuslav Chnoupek has said.

In an interview for CTK, concerning the party central committee sessions in December 1987 and November 1989, at which changes were made in the general secretary post, Chnoupek stated that as usually, the central committee, probably also influenced by Husak's address recommending Jakes, approved this candidate unanimously, and added that, after all, he never remembered the central committee ever disapproving of something the presidium presented to it.

Asked for his opinion, Chnoupek said he had wished a person faithful to the idea of restructuring, and, above all, to the democratization of political life to hold the post. He added that Jakes's address at the session fulfilled these hopes. However, much earlier than Jakes, it was Ladislav Adamec (then Czech premier) and Lubomir Strougal (then federal premier) who supported restructuring and were convinced ahderents of this path. "It will remain a political paradox that the outstanding exponents of the policy of restructuring were gradually shifted aside, were isolated, rid of functions and eventually, under various pretexts in the spirit of the 'best' traditions of the 1950's discredited." Strougal was rid of the post of premier and Adamec, after only nine months in the post, asked to be relieved so long as the leadership intended to hinder and discredit the restructuring program.

Asked about the Communist Party central committee session on November 24, 1989 at which Milos Jakes resigned the post of general secretary, Bohuslav Chnoupek, who was later on expelled from the party, said the atmosphere had been very tense but what was incredible was that Milos Jakes had obviously come to the session with the idea that he would remain in his post.

Taking the floor in the debate, then Academy of Sciences president Josef Riman stated that he had been receiving many letters from scientists demanding that Milos Jakes resign the post of party general secretary. He was the first person to express the idea. Afterwards criticisms followed and many of Jakes' one-time supporters very emotionally called for his resignation. There were also dramatic moments when some central committee members demanded that the radio and television be occupied.

Chnoupek said there had been several candidates for the post of general secretary, e.g. Strougal, Pitra, and Adamec. Recalling the election of Karel Urbanek, Bohuslav Chnoupek said he thought at the time that the post should have been taken by a more experienced politician, for instance, Ladislav Adamec or Lubomir Strougal.

Asked whether he had expected the events in Czechoslovakia to result in such fundamental changes that occurred after November 17 1989, Bohuslav Chnoupek said he had not expected such a fundamental change. He thought renewal would come through restructuring and believed he was not alone to have this opinion.

People's Party Chief Does Not Intend To Resign

LD0106134890 Prague CTK in English 1940 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Prague May 31 (CTK)—Representatives of the Czechoslovak People's Party told newsmen here today that party chairman Josef Bartoncik did not really mean he would resign of his post of Federal Assembly deputy chairman and that he had said it in excitement.

Referring to Mr Bartoncik's interview for the Italian News Agency ANSA carried on May 15 in which he described the campaign against this party as a conspiracy by former communists, now Civic Forum activists, People's Party Deputy Chairman Bohumil Svoboda said that the ANSA correspondent linked the answers into one whole which resulted in "confusion".

ANSA correspondent Lucio Leante who had interviewed Josef Bartoncik told journalists that he had written what had been told and that he had no reservations towards the way CTK had shortened this material. He pointed out Josef Bartoncik had not asked for authorization but, on the contrary, he had wished the interview to be published as soon as possible.

It resulted from the press conference that a complaint had been lodged with the Vienna court in connection with the Austrian Profil magazine which had described some chief functionaries of the People's Party as Secret Police (STB) collaborators in its article published before the interview.

Referring to the legal measure which was not approved and by which 96 church facilities should have been returned to holy orders. The Czechoslovak People's Party officials said this was almost a scandal.

They also spoke about the number of People's Party members which is growing rapidly, and pointed out that by the June 8-9 elections the number will increase from the present 95,000 to about 100,000.

New Wave of Prison Rebellions Suppressed

AU0106160890 Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 31 May 90 p 4

[CTK report: "A Crucial Intervention in Bohunice"]

[Text] On Friday, 25 May, a breakdown in discipline among the accused manifested itself again in Brno-Bohunice. A wave of revolt broke out again on Monday [28 May] evening. The news about the special task force operation in Ruzyne prison contributed only partially to calming down the situation. Since the talks on Tuesday [29 May] with individual prisoners did not have the desired results and since the news about the operation in Ruzyne was not a sufficient deterrent either, action was taken. It was carried out by members of the Bohunice Correctional Institution Corps. Neither prisoners nor members of the Correctional Institution Corps were seriously injured. In Brno-Bohunice, prisoners accused of serious criminal acts committed this year are being held in custody.

Havel Discusses Czech-Slovak Relations

AU0106121390 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 19 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Peter Duhan; place and date not given: "With Vaclav Havel at 2300"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted in which Havel gives his opinion on his predecessor Antonin Novotny]

[Duhan] In your opinion, what should Czechs do to reduce the sensitivity threshold and, on the contrary, what should we Slovaks do to ensure that the sensitivity threshold is not increased among Czechs?

[Havel] I have the impression that the main thing that annoys Slovaks about Czechs is not Czech patriotism; it is, perhaps, Czech paternalism, a kind of looking after the Slovaks. Moreover, for Czechs, Czech is fused with Czechoslovak. This creates the impression that the republic is somehow ours, a Czech republic. It is as if Slovakia only consists of beautiful mountains, which we visit from time to time and where only a kind of dialect is spoken. If it so happens that someone who speaks this dialect begins to talk about a hyphen and to campaign for it and the Czechs begin to ridicule this, an impression of arrogance and of an overbearing and bossy attitude is created. This is exactly what annoys Slovaks about Czechs. If relations between our two nations in our, now established, federation are to be rectified, then the Czechs' main task is to get rid of their arrogant, overbearing, paternalistic, and avuncular attitude toward Slovaks. As far as Slovaks are concerned, they should, in my opinion, cease quantifying their participation in the federation. Let me give you an example. As federal president, I often meet with the view that it has been worked out how many members of my armed presidential guard are Czechs and how many are Slovaks. This is a typical example of quantification. I consider this to be a false method of implementing the presence of the Slovak nation in the federation. I think it is of absolutely no importance whether my armed guards are Czech or Slovak. The main thing is that they are good guards. Unfortunately, we come up against quantification at all levels. There are the endless struggles for parity in which the essential matter is not who the minister is, but whether he is a Slovak or a Czech. I think quantification is a remnant from the era of federalized totalitarianism. At that time, recognition of the Slovak nation and of its existence was recalculated into the number of Slovak ministers, Slovak deputy ministers, and so on. Such a method of implementing national rights seems to me to be a little spasmodic. This is one of the examples which, in the interest of our common coexistence, Slovaks should take note of. There are more of them. But I will not talk about them so that it will not appear as if I, a Czech, am teaching the Slovaks too much.

[Duhan] Let us turn to another topic. The elections are approaching. I think you will agree with me when I say that the role of journalists is extremely important during this period. What, in your opinion, should a journalist comprehend at present and what should shape the core of his moral code?

[Havel] Journalists should understand that freedom is only one side of the coin and that the other side is responsibility. Journalists had no freedom for a long time. Now all of a sudden they have it. They think

freedom means writing about anything without any sense of responsibility. They have to find it again. They have to find it apropos Slovak, Czech, and Czechoslovak statehood. They have to acquire a sense of civil responsibility. They have to learn to weigh up their words. They must not think that journalistic freedom only means chasing after sensations at any price and provoking someone by something at any price. They have to learn to be true professionals.

Slovaks Prefer Czechs, Hungarians to Romanies

AU0106153390 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 19 May 90 p 2

[Unattributed report from the "Mirror on the Day" column]

[Text] According to the results of a representative opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research at the Slovak Statistical Institute in Bratislava, 64 percent of Slovak Republic citizens think that relations between Slovaks and Hungarians are developing unsatisfactorily at the moment, 38 percent of the respondents also see this tendency in relations between Slovaks and Romanies, and 33 percent see it in relations between Slovaks and Czechs. Sixteen percent of the respondents do not see any serious disagreements between the peoples and nationalities living in our state. Respondents expressed their personal attitude as follows toward citizens living in our country who belong to the nationalities and ethnic minorities: 90 percent have a friendly attitude toward Czechs, 55 percent toward Hungarians, 18 percent toward Romanies, and 98 percent of the respondent Slovak citizens have a friendly attitude toward Slovaks.

Significant Drop in Dollar's Market Value

AU0106140590

[Editorial Report] Prague MLADA FRONTA in Czech on 31 May on page 1 carries a 500-word Vladimir Matejovsky report entitled "Dollar Almost for a Pittance." The report deals with the results of the latest, 30 May, "foreign exchange auction." At these auctions, which take place every last Wednesday of the month, Czechoslovak exporters sell excess foreign exchange to the highest bidder. The report says that, in contrast to past auctions when demand for foreign exchange exceeded supply, the situation has been turned around. Whereas at the end of last year buyers were willing to pay 120 korunas for a dollar and in April 1990 still as much as 65 korunas for a dollar, during the 30 May auction, supply and demand "got into balance only for the previously unimaginable price of 39.60 korunas for a dollar." As Matejovsky comments, this was the first time that a "relatively reasonable price" was reached at a foreign exchange auction, even though this price still represents 2.4 times the official exchange rate.

The author mentions that while only companies have had access to foreign exchange auctions until now, from the next auction onward private entrepreneurs who are entered in the company register will also be able to take part. Matejovsky expects that, since many private entrepreneurs "are supported from abroad," this change is likely to increase supply and, hence, drive the price of the dollar further down.

No Visa for FRG Planned

AU0106140990 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 31 May 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Visa Obligation for the FRG To Be Abolished"]

[Text] Bonn—The federal government yesterday [30 May] decided to propose to the CSFR Government that it immediately open talks on repealing the visa requirement for trips lasting less than three months, the purpose of which is not gainful occupation. Government spokesman H. Klein said that the government has not yet fixed a deadline doing away with visas but the intention is to start talks immediately with the aim of ending these talks as soon as possible.

GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *Reportage on German reunification may also be found in the Federal Republic of Germany section of the West Europe DAILY REPORT and pertinent sections of the East Europe JPRS Report. Third country comment is published as available in the appropriate DAILY REPORT or JPRS publication.*

ADN Cites Daily on Bush-Gorbachev Summit

LD0206090190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0159 GMT 2 Jun 90

["NEUE ZEIT on the Washington summit"—ADN headline]

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—[passage omitted]...Of course there is something in it when it is repeatedly pointed out in commentaries in the run-up to the visit how shaky Gorbachev's position is at home. Yet, whoever thought the Soviet president was coming to Washington with bowed head and lowered voice has been disappointed. On the contrary, he self-confidently pointed to his policy of perestroyka which is regarded worldwide as a necessary and desirable element of humanity's political and philosophical potential. This process is not yet finished by a long shot, but something really new is developing and the United States can also play its part in making it happen. These words should above all ring in the ears of Gorbachev's political rival, Boris Yeltsin, who only a few days ago described perestroykas as a "failed undertaking" and called on the president to resign. [passage omitted]

Further on Summit

LD0306220190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1859 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Washington (ADN reporter)—After the summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and the USSR, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, the alliance membership of a future united Germany remains one of the most controversial issues in the dialogue between the two superpowers. It had dominated a great deal of the four official talks, it had been discussed in the more relaxed atmosphere of Camp David, and it had kept advisors and experts very busy. At their news conference today, Bush and Gorbachev put an end to the confusion of rumors about a supposed rapprochement or even a breakthrough.

It was all without drama—it reflected, rather, the matter-of-fact nature of the talks and the respect each man had for the contradicting viewpoint of the other. The discussions continue soon in Copenhagen between the foreign ministers, both within the framework of the two-plus-four talks and in forms and forums that allow all interested European states to be involved.

Bush held to the point of view that a united Germany must be a full member of NATO. He was not sure whether there had been a rapprochement on this issue during his talks with Gorbachev. The Soviet guest clearly stated how things stand: "I cannot say that we have agreed, but this does not mean that our efforts were in vain." Many new arguments appeared, and new possibilities were brought into the discussion.

Gorbachev's words show readiness and hope that movement is possible, though it is conceivable not just from one side. In any case, it was necessary, the Soviet head of state said, to maintain the balance of power that has developed over the decades. If NATO membership remained the only option—and some people wished to force this upon the USSR—the Soviet Union would have to consider its security, the future of its Armed Forces and the Vienna talks.

Everything that happens in Europe is a matter of strategic importance. Gorbachev and Bush totally agree on this. During the summit talks the United States had proposed a solemn declaration by the West to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states that no danger would emanate from a future NATO Germany. For all the good spirit that dominated this summit, it remains more than doubtful whether Moscow will be content with such a vague insurance policy. While Bush considers NATO to be the best guarantee for stability in Europe, Gorbachev insists on an organic integration of German unification into European unification and the CSCE process.

The outlining of the positions held by the United States and the USSR regarding the external aspects of German unification, which took place at the Washington news conference, showed the extent of the problems eventually also facing the Germans themselves. It is their sovereign right to determine their political future—Gorbachev and Bush have confirmed this. This summit again showed more than clearly that this is inseparably linked to duties and responsibilities toward others.

De Maiziere on Summit Outcome, Unification

Says NVA Taking Unilateral Steps

LD0306193190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1818 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Mainz (ADN)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere said the "decisive message" of the U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington is the fact that there are "new, completely different ideas" about security and stability in Europe. It attempted, he said on ZDF this evening [3 June], to define the concept of security "not in military terms and not to reduce it to simply counting missiles, but considerations were made of how economic integration and cultural links like youth exchanges and similar initiatives could create a new balance concept which strives for political, not military structures." De Maiziere added that the decisive thing seems to be that "there has obviously been success in setting clear goals for the

START negotiations, the Vienna talks, and other areas, so that through step-by-step demilitarization, a change in the strategies and structures of the alliances will be achieved." The GDR is already trying, as far as the strength of the NVA [National People's Army] is concerned, to make unilateral prior concessions.

Rejects Notion Bonn To Set Pace

LD3105190290 Hamburg DPA in German 1802 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Munich (DPA)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere rejects the idea that Bonn is to lay down the pace for German unification. In an interview with SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (Friday edition) [1 June] the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] politician said that this applied especially to the date of the first all-German elections and the early declaration concerning the GDR's accession according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, as demanded by the CSU [Christian Social Union].

The East Berlin head of government, at the same time, warned against jeopardizing with premature decisions a satisfactory solution to the external aspects of German unification, thus exerting pressure on the negotiating partners in the two-plus-four process. In De Maiziere's view, this could only be viewed as "blackmail."

"Any forecast, made by whoever, has so far been wrong," the premier said concerning the issue of a date for all-German elections. First, the State Treaty and the currency union would have to be concluded. The head of government rejected the idea of proceeding with the accession and to negotiate later about the conditions.

Says CSCE Can Solve Alliance Question

AU0306191390 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1700 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Interview with Premier Lothar de Maiziere by Giselher Suhr in East Berlin on 3 June—recorded]

[Text] [Suhr] Mr. Premier, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev were not able to agree on the question of Germany's NATO membership. At least new perspectives were mentioned. For you, what is the message of this summit?

[De Maiziere] The decisive message which I have perceived is that the stability of security is considered in a new and completely different way. That is, that the attempt was made to define the concept of security nonmilitarily, and not to restrict it to the counting of missiles, and that a new concept—a balance aimed at political and not military structures, created by economic and cultural ties, including youth exchange and similar things—was considered.

[Suhr] For this, the West would have to redefine the role of NATO itself.

[De Maiziere] To this end, it seems to me decisive that clear targets for the START negotiations, the Vienna negotiations, and other fields of disarmament have apparently been set as guidelines, so that the alliance strategies and structures will be changed by means of gradual demilitarization.

[Suhr] What could be the GDR's contribution to this process? Gorbachev calls for security, but also for justice for the Soviet Union's victims of World War II.

[De Maiziere] Well, for one thing, as regards the strength of the National People's Army, we are trying to make unilateral concessions in advance. At the same time, I think that the things we have tried to implement for weeks—that is, the strengthening of the CSCE process in which the Soviet Union is embedded—will make it possible to solve the alliance question.

De Maiziere Meets Martens on Brussels Visit

LD3105195890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1748 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Brussels (ADN)—Immediately after arriving in Brussels on Thursday evening [31 May], Premier Lothar de Maiziere met Belgian Premier Wilfried Martens for a talk. Martens, who greeted his guest outside his official seat in the Rue Lambermont 1, began by welcoming the German-German unification process in front of the journalists present. He emphasized the need to link this closely to the progressive unification within the framework of the EC. Apart from discussing relations between the two states, this was the main content of his talks with the GDR premier.

Wilfried Martens has recently appeared above all as a committed advocate of deeper political and economic integration within the European Community. On 10 May this year he was elected president of the European People's Party, an association of 13 Christian and Christian-Democratic parties from the EC countries.

The programme for De Maiziere's two-day visit includes extensive talks in the European Community Commission on Friday [1 June]. There will be a morning meeting with Jacques Delors, president of the EC Commission. Afterward further talks are planned which will be attended, apart from by the commission president, by the EC Commissioners Frans Andriessen (foreign relations), Martin Bangemann (interior market) and Henning Christophersen (economy and finances). After a joint luncheon, Lothar de Maiziere will give an international news conference.

As a spokesman for the Belgian premier said after the Martens-De Maiziere meeting, both Christian Democrat heads of government discussed the unification of the two German states from the angle of the GDR joining the EEC. Another topic was the two-plus-four talks. Martens and De Maiziere regarded the CSCE as the ideal framework for discussing this problem with all states concerned. They were of the opinion that in future the military pacts should play a more political role.

Further on De Maiziere Visit

WA0106131290

For reportage on the visit by Premier Lothar de Maiziere to Belgium, please see the Benelux section of the 1 June West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

De Maiziere May Attend EEC Summit in Dublin

LD0106173890 Hamburg DPA in German 1628 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] East Berlin/Brussels (DPA)—Premier Lothar de Maiziere may meet with the heads of government of the 12 EEC states at the next EEC summit on 25 and 26 June in Dublin. FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made the surprise announcement in East Berlin today [1 June] that the GDR will be represented at the conference for the first time. What form this representation will take is not yet certain, according to diplomatic circles.

A spokesman for the Irish EEC Presidency, however, did not want to confirm this in Brussels. The FRG Government has indeed suggested inviting De Maiziere to the EEC summit but Dublin first of all wants to obtain the agreement of all its EEC partners. "We still cannot confirm that De maiziere will be in Dublin," the Irish spokesman said. Irish Premier Charles Haughey will chair the meeting.

Meckel, Genscher To Coordinate Foreign Policies

AU0106125490 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Dieter Kopp report from East Berlin]

[Text] It was the first time Hans-Dietrich Genscher held talks in the GDR Foreign Ministry. However—unlike in the past—no one had to be concerned that his appearance would be interpreted as upgrading the second German state. On the contrary, his meeting with the GDR foreign minister served to organize the growing together of the two German states—as Markus Meckel said at the joint news conference in East Berlin just now.

This was also the main topic of the talks today [1 June]. Hans-Dietrich Genscher briefed his GDR counterpart on the talks he recently held with the foreign ministers of the four victorious powers, regarding the state and prospects of the two-plus-four talks. It is known that the six will meet in East Berlin in June, even though no date has been set so far. The issue of a unified Germany's NATO membership is controversial, even though things are moving in Washington in this respect.

Genscher and Meckel have staked their hopes on the idea that the structures and doctrines of the military alliances will change. There is no longer a basis of confrontation, said Genscher before journalists today. He said that the relationship with the Soviet Union was one of the most important topics discussed today.

[Begin Genscher recording] The Soviet Union maintains good relations with the GDR, and it also maintains good relations with the FRG. Owing to our alliance membership, on the one hand, and our EC membership, on the other hand, the two countries' relations with the USSR are of a different nature. However, they can both be described as good. We both agree that the quality and the level of these relations—and the opportunities they offer a unified Germany—are much larger than would be offered by the sum of the relations of the FRG with the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the GDR with the Soviet Union, on the other, so that German unification could be beneficial not only for German-Soviet relations, but for all of Europe. [end recording]

According to Genscher, one of the key issues of German unification is disarmament, specifically conventional disarmament. Both German states are grateful that the superpowers are trying to reach a result in Vienna prior to the CSCE special summit this fall.

Markus Meckel expressly paid tribute to the fact that Lothar de Maiziere and he were invited to take part in the EC summit in Dublin. Meckel said: [Begin Meckel recording] We have noted with pleasure that a process is developing in which the GDR is consulted at talks on various levels within the scope of the EC. It is important for us, the GDR Government, to take part in these negotiations. These negotiations do not deal with EC membership—however, we must deepen the people's knowledge of the EC in our country, and we must also bring our specific conditions into these common talks. [end recording]

Meckel agreed with Genscher that the alliances should in the future increasingly assume political tasks. Asked about the date of all-German elections, Meckel hinted that there are differences. However, this was not an issue in the two ministers' talks today.

Further on Meeting

LD0106154690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1329 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Excerpt] East Berlin (DPA)—In the view of Foreign Minister Markus Meckel, alliance issue in the process of German unification, which is also decisive for the Washington summit "has started to show some movement." Meckel, who today [1 June] received his Western counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for an official visit to East Berlin for the first time, also announced the start of the GDR Government being included in the deliberations of the EEC.

Genscher explained that GDR Premier Lothar de Maiziere and Meckel would take part "in certain meetings" at the next European summit in Dublin on 25 June. Meckel added that GDR representatives would first of all collect information at various levels within the EC. The participation in the summit, which at first will be limited, had been agreed in Bonn yesterday [31 May] between Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Genscher

on the one side and the Irish President of the Council of Ministers and Premier Charles Haughey on the other, Genscher said.

Both Foreign Ministers would set up a joint contact commission which is to supervise political coordination, joint lines of action, and the allocation of many duplicated functions in the course of which there would also have to be decisions on locations throughout the world. The commission will be chaired by State Secretaries Juergen Sudhoff (Bonn) and Hans Misselwitz (East Berlin).

The issue of the alliance, which dominated large parts of the ministers' news conference had to be solved in a pan-European context. Genscher again stated that the alliances would change. Above and beyond this, each free country could freely choose its alliance. Meckel underlined the importance of maintaining Soviet interests on this issue. It would be disastrous to tack on the alliance issue, on the assumption that Moscow had become too weak. Genscher and Meckel agreed that the alliances were needed for disarmament. [passage omitted]

Two-Plus-Four Talks End Seen by Fall

LD0106160590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1520 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—According to FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the four-plus-two talks could be concluded in such a way that results could be presented to the CSCE summit in the fall.

Genscher emphasized today [1 June] in Berlin after the talks with the Liberal People's Chamber group that the liberal forces of the two German states are on an upward trend. In practice, their unity has long since taken place; it is only still a question of minor organizational questions.

Genscher considers the intention of the East Liberals to structure unity according to Article 23 of the Basic Law to be a commitment to freedom, democracy, Europe, and peace. According to Genscher, the German unification process is not proceeding as a national solo effort but is being "embedded in Europe."

'Concrete Security Policy' Needs Clarification

AU0306191490 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1700 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Initial reactions to the summit also come from the GDR. GDR Foreign Minister Meckel told ZDF that Germany's integration will continue to be a topic in the two-plus-four talks. In this context, the German people's most important task now is to give concrete security policy signals to the East.

German-French Conference Discusses Unification

AU3105100590 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 31 May 90 p 10

[Bernt Conrad report: "GDR: NATO Integration Through Offerto Moscow"]

[Text] Berlin—Yesterday the first all-German-French conference in the Berlin Reichstag building ended in political harmony. Simone Veil, the former president of the European Parliament, stressed the common basis shared by all participants. "The unification of Germany is already a fact—only the schedule is still uncertain." Ernest Antoine Seiliere, chairman of the Economic Committee of the French Employers' Association, drew the conclusions: "We are confident that the things that are good for you are also good for Europe. There are no emotional reservations on our side."

Mrs. Veil noted with satisfaction: "The decision of the government and the parliament of the GDR to agree after unification to having the united Germany be a member of NATO makes the situation clear and does not permit misunderstandings." The Bush-Gorbachev summit will provide further clarity. The French politician advocated the immediate admission of the new democratic states in Eastern Europe into the council of Europe and offering them the prospects of EC membership.

Hans-Juergen Misselwitz, state secretary in the GDR Foreign Minister and two-plus-four negotiator, advocated linking Germany's integration in NATO with an attractive offer to the Soviet Union, which would make it easier for Moscow "to swallow the toad of NATO membership." Moscow must be included in the process of European unification.

Former Hamburg Mayor Klaus von Dohnanyi emphatically came out against a "singularization of the United Germany because of its size." If the European neighbors accept "80 million Germans as normal," the Germans will also be able not to turn this fact into a problem. However, any kind of singularization would lead to a German reaction, which would be detrimental to European stability.

During the three-day German-French conference, the concerns of influential GDR politicians that the GDR might not be able to fulfill its obligations of deliveries to the USSR despite goodwill became repeatedly clear. Edelbert Richter, People's Chamber deputy of the Social Democratic Party, pointed out that 35 percent of the jobs in the GDR depend on the export agreements with Moscow. If the GDR were to stick to these agreements also after the coming into force of the economic and monetary union, this would provide the opportunity to keep weak industrial branches alive, but it would also preserve their noncompetitiveness—an absurdity in times of market economy.

Berlin Border Controls To End 1 Jul

LD0106194590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1921 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—As of 1 July this year, all controls on individuals at the intracity borders are to be dropped. Deputy government spokeswoman Angela Merckel announced this today [1 June] with reference to Wednesday's cabinet resolution.

According to information from the Central Border Command, new additional border crossings from and to West Berlin would be created at the same time. With this, all roads into the city would again be open.

Telephone System To Receive DM55 Billion

AU0106085090 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 1 Jun 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The GDR Will Get The Most Modern Telephone Network"]

[Text] Bonn—The poor state of the telephone system in the GDR will continue for another few years, despite comprehensive emergency measures. According to internal calculations of the FRG Post [postal, telecommunications office], roughly 55 billion Deutsche marks will have to be spent on installing seven million telephone connections and building a modern network.

In any case, the FRG Post will have to make an enormous effort in the GDR. The number of new main stations will be increased from 100,000 this year and 300,000 next year to 500,000 and 800,000 in the following years, and 1.2 million in 1994. After that, 1.4 million telephone connections, and in 1997 as many as 1.5 million telephone connections will be created. A comparison: So far, the GDR installed 60,000 connections every year.

However, in the medium term, the prospects are really rosy. "In seven years, the GDR will have the most modern telephone network in Europe," predicts Gert Tenzer, chairman of the board of the German Federal Post Telekom in a talk with DIE WELT.

Paper Warns of Attempt To Overthrow De Maiziere

LD0206174290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1702 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Suspicion is increasing in GDR Government circles "that there are influential circles who, via the overthrow of the cabinet, seek to bring about a state of emergency in order to achieve still faster unification." This is reported by the liberal paper DER MORGEN in its weekend [2-3 June] edition. Under the headline "Attack on the Premier?" the paper continues: "These fears are based on the increasing calls for the dismissal of Interior Minister Diestel and Justice Minister Wuensche. The next blow would then hit Premier Lothar de Maiziere."

Eppelmann on Need for Two German Armies

LD0106163290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1559 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Hamburg (ADN)—There will have to be two German Armies for the period of time between the day of German unity and the coming into effect of a European security system. Anything other than the Bundeswehr in NATO and a nonaligned NVA [National People's Army] could not be politically acceptable, Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann said to BILD newspaper (tomorrow's edition). He had the impression that such a possibility was also now being considered in Moscow. However, one Army in the two alliances would be the variant that he himself would prefer, the minister stated. However, this necessitates the prerequisite of a guarantee from the two sides, binding under international law, on a fundamental renunciation of violence. Such a development, Eppelmann stated, would gave the necessary impetus for a new pan-European order, including the Soviet Union.

Alleged NVA Bugging, Detecting Role Denied

LD0106154790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1432 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The National People's Army [NVA] has not taken over and put into operation any bugging and detecting offices of the former state security, the Disarmament and Defense Ministry announced today [1 June] in a press statement. It was thus denying assertions in the TAGESSPIEGEL and in the WELT AM SONNTAG, according to which the NVA had taken over such installations and was thus continuing to bug radio and telephone communications in the FRG.

The information disseminated by the WELT AM SONNTAG according to which the NVA had taken over the bugging equipment in Rhoen in Thuringia directly on the intra-German frontier was also not in accordance with the facts. The statement says the following on this subject: "Here it is apparently a question of the Erbenhausen installation. The bugging devices existing in this installation were dismantled, and secured by the NVA by February 1990 and at present they are being scrapped."

Theft of Explosives Attributed to Army Members

AU0206200990 East Berlin BERLINER ALLGEMEINE in German 30 May 90 p 2

[ADN report: "Intensive Investigations of the Criminal Police: Indications—But No Hot Trail"]

[Excerpts] Jena—Despite numerous indications, the police lack a "hot trail" of the theft of about 40 kg of explosives from the underground depot of the National People's Army in Grosseutersdorf near Kahla. However, according to findings so far, it is certain that the perpetrators came from Army circles.

This was stressed by Kurt Liebmann, head of the Gera Bezirk Criminal Office. In his view, the suspicion, which was expressed among the public, that former State Security Service members were involved is completely unfounded.

The theft was possible only with the support of people who work at this facility. The technical safeguards and the permanent guarding on the outside would have made it impossible to enter the facility without help from the inside. [passage omitted]

As Liebmann stressed, this is a case of extraordinary dimensions. The stolen explosives are suited to carry out serious terrorist attacks, he said.

Gysi's Open Letter to SPD Published

AU3105074390 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 29 May 90 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Open letter by the Chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism to the Social Democratic Party in the GDR and the FRG: Do We Have the Right To Leave Historic Opportunities Unused?"]

[Text] I.

I note with great concern that leading politicians of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] in the GDR and in the FRG are pursuing a policy of enmity toward the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] and that the SPD in the GDR considers the Christian Democratic Union of Germany [CDU] and the German Social Union [DSU] more and more clearly as its natural allies. In its own words: "The PDS is the opponent, the other parties are competitors."

So far I have said little on the relationship between the SPD and the PDS, because I thought that this has something to do with the history of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and thus is a question of time and of the credibility of the renewal process in the PDS. But the historical periods are shifting. The CDU and the Free Democratic Party [FDP] in the FRG are setting a pace in the unification of the two German states, which overtaxes the people and does not leave us any time to think about each other in a sensible and orderly way. If leftist ideas and the social question are not to become insignificant for an extended period, we, too, have to think and act more quickly and use historic opportunities.

II.

The verbal accusations of the SPD against the PDS can be summarized as follows:

The SED has a history that excludes any kind of cooperation. This also goes for the PDS because it is the SED, said an SPD deputy in the People's Chamber under the vigorous applause of the right: "The PDS, or whatever the SED is calling itself...."

This argument does not stand up to any thorough examination. There are hardly any direct accusations against the program and the policy of the PDS.

As regards the renewal process in the PDS:

1. The PDS has a completely new program and a new statute, which is fundamentally based on grass-roots democracy.
2. The PDS has come to term with its history to a considerable degree.
3. The PDS has a completely changed membership structure as a result of withdrawals, expulsions, rehabilitations, new admissions, and readmissions. This includes the fact that three-quarters of the PDS voters never were SED members.
4. The PDS has given up most of the SED's property (financial and material) on the basis of its own decisions, and without being legally obligated to do so.
5. The people in the new PDS leadership are leftist politicians of integrity, who stand for the renewal of the party. Their backgrounds are very different, but the composition and the majority conditions alone are very expressive.

All this can be considered insufficient, but it cannot be considered non-existent or insignificant. In all this, the nature of the process and the briefness of time are to be taken into account.

The history of the SED, however, is also the history of the former bloc parties. Or did these parties not vote in the Council of Ministers for the Penal Code or for the Decree on the Limitation of Residence (the basis of forced resettlement)? For years, the Justice Ministry and the Supreme Court were in the hands of former bloc parties. Of course, the degree of responsibility is different. But they were never uninvolved. And what about points two, three, and four in their case? Are there any expulsions or rehabilitations? Is there a history committee or something similar in their parties? And has any of these parties hesitated for just one moment to continue governing? Since 1949, the CDU and the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] have participated in government coalitions without any interruption. Are the CDU or the FDP in the FRG bothered by the past of their sister parties? Not at all. It is planned to merge with them as quickly as possible, and before that they are getting any kind of material and ideological support.

The CDU in the FRG formerly refused to have any contacts with the CDU in the GDR; the FDP had had contacts with the LDP for quite some time and has now intensified them. Today, however, the state of relations is equal in both cases. In particular, the way in which the former bloc parties are cutting the PDS shows that, in contrast to the PDS, they do not admit their history. To avoid any misunderstandings—it is the business of these parties, which have been democratically legitimated by the elections on 18 March, whether and how they renew themselves or just turn around. I am not aiming at

individual persons in these parties, some of whom I even hold in esteem, but rather I aim at the SPD.

Why is it looking for comprehensive cooperation with these parties and does not have any problems with their past, but rejects any kind of cooperation with the PDS?

The accusation of the GDR's SPD concerning the PDS becomes even more incredible if one knows about some of its advisers. Advisers of the foreign minister, for instance, were involved in banning a scientist from exercising his profession and in disciplining a member of the Presidium of the PDS Executive Committee, just because he spoke out against the ban of SPUTNIK. The list of these examples could also be continued concerning other parties. Not a few of former or expelled SED members, who held more responsibility than the current PDS members, are today advising and supporting other parties. We are paying also for their responsibility. By leaving the party, they have avoided their responsibility, and in the end, this is accepted by the SPD.

In this connection, the behavior of some people in the FRG's SPD cannot be assessed as any more ethical. For years they had extremely close contacts with the SED leaders. In contrast to others, I still consider this correct even today, because these contacts benefited the people in the GDR. The relations were so close that a joint document on the conflict of ideologies was drawn up. This had a very positive effect within the SED. I remember well how we discussed it and how much more clearly demands within the SED were raised subsequently. The document clarified the contradiction between the statements of the SED leadership and its policy, for instance as regards the ban of SPUTNIK. However, it is also known that there were many SPD politicians (by the way, also politicians of other parties in the FRG), who were eagerly trying to be photographed with Erich Honecker in order to satisfy their own sense of importance and to appear in the media. I am supposed to believe their ethical motives when they refuse any contacts with the PDS?

III.

Thus, what are the real reasons for the SPD's total rejection of the PDS? In my view, one has to understand that the SPD is an election campaign party—that is, that it thinks that the only really important thing is parliamentarism. Therefore, its policy is primarily determined by assumed election chances—of course while observing a basic political direction. Obviously, leading SPD representatives now assume that it is impossible to win a large number of votes among conservative voters. If, however, it were possible to extremely discredit the PDS or even liquidate it, whom should the almost 1.9 million voters then vote for? Would they not become the famous "vote-for-the-lesser-evil voters" of the SPD? Thus, our voters are the crux of the matter. This makes the actions of the SPD very dubious, in my view. In addition, it seems to me that they are thinking short-sightedly and contrary to history. The German and European left will include social democrats, democratic socialists, ecological leftists, and democratic communists. Together they can achieve much; against each other they can do only little. Positive experiences have been gained not only in France and Italy. In particular since the SPD wants to have more and more influence in the "center," it cannot at the same time be the political home of all leftists.

IV.

Of course, the leading people of the SPD in the GDR and in the FRG have to take into account the mood among their members and followers. But it depends on whether feelings of enmity or a critical view and support of our renewal process are promoted. Quite a few representatives of Alliance 90 and the Greens have started to approach the second alternative, even though they suffered more under the policy of the SED. The latter does not apply at all to the representatives of the FRG SPD, anyway, so that their outbursts are hardly understandable for me.

V.

I have already pointed out that our own timeframe for thinking about ourselves is shortened by others. No one knows whether there will be results of local elections once again on GDR territory within the foreseeable future, results which facilitate cooperation or at least mutual tolerance of SPD, Alliance 90, Greens, and PDS. Does this not mean missing a historic chance for a local policy that is really close to the citizens? Could not all reservations within one's own ranks be gradually reduced by such a policy? No one will forgive us if we do not seize this opportunity.

VI.

How ineffective the SPD will be in coalitions with the CDU is shown by the government coalition in the GDR. The process of German unification offers the great historic chance of letting a new Germany emerge, which considerably improves the living conditions for the people in both German states and promotes the process of European unification. But the SPD approves the GDR's accession to the FRG via Article 23 of the Basic Law and thus reduces the chances of working out a new Constitution, which could take over the basic rights from the Basic Law, but supplement parliamentarism with grass-roots democracy; include the right to work and environmental protection; give the wage-earners more opportunity to participate in determining and deciding the production process as regards decisions involving investments, rationalization, and closing down businesses; regulate the ban on lock-outs; guarantee the women's right to determine themselves whether they want to be mothers; etc. A majority of the People's Chamber members refused any discussion about the GDR draft constitution of the Central Roundtable, even against the votes of the Social Democrats. How much did the SPD resist? Is it officially participating in the current

collection of signatures? Does it make this elementary matter a vital issue of the coalition? All this did not and does not happen.

And the State Treaty—who will protect the GDR domestic market and thus the enterprises and agriculture. The list of examples could be continued. Not the GDR's SPD, but Oskar Lafontaine criticized the State Treaty, which has been signed, because it lacks effective protection of the GDR enterprises, thus accepting unnecessary mass unemployment in the GDR.

Concerning the process of European unification, it is obvious that German membership in NATO would lead to a complete shift in the balance of powers and to a new political-military structure in Europe. Citizens' movements, SPD, and PDS together could prevent this and strive for a peace treaty which would really put an end to World War II and the cold war. Instead, the SPD agrees with Germany's NATO membership, even though with certain undetermined restrictions.

VII.

The main demands of the SPD in the GDR and the FRG, however, are currently aimed at the expropriation of the PDS. While the SPD in the FRG also demands the expropriation of the former bloc parties, the SPD in the GDR is prevented from this by its coalitions and limits itself to the PDS. Since this is, after all, an internal affair of the GDR, the issue will be only the property of the PDS. The goal is to liquidate the PDS because no party can exist without money. The PDS could no longer pay for staff, rents, energy bills, telephone rates, its own newspaper, election campaign in the laender or for an all-German parliament—in short, it could not pay for anything. State subsidies—as they are usual in the FRG—are not to be expected for the PDS nor is support by a sister party from the FRG, as is generously received by the CDU, Liberals, and SPD at the cost of the FRG tax payers. Remarkable about this demand also is the fact that it was first made by the SPD and then taken over by the CDU in the FRG. According to FRG law, expropriation presupposes making the PDS illegal, and this is precisely the goal of this demand. Is the elimination of a left, socialist, democratically renewing party justified just to gain votes, provided that the voters would ever forgive the SPD? The historical guilt would be great, comparable with the agreement to pay the war loans of 1914 and the crushing of the revolution of 1918/19. Only three times in German history have workers parties been expropriated—by the Socialist Law, in 1933 by the Nazis, and the Communist Party of Germany in the FRG in 1956. Should the young democracy and political pluralism in the GDR at the very beginning be disturbed to such a considerable extent by continuing such unfortunate traditions?

VIII.

Now that I have mentioned the real motives for the calls for the expropriation of the party's assets, I will now also deal with the arguments the SPD is using:

1. The SPD claims that the assets of the PDS originate from the SED. In reality, however, there are two main sources for the party's assets: The membership fees and profits from former party enterprises. The party received the enterprises through orders of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany as a compensation for the 1933 expropriation and the suffering of its members during the Nazi era. The same applies to buildings. Thus, the rights of the allies and the results of the defeat of German fascism are also involved here. Later the SED used the money to buy property. Through the payment of high membership fees (between 0.4 and three percent of the gross income, with the latter percentage being paid by people who earned 1,200 marks [M] and more) by 2.3 million members, the party received M700 million every year.

2. In part, there are unclear issues concerning legal entities, and there is legally unresolved property. In all these cases, we gave away the property. This also applies to all buildings which were taken over lawfully but free of costs, even if the party invested a considerable amount of money at a later date. If we have overlooked something in the course of our investigations, we are, of course, willing to give up such property in the spirit of our renewal.

3. The SPD claims that the PDS wants to be a new party and have nothing to do with the SED but wants to keep its assets.

Apart from the fact that it is strange for a party that denies that we are a new party to use this argument, this issue is of ethical significance. The PDS wants to have something to do with the SED in so far as its original ideals and its joint history are concerned. As the SED's legal successor, it assumed all its obligations. The SED did not only have high revenues, but also high expenditures. These expenditures are still covered by the PDS alone. We have accepted responsibility in this field as well. The 44,000 full-time employees of the SED have meanwhile been reduced by 34,000 employees, to whom we have to pay transitional allowances or early retirement allowances. The remaining 10,000 full-time employees receive reduced wages, and if we further reduce our personnel, we will have to pay transitional allowances or early retirement allowances in accordance with the existing law. The same applies to workers in party enterprises that are no longer needed. In the case of the expropriation of PDS enterprises, the state would have to assume these payments. The maintenance of buildings is expensive and will be even more expensive in the future. This is true, despite the fact that we have given away and swapped buildings or shared their use with others.

The Institute for the History of the German Workers Movement can be compared with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the SPD in the FRG, except that the institute does not receive any public funds, as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation does. The institute maintains a valuable archive and a valuable library with

original manuscripts by Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and other figures of the workers movement. Transforming this into national property would burden the budget and finally give way to the privatization of these documents, as a result of which they would ultimately be spread all over the world. Even members of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation have pointed out this danger.

The party's expenses are far higher than its revenues, because revenues now result exclusively from reduced membership fees by a considerably smaller number of members. The party no longer receives any profits from party enterprises because these enterprises have been given away or yield no profits.

In addition, the argument does not even tell half the truth. It conceals the fact that, with the exception of three publishing houses and three printing companies, the party has given away all Zentrag enterprises for free. The party did this—despite the fact that they were still largely supported by us until March—to abolish the media monopoly, to limit the party's economic activities in the course of the renewal, and to reduce it to the level that is prescribed by the party law.

This represented a deviation from the former SED policy. This also applies to the giving up of the majority of the guest houses and recreation homes, and other buildings.

4. Finally, the SPD claims that the PDS should pay reparations because of the SED's policy.

Besides the fact that the state has the sole legal responsibility, this has indirectly been done. We placed the entire financial reserves of the party—amounting to over M3 billion—at the state's disposal. This is much more than we received, as the official balance sheet shows. We wanted the money to be used for social and other purposes. The Council of Ministers decided on the use of the money. Where no decision has yet been made, we support the establishment of a fund for the victims of Stalinism.

The remaining assets of the PDS are constantly diminishing because its expenses are much higher than its revenues at the moment and probably for a long time to come.

Now I am facing the allegation that our party's giving away the financial and material assets has strengthened calls by others for the expropriation of our assets. Until that time there were hardly any such demands. However, I am convinced that our decisions were right and ethically justified. The remaining part of the party's property is vital for the party and necessary for it to meet the old obligations that it has assumed. By the way, it would have impressed me if the FRG's SPD had confronted Erich Honecker with calls for the expropriation of SED property a year ago. At this point, such a demand is neither very courageous nor justified.

However, dear SPD comrades, these are not really the crucial questions. As already pointed out—you are aiming at our destruction. Maybe you want to induce us to resort to some kind of trick, of which we might be accused later and which might be used against us. The liquidation of the PDS would not only be a disaster for us, but for you as well. Just recall what consequences the so-called radicals decree—issued by an SPD-led government—had for the entire political culture in the FRG, not least for the SPD. You would heavily burden yourself with guilt toward the German and European left, but also toward individual figures.

I am asking you: Who has the right to deprive our Comrade Walter Janka, for example, and the others who were imprisoned by the Nazis and in the GDR for their political convictions, of their new political home?

Instead of making use of a historic opportunity, some SPD officials are now ruining it. The members, supporters, and voters of the PDS will certainly not accept the expropriation of its assets, the party's criminalization or attempts to make its assets appear illegal without any resistance. However, I still hope for reason and moderation. Otherwise, a confrontation with far-reaching consequences might result, from which only right-wing forces would benefit.

Gregor Gysi

PDS To Fight Liquidation Attempts

LD0106120590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0950 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] will not allow any attempt to liquidate it without a struggle, stated PDS Chairman Gregor Gysi at a news conference in Berlin, referring to the People's Chamber resolution on party assets. This decision was irreconcilable with a state based on the rule of law. The presidium of the party executive had called for a protest rally in Berlin tomorrow [2 June]. The People's Chamber decision on the control of party assets was aimed at the expropriation of the PDS, its liquidation and banning. With the decision, fears in Europe and the world about German unification were confirmed. This step was also aimed against the policy of perestroyka.

Gregor Gysi reported massive threats against himself and PDS institutions. He received a noose and rat poison as well as anti-semitic letters. The party was strongly warned to adhere to its plans of expanding to FRG territory.

Gysi described the parliamentary decision as undemocratic. What was decisive for him was that the party administration on a trust basis did not allow any possibility of deciding about its assets. The decision would allow restrictions on the PDS' financing of elections to such an extent that it would inevitably be defeated.

Call To Dismiss Justice, Interior Ministers

LD3105113490 Hamburg DPA in German 1048 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] East Berlin (ADN)—The party council of the GDR-Social Democratic Party is calling upon Premier Lothar de Maiziere (Christian Democratic Union) to dismiss Justice Minister Dr. Kurt Wuensche (League of Free Democrats) and Interior Minister Peter-Michael Diestel (German Social Union). They were "miscast" and "demonstrated neither the intention nor the ability to implement the process of democratization in our country," according to a press statement in East Berlin today [31 May]. Therefore the creation of democratic structures and the suppression of the old apparatus necessary for this are not being consistently followed through.

State Emblem Removed From People's Chamber

LD0106170890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0833 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The state emblem was removed from the end wall of the People's Chamber before its 10th session [this morning]. The entrance to the parliament opposite Berlin cathedral and the doorway of the State Council building have been "freed" of this symbol. The hammer, compass, and garland of corn however still hang resplendent on the front side of the Palace of the Republic and the headquarters of the Council of Ministers.

Horn Evaluates Summit, Yeltsin Role

LD0206182190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1505 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, by Jozsef Laszlo on the "168 Hours" program on 31 May; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Laszlo] Prior to the current U.S.-Soviet summit meeting, the international press was hardly enthusiastic, and the experts were not so eager; rather they were pessimistic, since they said that Gorbachev is not in a good situation. His home territory, to put it mildly, is not the most stable, and this meeting means a lot to him, since by this he can hopefully increase his prestige at home.

[Horn] Look, it is a fact that uncertainty is great in the Soviet Union. Internal instability has increased greatly. I feel, as events progress, that we are witnessing the developments of multi-polar relations of powers. At the same time, I would not—and I am referring to certain opinions—confuse this with the significance of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. The Soviet-U.S. summits no longer have the same earth-shaking—I cannot find a better expression—significance that they had in earlier years, or when the series of meetings began.

It is generally known that at the talks in Vienna on reducing conventional weapons and Armed Forces, at the Geneva discussions, and most recently at the experts' discussions in Budapest in connection with Open Skies, there appeared a growing passiveness in the Soviet attitude over the past weeks and months. Such a summit meeting is extremely important, in order to give renewed impetus to these talks. I am thinking, first and foremost, of the Geneva discussions on strategic weapons limitation.

Therefore, I would separate these two elements from the possible impact the summit might have on the Soviet Union's internal situation or power-relations.

[Laszlo] To what extent might the appearance of Boris Yeltsin at this forum—he is not there in body, but he is nonetheless there at the summit, as there is a new situation within the Soviet Union—influence this current summit meeting, and, in the long term, the Soviet Union's internal relations?

[Horn] No matter how important the position might be that he has gained, Boris Yeltsin still is not the number one leader of the Soviet Union, although the Russian Federation might have exceptionally great importance within the Soviet Union. The radicalism of Boris Yeltsin is well known. There are a great many sympathetic features in his radicalism. If we look back at the past five years, one of the major negative aspects of the changes in the Soviet Union has been that a great many things have happened, but in the economic sphere and in several other spheres, substantive changes, important changes perceptible to wide circles of the population and society, have not taken place. Therefore, there is a growing need for radical changes, so that the Soviet Union can really set forth on the path of far-reaching renewal. In this, the role of Yeltsin could be an important factor.

Foreign Ministry Official on Summit

LD0206183790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1505 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Interview with Tamas Katona, political state secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, by unidentified reporter on 2 June; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] To a considerable extent, Europe (us) was discussed at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Washington in a manner whereby we were unable to have a say in the matter. Was this one of the final such discussions of an era which is passing, or will it be necessary to expect in the future, too, that decisions and viewpoints of this type, taken by great powers, will determine the fate of the continent?

[Katona] I believe that a new great power is being formed on the continent: the 12, the European Community. Starting in 1992, there will scarcely be a need to try to reach agreements over the head of Europe, as has happened now, as happened earlier. Indeed, it can already be seen now that perhaps the most interesting agreements were not so much European agreements of this type, but the two enormous empires' agreements regarding one another. If results were achieved somewhere, perhaps they were achieved in this sphere.

[Reporter] Gorbachev can register success at this meeting, but will this success be sufficient for even the coming weeks? He must face very tough internal political challenges: in the Baltic crisis, the Armenian disturbances which are flaring up again in the south, and in the person called Boris Yeltsin, among other things.

[Katona] Contrary to many people, I am of the view that even if Yeltsin's election victory is a considerable—allow me to use a fashionable word—challenge for Gorbachev, it also constitutes a sort of success for Gorbachev. Obviously, this person is caught horribly between the devil and the deep blue sea. There is terrible internal and external pressure on him. Such uncertain situations generate the old, bad, absolutist reflexes from the conservatives—that some kind of tough policy is necessary.

The United States wishes for Gorbachev to survive this crisis, because as long as Gorbachev is there, the Soviet political position will be predictable to some extent. They are able to size him up. It is entirely uncertain who will come after him. It might take one or two years for the situation of a new person to consolidate from this liquid state. Until then, it will be virtually impossible to take any steps forward.

That is why there is firm pressure from the West on East Europe, that the structure of the Warsaw pact basically not be overturned.

I consider it a big move by Gorbachev that the Russian Republic has come into existence within the Soviet Union. It can now be said that this Russian Republic is not interwoven with the Soviet Union itself. There is a separate Russia which does not exercise supremacy over the others—which makes it possible for a much looser federation to come into existence at the appropriate moment, in place of the current Soviet Union, which is still Stalinist. This position of republic president has been won by Yeltsin, an extremely interesting populist, a radical leader, who is necessary as a kind of counterweight to the conservative forces on the other side, so that the weight of those forces should not pull Gorbachev in their direction, so he can choose between a balancing and tactical role. Now he [Yeltsin], too, must think about what he says, and how.

[Reporter] A delegation of the Hungarian Government and the interim president of the Republic will visit Moscow next week. They will not be in a very easy situation after the rather sharp debate, which the Hungarian Parliament conducted about leaving the Warsaw Pact and after the reactions, the reactions of rejection, which have come partly from the East and partly from the West in connection with this matter. It will not be easy to represent a firm position. What does the Hungarian Government expect at next week's talks?

[Katona] First and foremost, that the other delegations will be the highest-level ones, and that the delegations from all the small countries at this meeting will endeavor to reaffirm their own sovereignty. In other words, they will adhere to maintaining and reforming the current state of the Warsaw Pact, but in practical terms all sorts of measures and initiatives are expected from all of them, which will enable them to practice to the greatest possible extent their own foreign policy and economic policy concepts, and to try to the greatest possible extent to make their Armed Forces independent of the Warsaw Pact.

The situation will not be one of the Hungarians again falling out of line; everyone will demand this reorganization. I consider it a very clever thing for us to be represented by a highest-level delegation, because much more can be achieved by our going over there, and even saying awkward things, than by our not going there, or by our being represented by an unsuitable delegation—by this we really would achieve rash measures, let us say of economic reprisal, from the Soviet side.

[Reporter] Is there a real danger of this?

[Katona] This is a matter which the Hungarian Government must constantly keep in mind, since our dependence does not consist solely in our getting oil and gas from there, but also in the question of where will we be able to sell Hungarian industrial products, decreasing amounts of which are exported to the Soviet Union.

Further on Dam, Power Plant Talks With CSFR

LD0106154290 Budapest MTI in English 1940 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—Laszlo Udvari, Hungarian Government commissioner for the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros water barrage, has held talks in Gyor with Dominik Kocinger, newly-appointed Czech and Slovak Government commissioner.

Mr Udvari told MTI that talks on the water barrage were put on ice over the past three months.

He has now informed his Czechoslovak colleague that the new government considers the hydroelectric power plant and adjoining facilities a hazard to the environment, and the project itself abortive.

For this reason, the Hungarian side feels it would be indispensable for the prime ministers of the two countries to launch talks on the future of the Gabcikovo power plant.

The sides have agreed to start preparations for bilateal expert consultations which would pave the way for the prime ministerial talks to be held after the elections and the formation of a new government in Czechoslovakia.

Mr Udvari informed his Czechoslovakia partner that the Yugoslav company which has been dredging a tailrace in Slovakia under a Hungarian commission would now be leaving the site.

Defense Minister Fur on Army, Warsaw Pact

AU0106120290 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 May 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Defense Minister Lajos Fur by Janos Desi; place and date not given: "What Do We Need the Army for?—Lajos Fur on Relations With the Warsaw Pact, Army Reserves Ranks, and the Generals' Power"]

[Excerpts] For the first time in a long time, the head of the Defense Ministry is a civilian, as is customary in bourgeois countries. Historian Lajos Fur, the former presidential candidate of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, is now facing the task of reorganizing the Army—this important power factor of the single party system—in accordance with the requirements of a multiparty democracy.

[Desi] The previous government had already decided to reduce Army personnel by 30 percent. Does this mean that, in fact, you came here receiving a bankruptcy?

[Fur] No, because this reduction of personnel had begun before I came here. Only disarmament continues now. It is possible that, as a result of the disarmament talks in Vienna, this reduction will be even bigger.

[Desi] Have you been given, or will you receive orders from the new government on ensuring that as little as possible be spent on the Army?

[Fur] The previous Council of Ministers had already considerably reduced this year's budget in the past weeks.

[Desi] According to the secretary of the previous parliament's defense committee, the Hungarian Army alone is suitable neither for attack nor for defense. Although several people denied this later, this was nevertheless the opinion of a person who knows the Army well. In your view, what is the Army suitable for today, and what should the Army be made suitable for?

[Fur] The Hungarian Army is currently in a state of transition, partly because of the aforementioned reductions, and partly because its goals have changed. Previously, the emphasis was on attack, and now it is on defense. In my view, the Hungarian Army is able to fulfill the tasks of defense.

[Desi] At least in one direction, toward the West.

[Fur] Yes, but if we can talk of a threat at all today, this, realistically, is not from the West.

[Desi] Then perhaps from the East....

[Fur] I do not see this as being realistic either. Even if nationalistic phenomena do emerge in the neighboring countries, these phenomena will not spread into the area of the military.

[Desi] Hopefully. Then why do we need an Army if there is no threat coming from anywhere?

[Fur] We need an Army though, at least an organization which is able to fulfill its defense responsibilities in case of danger or tension.

[Desi] The Hungarian Army was "meant" to act as a subordinate to the Soviet Army within the Warsaw Pact. If Hungary starts negotiations on withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact, one can also expect the military consequences of such a step. For example: Will Hungary then have to establish an independent military industry? Otherwise from where would we get ammunition and spare parts?

[Fur] Not at all. There are only two countries in the world today which do not need military imports: the Soviet Union and the United States. All the other countries are forced to import weapons. We will also import weapons in the future. It is impossible to cover our needs from domestic supply. At most, we will have to try to produce as much as possible domestically.

[Desi] Is there no real danger that the Soviet Union will simply "turn off the tap" and stop sending spare parts, ammunition, and other materials?

[Fur] I hope there is no such danger. Therefore, it is important to apply a negotiated solution to the issue of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and to thoroughly consider our mutual agreements with the member states. [passage omitted]

[Desi] In a recent statement made to the MAGYAR NEMZET, representatives of several parliamentary parties said that they would like to see a reduction in military service to six months for the foreseeable future.

[Fur] I do not regard this as impossible in the long-term. Naturally, this also depends on the general situation in Europe. [passage omitted]

[Desi] Rumors have repeatedly circulated that Hungarian officers might be trained in the West.

[Fur] This could happen in the future, in our view. Obviously, in the case of an all-European security system, it will be natural to train officers in Western countries. [passage omitted]

Colonel Keleti on Soviet Troop Pullout

LD0106165290 Budapest MTI in English 1553 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 1 (MTI)—A total of 196 Soviet military trains have left the area of Hungary by 8 a.m. on June 1, 1990. This number coincides exactly with the number set down in the timetable, said Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman for the Ministry of Defence, to MTI on Friday [1 Jun].

Apart from that, 11 passenger and 11 container trains have also left. These latter are carrying Soviet soldiers who were stationed in Hungary, their family members and property.

Under the timetable, 116 Soviet military trains will have to leave Hungary in June.

The headquarters of the Soviet Southern Army Group informed MTI that so far more than 9,000 people (privates, officers, family members) had left Hungary.

The 2,450 military-technical facilities withdrawn from the country included over 320 tanks, 100 armoured vehicles, 130 artillery facilities, over 1,300 vehicles, 44 military planes and 15 helicopters.

Pact Summit Delegation, Security Officials Named

LD0106154990 Budapest MTI in English 1025 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 1 (MTI)—During its session which ended late Thursday night [31 May], the government decided to send a high-ranking state delegation to the Warsaw Treaty summit due in Moscow on June 7.

The delegation will include Interim President Arpad Goncz, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, Defence Minister Lajos Fur and—because of Foreign Minister Geza

Jeszenszky's other commitments abroad—Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state for foreign affairs.

The government decided that the general amnesty would extend to all those legally convicted. But there would be far-reaching differentiation in respect of those who committed crimes which the population finds particularly alarming, as well as of criminals who pose a special danger to society.

Humanitarian reasons will be widely considered, together with the fact that earlier court practices imposed disproportionately severe penalties on certain types of crimes (e.g. economic).

With reference to the recent prison riots, the government declared that strict actions would continue to be taken against prisoners who attempt to influence government or parliamentary decisions by seriously violating the order of the penitentiaries.

The Council of Ministers appointed Dr. Bela Kadar, minister of international economic relations, to represent the Republic of Hungary in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Dr. Bertalan Adrasfalvy, minister of culture and education, will be co-chairman of the Hungarian-Soviet inter-governmental cultural cooperation committee.

The government proposes that parliament should modify the law decree on state and pubic security. Accordingly, the secret services would be supervised by an appointed minister, and not the prime minister.

At the same time, Lajos Nagy was appointed general director of the National Security Office of the Republic of Hungary, and Dr. Istvan Tercze general director of the Information Office of the Republic of Hungary.

Interim President Goncz Views Military Maneuver

LD3105232490 Budapest MTI in English 2105 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—A military manoeuvre to demonstrate the transformation of the Hungarian Army was held at Gyulafiratot, Veszprem county, on Thursday [31 May].

Observing the proceedings were Arpad Goncz, interim president of the republic and commander-in-chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Gyorgy Balogh, chairman of parliament's Defence Committee, Deputy Chairmen Erno Raffay, state secretary of defence, and Imre Mecs, almost the whole commanding staff of the Hungarian Army, and two Austrian guests: Brigadier-General Rudolf Striedinger, military and air attache to Hungary, and Hubertus Trauttenberg, staff colonel.

The manoeuvre was carried out by a battalion of the Savaria Armoured Brigade with support from air units. Excerpts say the manoeuvre was marked by several new features.

The most important was that all elements complied with the requirements of the defence doctrine.

Although the doctrine and Hungary's security and military policy concept are still taking shape, the commanders have decided to start military training of a purely defensive nature in parallel.

Antall, Gorbachev To Discuss Troop Withdrawal

LD0306124290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] The paper VASARNAPI HIREK has been informed that Mikhail Gorbachev and Jozsef Antall will deal first and foremost in their discussions with the scheduled withdrawal of Soviet troops and the future of Hungarian-Soviet economic relations. The two politicians will meet in Moscow at the summit meeting of Warsaw Pact member states on 7 June.

It is expected that the system of accounting will be changed in Hungarian-Soviet economic relations. We will transfer to dollar-accounted trade. The National Assembly will, foreseeably, decide tomorrow that in the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee Hungary should henceforth be represented by the head of government.

Antall Eschews 'Violent Changing of Borders'

LD0206143190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] The MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] continues its national rally that began on 12 april. MDF President [and Premier] Jozsef Antall recalled that the Trianon Peace Treaty was signed 70 years ago, by which Hungary lost two-thirds of the territory of "historic Hungary." He expounded that while "historically speaking" we condemn the peace treaty as a country which signed the Helsinki Basic Document, we nevertheless have foregone the violent changing of borders. At the same time we insist on—what was also part of the peace treaty, namely—guaranteeing the rights of (?our) ethnic minorities, said Jozsef Antall at the MDF National rally.

Views 'Cracks' in Coalition

LD0206152290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Atilla Miklos Nemeth now reports from the Olympic Sports Hall on the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] congress:

[Nemeth] The Magyar people are able to make good decisions in the nation's interest. Both the free elections after 1945 and the recent ones prove that Magyars decided in support of a center party, said Jozsef Antall. The MDF president welcomed Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock, who is participating in the MDF's third

national rally in his capacity as president of the European democratic parties. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the formation of a government, he stressed that the MDF is the strongest party of the coalition, and it must renew itself in this spirit. In a coalition, despite the fact that 60 percent of parliamentary seats are filled by governing parties, cracks still appear and this must be given attention even within the party, too. [passage omitted]

Yes, the MDF must conclude an agreement with the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] in the interest of stable government, and this agreement must be signed by the coalition partners, too. Therefore, I accept the political and moral responsibility for this agreement at any time, Jozsef Antall said.

We have choosen a peaceful transition. True, a burning revolutionary enthusiastic mood is not a concommittant of this, but then no blood flows on our streets either and in unity we have guarded (?our) values.

I wish to be the premier of 15 million Magyars, and this responsibility is shared by all members of the government. This universal undertaking includes representing the interests of the ethnic and religious minorities living in Hungary, the premier and MDF president stressed.

Addresses Democratic Meeting

LD0206212290 Budapest MTI in English 2025 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 2 (MTI)—The 3rd national meeting of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) ended its second working day in Budapest on Saturday [2 Jun]. The meeting was greeted by Alois Mock, Austrian vice-chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, who attended the meeting in the capacity of the president of the European Democratic Union (EDU). EDU, a party federation advocating democracy, social market economy and a united Europe, admitted the HDF among its members previously.

Addressing the meeting, HDF President Jozsef Antall, prime minister, pointed out that the HDF made every effort to cooperate with its coalition partners but, in a move to guarantee the country's governability, it had to conclude a pact with the Alliance of Free Democrats. Although the pact was approved by the HDF national board, Antall said he also assumed personal political and moral responsibility for it.

The HDF president stressed that the forum should renew itself since its role had greatly changed when the former opposition party became a governing party. The forum requires both a renewal and continuity, it must become a political and intellectual movement of a new type.

The national meeting approved a statement by the board. The documents greets the coalition government, which assumes great responsibility for effecting the change in system. It supports the idea that the former state and political leders should give an account of their assets and political activity, and that the conditions of their retirement, the size of their pensions and the cases of retirement before age should be revised and the exorbitantly high incomes of leaders eliminated. The document emphasizes the need of launching a sound and balanced but determined change in the staff of leaders. It initiates to explore the processes leading to the undebtedness of the country and the ruining of its economy, and establish personal responsibility.

On the proposal of the national ethical committee, the meeting unanimously expressed recognition and gratitude to the Gypsies of Tirgu Mures who helped the attacked Hungarians. The participants demanded to release the innocently condemned with no delay.

The national meeting modified the rules. Accordingly, the board will be extended by five members. The participants discussed a report by the HDF parliamentary group. The national meeting is expected to continue one month later with the election of the five new board members and an exchange of views on preparations for the local elections in autumn.

Calls Criticism 'Natural'

LD0206220790 Budapest MTI in English 2055 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 2 (MTI)—At the Saturday [2 Jun] national meeting of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the party and its leadership were sharply criticized by some contributors.

In reaction to these opinions, HDF President Jozsef Antall told MTI that he considered the sharp criticisms neither injurious nor harmful to the party. The free and open expression of opinions is a natural feature of the Forum, which has always been a disputing party. This style of debate is a feature of Western-type parties, distinguishing them from the Bolshevik parties. It has been known since the very beginning that there were a greater number of conflicting political tendencies in the Hungarian Democratic Forum than in any other Hungarian parliamentary party. Nevertheless, the HDF stood the test and remained together even in the most difficult periods, Mr Antall said.

The differences in views reflected by the debate did by no means indicate that there would be a kind of split in the HDF, Mr. Antall said. These debates are required for the emergence of a genuine pluralist democracy.

Some contributors proposed creating a post of HDF co-president. On this score, Mr. Antall said he had for long urged that Sandor Csoori should take part in the direction of the party as an honorary president or a co-president. 'I have not yet received an affirmative answer. I think it is quite understandable if a writer preserves his independence,' Mr. Antall said.

Referring to his statement that he feels himself the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians, Mr. Antall said that

his remark had been misinterpreted by some contributors. 'I still hold it natural that the prime minister of the Hungarian Government is, in a sense, the advocate and representative of the linguistic, intellectual and cultural community of 15 million Hungarians, and takes a stand in their interest anywhere and at any time.'

An MTI correspondent asked Sandor Csoori whether he would accept the co-presidential post. The renowned writer gave an evasive answer but, according to an authentic source, he refused the request.

Antall on Responsibility for All Hungarians

LD0206170490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Interview with Premier Jozsef Antall by reporter Jozsef Orosz at the Hungarian Democratic Forum headquarters in Budapest on 2 June—recorded]

[Text] [Orosz] Mr. Chairman, you said you want to be the premier of 15 million Hungarians. If you would like to further elaborate on this, what does this mean?

[Antall] I was talking about this not in the legal sense but in the spiritual, emotional context; therefore not about having claims in relations to our fellow Hungarians who are citizens of other countries, but the sense of a spiritual community which is determined by being Hungarians, whether they are living in the Hungary of today, or in the neighboring countries, or those who during different periods in past centuries, ended up a long way from the land of Hungary. I personally feel duty-bound to accept this community in the spiritual and intellectual sense.

[Orosz] I believe this can still be read in a variety of ways. One, for example, is that the premier said this exactly on the anniversary of Trianon, when public opinion is again much exercised by Trianon, the Trianon borders, the present Hungarian borders, and if we read it with these in mind, then perhaps it could even have a negative interpretation.

[Antall] This can only have a negative interpretation if somebody deliberately wants to misinterpret it. This cannot be misinterpreted. The Trianon anniversary is only a date marker when the former historical Hungary fall apart. It was then that one-third of Hungarians, without having left their homeland or country, became citizens of a foreign country.

We stressed in all our statements that we accepted the Helsinki agreement, which means that the forcible change of borders cannot be the aim of anyone, since this would threaten European security, the peace of the people of Europe, the relations established between the nations.

But a Hungarian Government has a moral and spiritual duty to be responsible for every member of the 15 million Hungarian community. This means that we have to stand up for their human and minority rights, we must find a way to support their cultural aims, education and all other things connected with it. I belive we are not the only country which feels responsible for compatriots living outside its borders.

I would like to emphasize that the anniversary of Trianon is the appropriate anniversary for this, in spite of any irredentist or revisionist accusations, because this anniversary is precisely suitable to draw the historical consequences, to draw the conclusions on the basis of which we take account of the facts of history.

At the same time we declare our responsibility for those people who, precisely as a consequence of that historical decision, became citizens of foreign countries, but who wish to continue to belong to the spiritual, cultural, and linguistic community of the Hungarian nation.

Economic Restructuring, Unemployment Assessed

AU0106094990 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 30 May 90 p 5

[Economist Ivan Szelenyi article: "Unemployment Is the Main Danger—The Political Limits of Economic Restructuring"]

[Excerpts] It is the greatest dilemma of the new Hungarian Government: In order to eliminate the budget deficit as soon as possible and to halt inflation, the government should rapidly eliminate the subsidies provided to state enterprises that are losing money and also restructure the Hungarian economy. The 40 years of communism created an obsolete and false economic structure, there are too many large-scale enterprises, there is not enough high technology, and the proportion of obsolete heavy industry is too high, most of our industry is incapable of exporting goods and it is too capital-, raw material-, and energy-intensive, as well as polluting to the environment.

This double task: a restrictive monetary policy serving the budget balance and the restructuring of the economy is inevitably accompanied by large-scale unemployment. The big question of the coming years is the extent of unemployment our society is able to tolerate politically, and who will pay for the expenses of this unemployment.

According to some western experts, the new democratically elected Central European governments have a particularly good opportunity to make the population accept the temporary price connected with unemployment. After 40 years of dictatorial policy, it is the first time that governments elected on the basis of the principle of the people's sovereignty are taking office, governments which also have the mandate to carry out unpopular measures if necessary. There are people who, based on this, encourage the new Central European governments not to be satisfied with half-measures, but immediately to introduce dramatic restrictive monetary measures and accept the reduction of the standard of living to a level necessary to eliminate inflation, and also

accept the level of unemployment demanded by restructuring. According to this line of argument, the Central European government should run, rather than walk, if they want to avoid marking time. We need shock therapy, and not experiments with mild treatments, and we must accept chemotherapy if we want to overcome our cancer. According to the economists who share these ideas, the "normal" unemployment level is around eight percent: We must learn how to live with such a level of unemployment. [passage omitted]

I am skeptical about these arguments for several reasons. It would be a mistake to underestimate the tolerance of the Central European voters. Naturally, this particularly refers to Hungary. Although the national Christian center-right obtained a comfortable majority in Hungary, and we can even say that it has some sort of "mandate" mission, the Antall government is in a relatively weaker position than the Polish Government for example. We must also not forget that the center-right coalition led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] was able to win the voters over precisely because, contrary to the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the MDF spoke of careful progress and readiness for compromises, and did not mention any shock therapy.

Under such conditions, I do not think that our society, which was constantly requested to make sacrifices during the past 40 years, would be ready to make further great sacrifices or would be able to accept a considerable reduction in the standard of living and large-scale unemployment. If I read the Hungarian voters correctly, they said in March and April that they had had enough of experimentation, enough of radicalism, and they should be left in peace for a while and be allowed to live the way they want. [passage omitted]

The example of several countries, like Poland and Bolivia, prove that restrictive policy inspired by the principles of the classic economic sciences is indeed an effective means of halting inflation, creating a budget balance, stabilizing the national currency, and making it convertible.

However, the shortcoming of this economic policy lies in the employment policy. Those who encourage this restrictive policy have been rather unsuccessful so far in attracting non-speculative capital which is able to create adequate jobs for the existing manpower in the respective countries. [passage omitted]

The shock therapy proposed by some economists, the sudden elimination of subsidies to state enterprises is an attempt to shift from an obsolete economic structure to a new high technology structure too quickly, and this experiment is accompanied by the danger of creating massive unemployment, of creating a class below the existing classes, a social group whose members are forced into constant poverty because of their inadequate professional training. [passage omitted]

This problem is even more serious because the restructuring aimed at adjusting to the forefront of the world market will make the huge masses of people over 40 years of age into a "class below the existing classes." Most of the people over 40 today cannot be retrained to any high technology professions, and they will never be able to learn how to operate modern computers and complex production systems. What will happen to these people? How many hundreds of thousands of people will have to be sent into retirement at the age of 40 or 45, and who will pay all these pensions? [passage omitted]

Unemployment is the main enemy. The post-communist social and economic changes are providing incredibly complex tasks for our society and our new government. I sympathize with Jozsef Antall's program declaration. I find it correct that his government wants to avoid the "big leap", and concentrates on increasing the enterprises' ability to absorb manpower in its industrial policy, and on developing family enterprises and their free association in its agricultural policy. The Antall government will not have it easy. [passage omitted]

Justice Minister Balsai Presents Plans

LD2205133490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 22 May 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The Constitutional Committee began its work today [22 May] by looking over the most important directives of the government program. Gyorgy Ney reports:

[Ney] Justice Minister Istvan Balsai is not planning very significant personnel changes at the ministry, for as he said this has been overtaken by the wave of departures. Among the most important legislative tasks, he listed first the work connected with international obligations, for Hungary wishes to become a member of the Council of Europe. This has consequences for Hungary's legal usage: For example, foreign law must be made a part of Hungarian law much more quickly.

After last year, the nominee is planning a general amnesty for this year too, as last year's was very restricted, despite the great publicity it received. This year's amnesty would affect around 6,000 people, but in 5,000 cases, these are matters already in process. The procedure for general amnesties must be changed; there is no justification for the president of the republic not receiving the application directly. The stipulations of the Penal Code regarding economic crimes must be amended, as well as the part of the Civil Code relating to property.

According to the nominee's plans, the penal authorities will be self-managing. They will not operate as a united armed force, but will be an institutionalized, professional-style organization, alongside the supervision of judicial affairs. The court organization, which must pass judgement completely independently, must definitely be placed in conditions worthy of a constitutional state. As regards the conditions, Istvan Balsai would like the courts not to depend on the ministry, but to feature as an independent budgetary item in the budget. The nominee

also spoke about one very significant organisational amendment. He considers it necessary to introduce two-stage appeals, and a four-stage court system, in place of the present one and three stages. There was no mention of the financial conditions for this. There was, however, mention of the fact that since there are more pressing legislative tasks, for example relating to the deputies' legal status, ministerial rsponsibility, the rights of the nationalities, the press, and house rules, the codification of the new constitution can still wait. The present constitution will suffice for some time. [passage omitted]

Foreign Ministry on Romanian Minority Proposal

LD0106195490 Budapest MTI in English 1833 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Budapest, June 1 (MTI)—The Hungarian Foreign Ministry learned it with surprise that Romania was going to present its motion concerning the national minorities as a joint Romano-Hungarian draft at the CSCE expert conference on the human dimensions of the European situation, to start in Copenhagen next Tuesday [5 Jun], Bela Szelei, staff member of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, told MTI.

Although the ministry was verbally informed late April that a motion of that kind was being elaborated, the document only arrived to the head of the Hungarian delegation after repeated inquiries. Early this week, later on, the ministry learned it from the press that the motion was meant to be a joint proposal. According to our information, Romania sent the motion to the other participating countries earlier, Szelei said.

Hungary has also elaborated a motion and, in keeping with the diplomatic practices, sent it to the states concerned since it would hold it desirable if the most possible countries put forward joint proposals in Copenhagen. The Foreign Ministry received favourable responses from several states but Bucharest has not yet reacted to the initiative.

There is a major difference between the Romanian and the Hungarian positions. The Romanian motion includes declarative elements and lays emphasis on the minorities' obligations towards the state. In contrast, the Hungarian motion is practice-oriented, and focusses on the states' obligations towards, and support for, the minorities. According to plans, the motions will be coordinated on bilateral level in Copenhagen. The chances of a joint action, however, are deteriorated by the recent discriminatory steps against the minorities, for instance the latest Romanian decree on education.

Szelei recalled that although late December Hungary put a comprehensive package, including conceptions for the minorities' rights, on the table of the Romanian leadership, the Foreign Ministry has not yet received any response from Bucharest.

National Assembly Passes Modification to Land Law

LD3105174790 Budapest MTI in English 1514 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—After a debate lasting a day and a half, the Hungarian National Assembly has finally passed the bill on modifying the land law.

This means that state-owned property can only be sold or leased to its handler organizations with permission from the asset control committees to be set up in the countries and the capital.

This regulation was necessary because of the provision in force up to now under which real estate could be sold or let out by its handlers at a substantially lower price than its market value.

Approves Minorities Law Amendment

LD3105194490 Budapest MTI in English 1728 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—Parliament has approved, with no real debate and no vote against, the draft amendment to Law XVII, 1990, on the parliamentary representation of national and language minorities.

The motion to amend the law was put forward by Istvan Fodor, MP [Member of Parliament] (Independent).

The original law stipulated that MPS representing the minorities would have to be co-opted within 30 days after the founding session of parliament.

Since many MPs and the minorities' federations themselves opposed the method of coopting, parliament found it reasonable to extend the deadline, which would have expired in a week, by another month.

Session Ends; To Meet 4 Jun

LD3106200490 Budapest MTI in English 1915 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—After suspending the general debate on the bill on the temporary prohibition of transferring arable land belong to cooperative farms, the Hungarian Parliament closed its Thursday [31 May] session.

The issue, together with other items scheduled for Thursday, will now be discussed on Monday, provided the relevant committees have completed their preparations.

Premier Proposed as Pact Representative

LD3106203790 Budapest MTI in English 1951 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—After the plenary session of parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee held a meeting on Thursday [31 May].

Tamas Katona, political state secretary of foreign affairs, outlined the motion the government will be putting forward to parliament for amending a former resolution on appointing a delegate to the Political Consultative Committee [PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO].

Under the motion, parliament would delegate the prime minister to represent Hungary in the WTO PCC.

(So far, under a March, 1990, resolution of parliament. Hungary has been represented by the interim president of the republic.)

Arguing in favour of the motion, Mr Katona said it would comply with the Constitution if the Hungarian delegation to the WTO PCC were headed by the prime minister, who would bear full responsibility for the work of the delegation.

The Foreign Affairs Committee supported, with 11 votes for and 1 abstention, the motion's being put forward to the Monday session of Parliament.

FYD Leader Previews Upcoming Congress

LD3105231790 Budapest MTI in English
1548 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 31 (MTI)—The Federation of Young Democrats (FYD) is to hold its third congress over the coming weekend [2-3 Jun].

At a press conference on Thursday [31 May] heralding the event, Tamas Deutsch, member of the FYD board, said the congress would not only put an end to a phase in the history of the FYD, but would also coincide with the start of establishing a new democracy.

Consequently, the young democrats will have to tackle a different function in future.

Therefore, the congress, which is linked to personnel changes, will have the crucial task of reshaping the FYD's political image.

Mr Deutsch also underlined the task of making arrangements for the local elections in the autumn.

He thought that in the near future, every party would shift emphasis onto local politics, and increasingly the local party organizations would have to face up to the challenges.

The congressional agenda features a modification to the FYD statutes.

This will again involve the question of age limit, as under the present rules, it is set at under 35.

Mr Deutsch pointed out it would be a sensible idea for the FYD to remain an organization of young people aged between 20 and 30, as if the older generation was admitted en masse, this would probably entail a fundamental change in the political profile of the organization.

Democratic Forum Group Elects New President

LD2605102490 Budapest MTI in English
1918 GMT 24 May 90

[Text] Budapest, May 24 (MTI)—The Hungarian Democratic Forum's [HDF] parliamentary group held a secret ballot after Thursday's [24 May] National Assembly session, and elected Imre Konya their new president.

The new leader said a nine-member presidium had also been elected during the meeting.

Jozsef Antall—who was unable to attend the meeting owing to other commitments—resigned from the post of president of the parliamentary group of HDF MPS prior to the meeting. Since the position was incompatible with his duties as prime minister.

President Summons Government, Parliament Leaders

LD0106180390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] At 1900 a meeting initiated by the president of the Polish Republic began at Belweder, with the participation of representatives of the government, parliament, and the President's Office. Taking part in the meeting are President Wojciech Jaruzelski; Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki; Sejm Speaker Nikolaj Kozakiewicz; Senate Speaker Andrzej Stelmachowski; Deputy Premiers Leszek Balcerowicz, Czeslaw Janicki, Jan Janowski, and Czeslaw Kiszczak; Ministers of State Jozef Czyrek, Jozef Koziol, and Piotr Nowina-Konopka; Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski; Defense Minister Army General Florian Siwicki; Jacek Kuron, minister of labor and social policy; Minister Jacek Ambroziak, head of the Council of Ministers Office; Minister Michal Janiszewski, head of the President's Office; as well as Deputy Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission.

Communique Issued

LD0106214990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2100 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Excerpts] A meeting convened on the initiative of the president of the Polish Republic, and attended by representatives of the government, the parliament, and the president's office, has taken place at the Belweder Palace. [passage omitted]

The subject of the exchange of views was the country's current social, economic, and political situation following the self-government elections held on Sunday, 27 May.

We are entering the implementation of the local self-government program, and at the same time the next stage in consolidating economic independence. To maintain the correct pace of reform it is essential to fully mobilize society's energy and enterprise. Poland's chances depend to a decisive extent on maintaining public support for the economic program, which is being implemented. The attitude of patience and the trust of Polish society in the face of the fundamental reconstruction of the country's economic system has been noted with profound respect. The significance of social policy in view of the difficult living conditions of working people was stressed. It was acknowledged to be exceptionally important to ensure a spirit of cooperation and tolerance in sociopolitical life, expressed in support for the government's plans concerning the further implementation of the reform.

Poland's chances are closely linked with the international situation. Recognizing that the social and institutional efforts in our country have an important bearing on the possibilities of economic cooperation abroad, an analysis was made of how much understanding and support they find there.

It was stated that our trump card remains public confidence in the consequences of the government's actions, and the fact that Poland is a country whose experiences promoted transformations throughout Europe. It is at the same time a country which is carrying out radical changes in a responsible and stable manner. The active policy of the government promotes the consolidation in world opinion of a favorable picture of our country as a sovereign and reliable partner in international relations.

Matters linked with Polish foreign policy were examined in the context of European processes and the formation of a new international political order. The position of the Polish delegation at the announced meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee was discussed.

That was the communique from the meeting convened at the Belweder Palace today on the initiative of the president, in which representatives of the government, parliament, and the president's office participated.

Mazowiecki Interviewed

LD0206160990 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1400 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Interview with Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Mr. Premier, since the communique from yesterday's meeting in the Belweder is very terse, since many rumors are going around about that meeting, I would like to ask you what the reasons were for that meeting, and whether that meeting really should have given rise to so many rumors; to so many kinds of speculation.

[Mazowiecki] The meeting had already been planned by the president for some time. By virtue of his post, the president has the possibility, the right and the duty to consult a certain team of people holding the leading state posts, and he wanted such a meeting to take place immediately following the local government elections. I cannot see, therefore, any reason for any kind of speculation or rumor, and I must say that I was amazed to read them in today's TRYBUNA, rumors of which, those deliberating in the Belweder, were totally unaware of.

I would like to say that the meeting had two main subjects. The first dealt with an assessment of the situation in Poland, particularly following the local government elections. The second dealt with foreign affairs, connected mainly with the current Bush-Gorbachev meeting, a report on which we are expecting to receive in Moscow at the meeting of the consultative committee that has been called—above all with this Moscow meeting. As is known, a Polish delegation made up of the president, premier, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of national defense is going there, and we also want to discuss those matters within a wider circle.

The first subject group, as I have said, deals with an assessment of the (?internal) situation, particularly the tasks following the local government elections.

We listened attentively—I speak for myself and the members of the government—to all comments and opinions. As I stated at that meeting, the government will analyze them carefully in the course of its work.

With regard to the second subject group—and we talked about matters of particular interest linked with the two-plus-four conference, but they were not detailed examinations—the essence concerned what the subject of debate will be at the meeting of the Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact. Poland will express its point of view that the pact, as long as it continues to exist—for in the future a system of collective security in Europe should be brought about—should be reformed. It should have a consultative character and should be based on complete and total equal rights. In this spirit we will be taking our position to Moscow.

With reference to your question [word indistinct], I want to say that this meeting was normal, and resulted from the function of the president and (?leading) state organs: the need for consultation, at important moments, both internal and foreign, before important foreign meetings; I see no reason for any kind of speculation to surround it. There was nothing inherently sensational in it. It was held in an calm atmosphere of normal work of state organs.

More on Mazowiecki's Comments

LD0306185390 Warsaw PAP in English 1724 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 3 June—Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki termed as rumours the speculations of the TRYBUNA daily that Friday's [1 June] meeting at the Belweder Palace could result in President Jaruzelski resigning in favour of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.

The premier stressed that the meeting, also attended by high-ranking government and parliamentary officials, was planned earlier. He said it dealt with two matters: the situation following the local government elections and foreign issues, the summit meeting inclusive.

Mazowiecki also announced that at the coming meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, Poland would present a view that until its exists [as received], the treaty should be reformed and have a consultative, fully equal-rights character.

Second OPZZ Congress Convenes in Capital

LD0106233390 Warsaw PAP in English 2155 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 1 June—The second congress of the OPZZ, All-Poland Trade Union Alliance, opened three-day debates in Warsaw today.

The congress is being held half a year earlier in the light of a need to determine the identity of this trade union movement in a radically new political and economic situation.

The congress is attended by 642 of the 680 delegates representing the 6.5-million-strong trade union movement.

Miodowicz's Address

"For four years now the OPZZ has defended the interests of the working people," stated the trade union's leader Alfred Miodowicz opening the debates. "This year we had to defend the workers against exploitation, to defend people against unemployment. We did not expect this four years ago. This is a new situation. In a new situation it is good to elect new authorities. We should also ponder on our program, on the operation of the OPZZ in the new situation." Miodowicz told the congress, adding: "Let us above all talk about what is currently taking place in the trade union, what the working people expect in the nearest future."

Elections

The delegates elected the Secretariat and the commissions of the 2d congress, adopting the regulations and agenda which envisages passing a new statute and electoral rules, discussions, and election of the OPZZ leadership for the new term.

The statutory commission spoke in favour of clearly defining the functions of the [sentence as received]

Discussion

The delegates spoke in favour of strengthening the rank of the OPZZ as a partner in talks with the authorities. A strong government will pay little heed to respective federations, it was argued.

The participants postulated for the statute to put to detail the key obligations and powers of the OPZZ chairman and his deputy.

There was a suggestion not to state specifically in the statute that in cases of a breach of the rights and interests of employees, the OPZZ could organize strikes. "Let us not bind our hands with such an unequivocal entry," stated one of the delegates, proposing only a general entry on the possibility of various forms of protest being undertaken in such situations.

In the voting, the congress decided that it would elect OPZZ vice-chairmen (a motion to convey this right to the OPZZ council was defeated).

The Presidium of the Council, as the OPZZ executive body, will have up to 25 persons and it will also be made up of chairman and vice-chairmen. The Presidium will be elected by the council on the basis of the principles established by itself (a proposal to elect Presidium through branches was rejected). In tune with the statute,

the OPZZ has been a federative rather than a branch structure of nationwide organizations.

By an overwhelming majority of votes, the debaters adopted to preserve a provision in the statute that the OPZZ would be able to stage strikes (Thus, a postulate was defeated not to use the word "strike" in the statute, replacing it with a general formula "various forms of protest").

Regulations

The congress agreed on the procedure of electing the Presidium of the OPZZ Council, a 25-person body which would replace the Executive Committee. The Presidium is to be elected under principles set by the council itself.

The congress adopted regulations governing the election of members of the OPZZ leadership.

At 2230 the 2d OPZZ congress closed its first day.

Greetings for the Congress

On the first day of its debates, the congress received greetings from: the general director of the International Labour Office, the general secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions as well as national trade union centres from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, France and Portugal.

Charges Against OPZZ Rebuked

LD0206140590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1005 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpt] [Announcer] The second congress of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Alliance] is continuing. Over to our reporter Magdalena Winiarczyk:

[Winiarczyk] The starting point for today's discussion was Alfred Miodowicz's statement. There are four [as heard] most important issues, he said: The issue of social justice; the unions' position on revindication, their radicalism and fighting spirit, that is, typical defensive functions for working people. The government's mandate not to accept trade union standpoints has ended. That is it, stressed the OPZZ's outgoing chairman.

The public is not only disheartened and worried by what is happening in the country: it is simply in despair. We must prepare for a five-year battle for the survival of Polish society. There will be no improvement within six months or a year. Alfred Miodowicz heatedly rejected the slanders that the OPZZ, and its unions, were the children of martial law. After all, we...I apologize here, but I want to quote his precise words...we were slogging away [zapieprzalismy] at our work posts at the time; and many of us were members of Solidarity. [passage omitted]

Miodowicz Reelected Chairman

LD0206180890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Excerpts] Alfred Miodowicz has again become the chairman of the OPZZ. The trade union congress is continuing. [passage omitted]

Of the four candidates put forward, Rajmund Moric and Stanislaw Wisniewski declined to run. Waclaw Martyniuk and Alfred Miodowicz, however, upheld their decision to run. There were not many questions to Martyniuk. Miodowicz had to explain in detail why he had decided to run again, despite manifold declarations as to his stepping down. When the adjournment was announced so that the election of the chairman could be held, it was difficult to assess which of the claimants had the greatest chance. Miodowicz was elected by the votes of 352 delegates respresenting more than 54 percent; Waclaw Martyniuk received 269 votes, which is not quite 41.5 percent. There were, therefore, delegates who cancelled out both candidates.

Miodowicz Addresses Congress

LD0206195990 Warsaw PAP in English 1750 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 2 June—During today's, second day of the congress of the OPZZ, All-Poland Trade Union Alliance, held here, its chairman Alfred Miodowicz made an impromptu speech in which he resolutely rejected allegations that the trade union which he led was an "offspring of martial law" and recalled his television debate with Lech Walesa two years ago, without which, as he said, "Mr. Walesa would go on stumbling against the Political Bureau and Central Committee for a long time."

Midowicz stated that Vice-Premier Balcerowicz strictly realised a programme which he rewrote from the International Monetary Fund and stressed that the latest railmen's protest and low turnout in the self-government elections allowed for saying that "Polish society was not even disappointed with but already desparate over what was going on in Poland."

The OPZZ leader also rejected charges of his being a demagogue and passed this title over onto Balcerowicz calling him the biggest demagogue in Poland.

Miodowicz was sceptical of the possibility of a prompt emergence from the economic crisis and spoke about a five-year-long struggle for Poles' existence. In this context he said point blank: "When Germans get stronger then they will knock on to us for our Western territories" and went on speaking about the need for having a strong army and efficient authorities. At the same time he assured the government about the OPZZ's support for it.

Keeping his address in this tone, Miodowicz stated that Poland, being pressed by the IMF programme, was entering a 19th century capitalism. "This will suit the

Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Germans. But it will not suit us," said Miodowicz and was applauded by the delegates.

Miodowicz spared no critical remarks concerning Lech Walesa, and said that the Solidarity was the only trade union he knew of that supported privatisation.

Ending his speech, Miodowicz addressed Sejm (Lower House) Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, who was present at the congress, and said: "If the Sejm started to deal with the assets of the trade unions, then it would be an absolute precedent on a world scale. No trade union has ever been subject to such restrictions as the OPZZ is now. Should it really happen, we will really appear in front of the Sejm (building)."

Election Success of USSR's Yeltsin Viewed

AU0106153590 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 May 90 p 1

[Leon Bojko commentary: "The First Act of a Sovereign Russia"]

[Text] Against the wishes of Mikhail Gorbachev and despite his personal intervention, Boris Yeltsin was elected chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Republic.

This result became a foregone conclusion when Yeltsin's main rival withdrew his candidacy. Aleksander Vlasov, the present premier of the Russian government, had no chance, but the numbers of votes he received clearly showed the powerful force that the conservative apparatus still is.

Boris Yeltsin proposed the formation of a coalition government. This is not the best solution for Russia.

The most important thing is the fact that at this congress of Russian deputies and for the first time in its history, Russia effectively followed normal parliamentary procedures. This avoided the possibility of a grave social and political crisis. The democratic parliamentary outcome will have a calming effect on social tensions and Russia will gain several weeks of respite.

What is equally important is that Yeltsin's election is the first act of a sovereign Russia, freed from agreements and pressures of the central authority.

The second act on this road will be the declaration of Russian sovereignty. This will fundamentally alter the whole state structure of the USSR, if the principle of the precedence of Russian federal law over the law of the Soviet Union is passed. The Baltic republics have already adopted this principle. In this way the real authority of the central government and the Soviet president will be circumscribed, although it is difficult to foresee how this will be done. It is also difficult to foresee the political and historical consequences for the whole empire.

The first significant step has been taken.

New Soviet Ambassador Received by Skubiszewski

LD2805163690 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1200 GMT 28 May 90

[Text] Krzysztof Skubiszewski today [28 May] received Yuriy Kashlev, the newly appointed ambassador of the Soviet Union. This was an introductory visit before the new Soviet diplomat takes up the post in Poland.

Meets Jaruzelski

LD3005072890 Warsaw PAP in English 1510 GMT 29 May 90

[Text] Warsaw, May 29—Poland's president Wojciech Jaruzelski received here today [29 May] USSR Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Poland Yuriy Kashlev who presented his credentials.

Next the new ambassador was received by the president at a private audience.

In connection with the beginning of his diplomatic mission Ambassador Kashlev laid a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier here today.

Soviet Commando Brigade Departs Country for Home

LD0106192990 Warsaw PAP in English 1732 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 1 June—Another unit of the Soviet Northern Group of Troops left today Poland in tune with the plan of reduction of the Soviet troops' presence in Poland adopted last year.

A regiment of the Soviet Commando Brigade, leaving for the USSR, was bidden farewell in Bialogard (northern Poland) today. The ceremony was attended by government's plenipotentiary for Soviet troops' stationed in Poland General Mieczyslaw Debicki and representatives of the Command of the Soviet Northern Groups of Troops as well as authorities of the towns of Koszalin and Bialogard.

The withdrawal has put at the disposal of the town 12 residential buildings and a big department store.

Economist on Future EC, Warsaw Pact Relations

LD0106115790 Warsaw PAP in English 1035 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Warsaw, 1 June—"One of the factors in the battle for Poland's joining the EC or a future united Europe could be its assuming of a role of a political stabilizer in Eastern and Central Europe affected shaken by upheavals today," wrote the ZYCIE WARSZAWY daily quoting WALDEMAR PIOTROWSKI, a specialist in

intenational affairs in the Polish President Chancellory as the author of the concept.

"It is not a military threat that upsets the West in our region most—which was the case in the past—but the situation of destability and uncertainty and fear of Europe's new balkanization. To prevent this, England, France and the U.S. are ready to make some investments in our part of Europe, both political and economic ones," Piotrowski wrote.

"Does Poland have a chance to become a factor of stability and development in Eastern and Central Europe? Yes, but this requires that Poland should conduct wise and balanced policy, both at home and on the international arena. At home this will require following an evolutionary road of changes, avoiding all shocks and completing the process of building structures of a democratic state next year. On the international arena Poland must work out first a new modus vivendi with Bonn and Moscow," Piotrowski went on.

"As a nation we should make an effort to overcome anti-Soviet elements and anti-German resentments," said he.

"One of the possibilities to calm anti-German and anti-Soviet fears, which are so strong in Polish society, could be to ask Western superpowers to considers as possbility—as part of the construction of a new system of security in Europe—to temporarily station a small contingent of British, French and U.S. troops in Poland. Of course, such an option could not be implemented in an anti-Soviet way and against strategic interests of the Soviet Union," he added.

"The stationing of Western superpowers troops in Poland does not have to imply Poland's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty. In the transitory period, in the coming two or three years, the issue should be negotiated by the Polish and Soviet governments, especially in the light of a growing desintegration of the Warsaw Treaty military infrastructure."

"It seems that it would be desirable in this respect to base Poland's relations with the Soviet Union on a bilateral plane. The process should not infringe superpower interests of the Soviet Union or upset the fragile parity of forces in Europe," Piotrowski concluded.

West Germany To Open Consulate in Krakow

LD2605050390 Warsaw PAP in English 1842 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Krakow, May 25—The FRG plans to open in the near future its consulate general in Krakow. An appropriate agreement was signed here today [25 May] on the handing over of a Krakow building to house the new consulate whose services are to embrace 18 southern voivodships.

The consulate is to grant its services to about 700 thouisand people annually. FRG Consul Ralph Hermesdorff said that the opening of the consulate, which the FRG side hopes will take place as quickly as possible, will be connected with the opening of a visa section. It is planned that the section will issue about 2 to 3 thousand visas per day.

The FRG Consulate General in Krakow will also be a centre of the promotion of German culture and of the development of economic relations between Poland and the FRG.

Prof. Tymowski Views Government Social Policy

PM0106162590 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 31 Mar 90 p 10

[Interview with Professor Andrzej Tymowski of Warsaw University, social policy expert and former Solidarity adviser, by POLITYKA correspondent Ewa Nowakowska; place and date not given]

[Text] [Nowakowska] What grade would you award to the government—and in particular the labor and social policy sector—for its social policy program?

[Tymowski] I cannot judge something that does not exist.

[Nowakowska] But three-quarters of Poland's population listen to Minister Kuron's conferences every Tuesday and discuss them for the rest of the week!

[Tymowski] You asked me to asses his social policy program, not his television appearances. But even the content of his television programs confirm my charges against his sector—namely, the lack of any model of such policy. Minister Kuron's appearances are designed as appeals to the population: Do this or that! Give money for one noble cause or another! But instead they should provide concrete information on the policy the government intends to pursue toward the elderly, the handicapped, and so on. I know that social policy cannot be run on credit, and of course we have limited resources and many other difficulties. But this does not justify the absence of a concept of what the government intends to achieve.

[Nowakowska] Perhaps we have had too many visionary concepts and it is now the time to come to terms with a realistic policy of meager resources?

[Tymowski] Agreed, let it even be a realistic policy of meager resources, as you say, but I would still like to know its direction and the hierarchy of objectives and priorities. The decisionmakers say that we we will only begin to design a proper social policy program after the economic reform has proved successful. I disagree! It is precisely now that it is absolutely essential to work out a clear model of such a policy. The transition period could take any amount of time and can be expected to throw up

whole groups of people living in very difficult circumstances. We are at present witnessing a cloyingly sentimental brand of philanthropic action with unclear and uncontrolled criteria of who deserves help, whereas what we really need is a policy of social welfare protection based on appropriate legislation. A social benefit network that would identify and assist all who live below the minimum subsistence level would be a necessary component of such policy.

[Nowakowska] The minimum subsistence level is no longer a fashionable concept—in the language of politics, also.

[Tymowski] It required long years of political struggle to "declassify" the concept and the actual limits of the minimum subsistence level. It is very sad and also very alarming that this very sector, administered by leading Solidarity activists, has swept away the agreements which we had negotiated jointly in 1980 and which guaranteed that the minimum subsistence level would be calculated on a regular and ongoing basis and announced publicly.

[Nowakowska] But perhaps the minimum subsistence level obscures the issue in public eyes instead of clarifying it? At the time when the question of the minimum subsistence level was so much in the limelight, people adopted its value as a basis for social demands, whereas it only provides a kind of comparative basket figure.

[Tymowski] The minimum subsistence level is, as it were, a dangerous line below which the living standard of the population should never fall. And here we have a situation where the same people who had previously fought for nd won this barometer of social standards decide to smash it and throw it out today. Their viewpoint has obviously changed as soon as their position changed: There is a difference between telling the authorities what they should be obliged to provide and providing it yourself once you have assumed a position among the authorities.

[Nowakowska] So the minimum subsistence level can be compared to a stone in the shoe, which irritates the authorities and which they want to get rid of as soon as possible?

[Tymowski] Only when the authorities are expecting to see impromptu solutions. Let me reiterate: The minimum subsistence level is not a reference point for making demands—that is, a level of income which the state is obliged to provide to everyone by right. The state is only obliged to provide opportunities for everyone to earn it themselves. Knowing the actual dimension of the minimum subsistence level allows us to determine which social groups live below that dangerous line and to take appropriate and conscious action to direct our resources to ameliorate the situation. We all know that the state budget does not have as much money as people expect, but I am deeply convinced that what there is can be spent more rationally and more effectively. I truly regret that the people with whom I cooperated in Solidarity's early days have now discarded all the knowledge gained from our joint work on, and research of, the subject. They are basing the sector's policy on philanthropic ideals rather than on the provision of social welfare protection. Philanthropy can be a significant complementary element of the state social policy, but it must not constitute the linchpin of this policy!

[Nowakowska] But surely there must have been reasons why this choice has been made.

[Tymowski] The social policy sector is run by people who are full of good intentions, but who are nevertheless amateurs: They are deeply convinced that the course they have taken is correct and they refuse to listen to specialists. Scientific advisers have not had any say in the way our social policy is planned and they are still denied such say. And we could have avoided many mistakes if only experts had been listened to.

[Nowakowska] For example?

[Tymowski] For example we could have avoided the whole disastrous affair with the cooperatives run by the handicapped—and this particular matter is gaining increasingly negative publicity at the moment. Under the smokescreen of slogans advertising elimination of overgrown bureaucratic structures, they were deprived of the right to represent their own interests—a right which, as it turns out, is essential for the protection of the interests of smaller, individual cooperatives. I find it astonishing that the sector claims to have been surprised by the unforeseen consequences of this move. True, the cooperative sector catering for the handicapped must adjust both its production structure and financial policy to fall in step with the new market principles and the current market requirements, but it certainly should have a spokesman who would promote its interests at government level. Or, rather, it should have several spokesmen, since social policy should not be the domain of only one particular sector. Social policy is composed of many elements: social policy with regard to the elderly, the family unit, the handicapped, and so on. All this must be devised in a comprehensive strategy which would even include active involvement of such sectors as finance and commerce.

[Nowakowska] The concept, which proposes that all sectors should be involved in pursuing a definite social policy, is not a popular one. People associate it with the idea of a welfare state, which has already been compromised and discarded.

[Tymowski] But please note that such is the reality of countries based on the liberal democratic system—and we are just moving from the system of real socialism to that of neo-liberal economy. In the education sector, the state's social policy is reflected in the prices of books and learning aids; in the health sector, in the cost of health services and medicinal drugs. The housing sector is also an area where a clear social policy should be pursued. In all these fields we must make certain choices which should be presented to the public with the underlying

reasons clearly explained. However, at present, complete chaos reigns in this whole area. I fail to see any clear, overall concept here—a concept which should be the result of joint, interdepartmental work carried out by many sectors. This is what worries me most here.

[Nowakowska] Perhaps such social costs are inevitable in these times of violent changes combined with market orthodoxy and unbridled entrepreneurial activity?

[Tymowski] That is not true. Recently Premier Balcerowicz invited a team of agricultural economists to help him revise the agricultural aspect of his economic plan. I hope that the labor and social policy sector will also remember that experts are available and waiting and invite them to assist in tidying up the whole desperate mess. There are even more reasons for concern than the ones I listed so far. For example, the ease with which we are acquiescing to unemployment. Since we have the reform, we will have unemployment, and that is that, these are the rules of the game. Well, it does not have to be so. Unemployment is always a pathological phenomenon, and in our country work is still seeking people instead of the other way round. You only need to ask the experts to advise you on how to solve the question of employment restructuring.

[Nowakowska] Thank you for talking to us.

Declaration Calls for Reform Within PAP

AU2505121790 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21 May 90 p 3

["w.k."-signed report: "No Changes in the Agency"]

[Text] The 100 members of the "Solidarity" trade union chapter, who are employees of the Polish Press Agency [PAP] (the agency has some 800 employees), have published a program declaration and declared their position on the present problems within the agency.

The "Solidarity" chapter has proposed the adoption of the agency's former name, Polish Telegraphic Agency, and is demanding that the agency be modernized. This means changing the agency's technical equipment, its work and pay conditions, and the mentality of its staff who occupy senior managerial positions. The chapter members are opposed to the employment of people with mediocre qualifications, in many cases, people who were formerly employed in the old party-government apparatus, as well as journalists who in the past were the loyal servants of the former authorities. The present personnel structure is inappropriate. There are too many people in managerial posts who benefit from the privileges that such jobs entail. The bureaucratic immobility is stifling and there is staff overmanning.

There is a need to completely renew managerial staff and the team of foreign and national correspondents, a need to bring in young blood. There exist, after all, clear criteria for evaluation: Educational background, professionalism, modern thinking, and a high degree of probity. Those who in the past have performed their duties for better or for worse should now depart. It is absolutely essential to define specific tasks for foreign correspondents, because at present each of these correspondents works according to his own criteria, often sending in reports of events that other foreign news agencies have put out earlier and often in a more correct form, or merely cites excerpts from the foreign press.

PAP's image ought to be that of a serious, representative, and governmental press agency, with a large deal of internal autonomy. For this to happen, the government has to invest the necessary funds to modernize PAP. There has to be a detailed analysis of the organizational structure, the forms of operation, and the true usefulness of people in the particular positions they occupy in the agency. Texts issued by PAP should be characterized by their conciseness, objectivity, and truthfulness in representing facts. They must be linguistically and stylistically correct. It is also necessary to agree on a classification of news importance. This ought to avoid overloading the agency services that day by day are becoming less useful to newspapers.

Stanislaw Dmitrewski, a journalist on the PAP foreign desk and chairman of the "Solidarity" chapter at PAP, complementing the information contained in the declaration, adds that the union chapter has demanded that those journalists, who, until very recently, defended the Polish communist model in their writings, should depart from the agency. This would include most of the people who occupy managerial positions and includes PAP chairman Bogdan Jachacz who came to PAP from the former Polish United Workers Party Central Committee's propaganda department in order to ensure the continuity of the information system of the former regime. For this reason, the agency is still an instrument of propaganda and this conflicts with its task of being strictly a news agency. This is what everyone expects PAP to be. This situation has to be remedied as soon as possible.

Party, Candidate Coverage During Campaign Viewed

AU0206190390 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1700 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] We present the text transmitted to ROMPRES news agency by Romanian Radio Television:

We learned, in the statement issued by the U.S. State Department in connection with the 20 May elections in Romania, broadcast by the Voice of America on the evening of 31 May 1990, that there is also a laconic but nevertheless clear note about the fact that the major opposition parties were seriously hampered in their access to the television.

Apart from the fact that it is not quite clear how the above mentioned opposition could be acknowledged before free elections, we do not want to comment on this surprising statement, in any other way than through figures and concrete examples that have already been presented to the Romanian and international press, during a news conference held by Romanian Radio Television, held on 24 May 1990.

Throughout the entire electoral campaign, in which political parties and groups enjoyed the provisions of the electoral law—that is, free access, free of charge, the television broadcast more than 15,000 minutes, representing a sixth of the entire time of the electoral campaign of parties.

During some distinctive program series— Electoral Studio, Electoral Dialogue, The Electoral Chronicle, and The Guest of the Week—virtually all political parties and groups, as well as many independent candidates were introduced. If, for instance, we mention only the Electoral Studio, we can say that 70 political parties and groups as well as about 120 independent candidates were present on this program, and among these, 38 parties appeared 3 times. Along this line, we can mention not only the National Salvation Front, but the National Liberal Party, the National Peasant (Christian Democratic) Party, the Republican Party, the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians, the Christian Democratic Union, and the National Reconstruction Party as well. Twenty-two parties appeared twice; 14 independent candidates appeared three times; and 28 candidates appeared twice on television.

We report all these figures, without counting the 12 editions of the "Electoral Dialogue", in which, about 33-35 representatives of various parties and independent candidates participated, during each program. The National Salvation Front was present only in eight out of the 12 mentioned programs, while the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant (Christian Democratic) Party were present in 10 programs and some parties were present even in all 12 programs. Likewise, we have not counted the Electoral Chronicle program, during which the parties which wanted to record video cassettes, commentaries, or communiques, were always present—that means 460 appearances by 53 parties and groups in the order of their daily arrival to the television.

In conclusion, we mention that thanks were expressed to Romanian Television—directly during broadcasts or later in writing—by several party leaders, such as the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant (Christian Democratic) Party, for the objective broadcasting and for its entire attitude during the electoral campaign. This last fact makes it even more puzzling, if not even embarrassing— certainly not for Romanian Television—the statement included in the U.S. State Department declaration.

Press Comments on Fairness, Conduct of Elections

AU2905152990

[Editorial Report] Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian on 20 May, the day of the elections in Romania, carries the words, "We need quiet, good people!" on its front page, which, apart from these words placed in the middle of the page, is completely blank. The explanation for this appears in the 22 May edition of ADEVARUL in Darie Novaceanu's front-page editorial article entitled "And it Was Quiet," in which the author says that "it was an unprecedented gesture, I admit it, but it had to be done.... We left the front page blank because we wanted our readers themselves to write their thoughts and feelings on it in peace." ADEVARUL on 22 May, under the headline "In Front of the Eyes of Europe and the Whole World, the Romanian People Signed Their Freedom," devotes all of page 2 to reports on the way in which the elections had been carried out in several counties, noting everywhere "the calm atmosphere, legal framework, and complete honesty" that prevailed during the electoral process. The paper also devotes several brief articles to the "first free elections" in Romania in the past 40 years, noting the fact that through their votes, people demonstrated that "this nation knows how to honor the victims" of the December revolution.

Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian, which is the National Salvation Front's (NSF) mouthpiece, on 22 May reports on the presumable NSF victory. In its 800-word front-page editorial entitled "The Verdict of the Majority," the paper notes that "the participation of the Romanians in the elections shows their thirst for democracy and their will to express, in an untampered way, their views regarding the country's destiny, the way they believe it should be, without delegating anybody to speak or to act on their behalf." The paper also praises the television for being "up to expectations."

Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian on 22 May is more skeptical about the outcome of the elections. Almost each article questions the correctness of the elections. Sorin Rosca-Stabescu, in his 600-word front-page article entitled "The Cards Have Been Dealt, but How?", mentions the fact that in the vicinity of several polling stations "serious incidents were noted." He also

mentions several irregularities such as the "disappearance of stamps...votes cast on behalf of some real or fictitious family members...and the practice of intimidating people in some villages." Dumitru Ceausu, in his 2,800-word article "Victory—Against Whom?", makes a more thorough analysis of the elections and the voting process, saying that "the historical parties, just like the electorate, contributed to the victory of the NSF." Ceausu believes that radio and television also contributed to "forming the electorate's opinion," and he says that "the Front has won the elections but it seems that it lost several millions of voters, while the country lost a chance. It lost the chance to have a true political opposition in the parliament."

All the other dailies deal extensively with the issue of the elections on a general or at the local level. Iulian Costandache, in his 400-word front-page article entitled "Romania's True Face," mentions in Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian on 22 May that "those who expected a sensation were very disappointed. No incidents, no intervention, and no confusion. A relaxed and clear atmosphere. A complete understanding of the situation and intense participation."

Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian, the paper of the National Peasant (Christian Democratic) Party, on 22 May, under the headline "The Day of the Free Electoral Abuses in Romania," carries on the front page a number of brief reports from various polling stations about the way in which the elections were carried out, noting "incidents, disorganization," and "various irregularities." Ilie Paunescu, in his 600-word front-page article entitled "Counterrevolution After 20 May," says, "Mr. Ion Iliescu is far from having gained the stature of a politician in only five months of governing," and, "Mr. Iliescu's mistake is trying to save his power in May according to the model figured out in February" while things have changed in Romania.

Contrary to the papers that favor the NSF and report on statements by foreign observers who considered the Romanian elections fair, DREPTATEA reports on statements by foreign observers, such as Italian observers Roberto Formigoni, a member of the European Parliament, and Rinaldo Ceccardi, Italian Christian Democratic Party member, who witnessed several irregularities in the voting process. DREPTATEA on 22 May devotes all of page three to reports on several cases throughout the country in which the voting was not carried out in a fair manner and several incidents that demonstrate that the NSF "turned the electoral campaign into something similar to a bloody civil war."

NSF, NLP, NPCDP Officials on Elections

AU2305151490 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 May 90 p 3

[Report on interviews with Dr. Adrian Nastase, foreign affairs secretary of the National Salvation Front and party spokesman; I.V. Sandulescu, National Liberal Party first deputy chairman; and Dr. Ioan Barbus, deputy chairman of the National Christian Democratic Peasants Party, by reporter Oszkar Fuzes in Bucharest on 20 May: "Exclusive Interviews to NEPSZABADSAG—Calm but Slow Elections in Romania"]

[Text] With the exception of some smaller skirmishes, the first free and multiparty elections in Romania in 45 years took place in a calm atmosphere.

Long lines of people were standing in front of the polling stations from 6 A.M. til 11 P.M. A voter stood in line on average one-and-a-half hours. Only one-third of the eligible voters, and only one-quarter in Bucharest, were able to cast their votes by 4 P.M. The national election committee president said that the elections were taking place adequately, proving that Romania is a civilized country. The counting of the votes, which is expected to last five days, began in the afternoon of 20 May.

The elections are slow because the voters have difficulties in finding themselves on the lists.

The National Salvation Front [NSF] counts on an absolute majority in the presidential, Senate, and House of Representatives elections. The National Liberal Party [NLP] and the National Peasants Christian Democratic Party [NPCDP] are preparing for opposition. Our reporter paid a visit to the headquarters of these three parties on 20 May.

Dr. Adrian Nastase counts on an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections and hopes for at least 60 percent for Iliescu as presidential candidate.

[Fuzes] Thus, will the NSF set up a government by itself?

[Nastase] We have only principled ideas about this, and we are waiting for the elections results. Perhaps, a coalition government would be better for us, because Romania is facing a lot of problems. We have not yet decided on whom to turn to as coalition partners or whom to nominate as prime minister.

[Fuzes] Many people accuse the NSF of preserving the old regime.

[Nastase] This can only refer to the Front's state organizations and not to the party itself. As a party, the NSF has deputy candidates who personally are guarantors of renewal. Naturally, it is true that the Communist Party had 4 million members, and the Communist Youth Organization 3 million members until December 1989. Nonparty professionals were rare in the apparatus. We must win most of these people over. We reject the idea of excluding all the so-called old members on the basis of some kind of collective guilt. This would be neither just nor democratic. We are for individual investigation and using a legal framework for calling to account people who are really guilty. It is a fact that, mostly in the lower echelons, many people saved themselves as a result of the chaos. Besides, we are for a continuous and gradual change free of extremism. However, this needs time.

[Fuzes] What about the future national minority policy?

[Nastase] This depends on the progress of comprehensive democratization. We would like to enact laws that assert the rights of the national minorities both according to the European norms and in reality. However, we must wait until the Romanian majority stops feeling that the minority received more rights and privileges. Besides, a lack of confidence toward Hungarians continues, and many Romanians feel threatened.

[Fuzes] From what?

[Nastase] The events on 15 March and the fact that the Hungarian election campaign made use of the issue of Transylvanian minorities made a bad impression on many people here.

[Fuzes] Why?

[Nastase] Many Romanians confused the positions of the nationalist Hungarian emigration with the position of the political parties in Budapest. This also shows that we need a lot more mutual knowledge and better information about each other. I would like to stress that, in our view, Romania and Hungary should cooperate in as many areas as possible as good neighbors. [end Nastase interview]

I.V. Sandulescu does not predict results. The goal of the NLP is to come first among the opposition parties. In his view, for the time being, fear and uncertainty make people adhere to the Front.

[Fuzes] What is the difference between your program and the other parties' programs?

[Sandulescu] We want freedom, democracy, privatization, and a market economy, and we want to promote private ventures and to give the land back to the peasants.

[Fuzes] Will you form an alliance with some parties?

[Sandulescu] We are waiting for the results. I would prefer to sleep until the official results are announced, as I have had enough tension. One thing is certain: We will not form any coalition with the Front.

[Fuzes] What is your position on the national minority issue?

[Sandulescu] I had an extremely useful discussion with Geza Domokos, chairman of the Magyar Democratic Union of Romania [MDUR] on 19 May. We agreed to also discuss specific issues after the elections. Besides, in my view, the prospects of Hungarian-Romanian relations are excellent. My party believes in a Central European and European union, and Bucharest and Budapest could play a very important role in promoting this union. [end Sandulescu interview]

Dr. Ion Barbus greets me in Hungarian, as he originates from Satu Mare. He switches to Romanian when he talks officially, and, in his view, both the election preparations and the elections themselves strongly eclipsed the opposition, and the Front abused its power.

[Fuzes] How?

[Barbus] The opposition did not have time to counterbalance the conditioning of 40 years of Communist dictatorship. During the campaign, we were isolated from the press, and the post did not hand out our newspapers, and almost all our 800,000 members have been living under constant threat. Three of our activists were killed, 72 of our elections offices were ransacked, and our party members were physically abused in more than 2,000 cases. On the other hand, the Front inherited the 17 billion lei property of the former Communist Party, including all the country's public administration and infrastructure. I also heard of cases in which voting slips already stamped were handed over. Where is there a free election here? If free elections were held here, the opposition would win.

[Fuzes] Whom do you count on?

[Barbus] I do not know yet. My party is seeking alliance with 14 other parties, mainly with the liberals and the social democrats, either in opposition or in the government. We will not cooperate with the Front in any case.

Daily on Positive Nature of Elections

AU3105175290 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 22 May 90 p 1

[Julian Costandache article: "Romania's True Face"]

[Text] In the days that proceeded the revolution, during the revolution, and until the victory, the Romanians, moved by the same thoughts and the same goal, showed an extraordinary unity. The spontaneous uprising directed the flow toward a unique path, and the most visible scene for it was the street. Do you still remember the happy hugs of the victors, the raised fingers with the victory sign, the gentle words, and the expressions of self-denial when each person wanted to help the other. The bustle of the street and the care for one another went far beyond the condition of the citizen, it rather represented the belonging to the same nation, in a major patriotic meaning, a fact that was noted and praised by the whole world. Thus, the Romanian people returned to their own nature and expressed their dignity frankly and with candor.

However, democracy has not strengthened this unity. On the contrary, it dispersed it. It was only natural that contradictions and different goals and ideals would appear but no rivalry and antagonism. Those who for more than 40 years were bending their heads suddenly believed themselves masters of their own destinies and were trying to impose their own opinions on others. It is bewildering how after so much silence the emotions broke out as if a volcano were reactivated. It was the street again that reflected these actions with the most

fidelity. A few months of nonstop unrest, demonstrations, strikes, meetings, flurry, and violence followed. Politics seemed to have destroyed patriotism, and the idea of being a Romanian seemed to have been pushed to end of the parties' priorities. The solutions for restructuring proposed by them seemed to have blurred the sight of the citizen and made him in a way subjective and opaque. The opacity also results from ignoring the partner in the competition, from braking dialogue, and from misunderstandings. All these were leading to frenzy and uncontrollable actions. The street was again witness to the conflict, and even democracy seemed to sway seriously. The world was judging us gloomily, waiting for the explosion of the bomb.

And then a moment of revelation came when again we were our own selves. Who could have dreamed about this warm and clear day of 20 May? Who would have believed in the calm atmosphere full of hope that provides the framework for the future? Those who were expecting great sensation were extremely disappointed. No incident, no intervention, and no confusion. A relaxed and clear atmosphere. A complete understanding of the situation and an intensive participation. A clear dialogue among people who not long ago were not even talking to each other. The street was again the witness of these events.

Thus, the Romanian people have regained their understanding and unity. Because their aspirations for calm, peace, work, and happiness are the aspirations of all of us. Because only in harmony can one achieve prosperity. I believe that now and here Romania showed its true face, which did not miss its historical chance.

Chance For 'Genuine Democracy' 'Missed'

AU2405163390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1443 GMT 24 May 90

["Elections in Romania: Assessments by the Bucharest Press"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 24/5/1990—In a commentary in daily ROMANIA LIBERA Florin Gabriel Marculescu reviews declarations and stands taken in various countries, including the USSR and the U.S., about the electoral process, recognizing it is difficult to match them. The author comments the National Salvation Front's [NSF] victory as follows: "Quite uncommon seems to be only the fact that communism is brought to power through free elections for the first time now. It is a singular performance on a world plane, and it comes after 45 years of terrible and devastating communist dictatorship." The columnist assesses that "the almost unique chance to take now the road of genuine democracy and join in the flow of European values has been missed, at least for a while, with amazing carelessness." He blames this "failure" on all those who "refused to understand the historic significance of their option." Assessing that the poll was "a significative moment but by no means a decisive one," the author thinks it necessary that in the two-year interval until the next elections the oppositions acquire a viable structure apt to win the confidence of broadest possible social categories.

As for the possible existence of an opposition in the future parliament, the same daily publishes a note highlighting legal aspects.

Daily ADEVARUL carries a commentary by A. Gavrilescu who writes in his commentary "the opposition in mourning attire": "In the future parliament, the society's major political force—the National Salvation Front—will have the advantage of the majority. The sufferings of the opposition parties are big and they must be respected. The way to power becomes thorny and it is only the struggle of ideas and pragmatic programs that will make the defeat bearable." The author notes also that the prevalence of only one political formation in social life raises many questioning marks about pluralism, economic and ideological convergence. He advocates the assertion of a genuine democracy, a constructive social dialogue that should guarantee stability and consensus. The author opines that in order to retain its progressive character, authorized by the success in elections, the future parliament is bound to encourage unlimited democratic conduct, that should exclude the isolation of the opposition through an arbitrary reaction of the majority and an exacerbated privileged position of the incumbent.

"Romania has once more proved to be singular in the process of transformations in Eastern Europe and the revolution here retains the peculiarities it started with" writes in TINERETUL LIBER Constantin Sorescu in an article explaining the NSF's landslide electoral victory. As for the accusation that the NSF defrauded the elections abetted by the people, the author notes that the opposition explains the disaster by the winner's fraudulent strategy on the one hand and the electorate's instrumentality on the other hand.

Showing that he is independent and by no means a pleader for the Front, the author writes: "No error, wanted or unwanted, could alter the correctness of the final figures. The Romanian people sanctioned on May 20 the ghost of a possible dictatorship that has been haunting some cities' squares for some time now, on which some political, apolitical and cultural formations base their publicity campaign... The Romanian electorate did not vote against the opposition but against an obsolete manner of opposing. The May 20 vote confirms the electorate's belief that all that has been left of communism with us is a horrifying memory," the article winds up.

An explanation of the paradox of the first free elections in Romania is attempted by Ioan Buduca in weekly "CUVINTUL." He wonders: "How was it possible that the Romanians, who had a communism imposed by the Soviet tank and who suffered because of the most savage communist dictatorship, opt now for candidates originating from the second line of the former Communist Party? The author considers that the paradox is

explained by the moral, cultural and economic genocide inflicted by communism on the Romanian people, that blurred its political discernment and ability to single out the forms concealing neo-communism and the neo-communist (?system) in the new conditions. But it is a helpful evil, the author concludes, predicting that although "we will not have a coalition government, those who are stuck to the power now the same as their forerunners will bring the disgrace upon themselves the way the other ones did."

Octavian Stireanu, chief editor of daily "AZI" thinks the NSF election success needs not too many explanations, as it is determined by "the rational nature of the platform program, the (?realistic) approach to the interests of the poorly provided for categories of the population—pensioners, students, large families. As for the "vote distribution," O. Stireanu notes that the Front's success was helped unwillingly and unknowingly by the "opposition" itself, as it appointed leaders who, living abroad for a long time, proved they did not understand the Romanian people's frame of mind.

Need for Healthy Opposition Emphasized

AU3105120090 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 24 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Al. Gavrilescu article: "Opposition in Mourning"]

[Text] In the next parliament, the main political force of our society, the National Salvation Front [NSF], will benefit from the advantages of the majority. Guilty of that is the Romanian electorate, which will go on trial for having been converted to the idea of democracy. The suffering of the opposition parties is great, therefore, one should show the appropriate respect. The road to power is difficult and only the struggle of ideas and pragmatic programs will make this terrible defeat bearable. The defeat rules and explains the anger of the personalities who agreed to appear on the candidate lists. That is why the opposition should unite. The official terminology used in University Square is not enough to make a real impact on the authorities; it remains what it is, namely an artisan's weapon in an antiquity museum. The drama experienced by the parties that came out of competition can be explained by the impact made on the public's thinking by the persistent political and moral dilemmas raised during the preelectoral campaign by an apparently immaculate intransigence. The explosion of contradictions threatened civic peace, thus foreshadowing a Bonaparte-type of carnage and tyranny. Romania's social realities did not require linguistic stereotypical formulations from the leaders, but rather ideas capable of encouraging the process of consensus as a reaction against the political desert that risked starting, if not a civil war, then at least a war of all against all.

The answers were not satisfactory and did not take into account the formidable force of the electorate, which decided concisely and clearly: No! It was the shortest and most vigorous answer of contemporary history. The authorization of the voting stamp has revealed a social awareness capable of disarming some foreign observers with preconceived ideas about the purely fictional manipulation of the ballot. Still, the massive presence of a single formation on the political scene raises many question marks about pluralism and about economic and ideological convergence, suggesting possible crises. True democracy, as shown by world experience, requires—not as a mere formality—a system in which specific social interests and differences of opinion must be seriously represented in a creative social dialogue, which should guarantee stability and consensus.

As an organizational structure of the national public opinion, the parliament must have the strength to survive the vulnerable temptations of a gravitational and united democracy, whose single expression would be an avalanche of frenetic endorsements. The idyllic picture of fraternization in a one-way bloc devoid of diverse opinions and private values—with only one good and one evil—would make the electorate believe less strongly in those for whom it voted, thus accentuating confusion, indifference, and cynicism toward the state's social programs and projects. In order to be efficient, a democratic government needs and implies, as a strong and convincing proof, an opposition. However, opposition does not mean a state of conflict, nor does it mean usurpation of the discretionary right of an overwhelming majority over the extant minority. Regardless of its merits, unconditional loyalty to those in power ends up as a kind of society identified with a revolute historical experience, which favored bureaucratic thinking and totalitarian precepts. It is even more difficult to believe that a dominant group will resist the temptation to assume leading functions by invoking the need to defend the political order legitimated by its electoral success.

In order to maintain its progressive character, the future Romanian parliament is dutybound to stimulate unlimited democratic behavior, which should take care not to isolate the opposition through the arbitrary reaction of the majority, not to encourage conjectural speculations, and not to exacerbate the privileged position of those that have the greater weight. Persevering and creative common work, which is essential for promoting competent approaches, is an important variable for changing unilateral, nondialectical, and arbitrary attitudes into decisive political acts that can achieve social results in a democratic framework that is steady, strong, and realistic. Instead of a simple distribution of spheres of influence, one should prefer an objective parliament, which is in step with the country's realities and does not want to risk becoming involved in a uniform and approximate political practice. The goal, not the idyllic presumption, should be to maintain the specific identity of opposing concepts. In order to be credible, the parliament should create its own opposition.

NLP's Campeanu Favors 'Constructive Opposition'

AU0106185190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1814 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 1/6/1990—The National Liberal Party's [NLP] leadership made a political analysis of the May 20 legislative elections in the Thursday [31 May] meeting of the party's enlarged permanent delegation that included heads of county organizations, the central leadership and all the deputies and senators elected, stated Mr Radu Campeanu in an interview with a ROMPRES editor.

After such an analysis which evinced "the frauds and the real part of elections," attention concentrated on questions related to the party's organization. Its fast development after its refoundation on January 6, brought about "some mistakes, some irregularities in organization, which is but natural," specified the collocutor. However, the National Liberal Party is "at its youth though it is the oldest party of Romania."

Some representatives, Mr Campeanu mentioned, raised the problem of the party's participation or not in a possible coalition government. I clearly said no proposal of the kind was advanced and I think none will ever be made taking into account the election returns: 85 percent of votes for a president and 67 percent of mandates in the Parliament for only one party. Most of the participants opined we should not partake of a coalition. Nevertheless, no final decision can be said was taken because there was no proposal of the kind, Mr Campeanu specified.

I told the participants we decided to participate in the Parliament's works even if we contested the election returns. We take them as they are, in a spirit of democracy and we shall make a constructive opposition, that is we shall not criticize systematically everything the government does but where we think criticism should be made we shall table effective proposals for reforms and laws regarding the liberalization of the economy and the democratization of the country. We shall associate in the Parliament with those who have opinions similar to ours, the NLP president also said.

Answering a question related to the future electoral strategy of his party, Mr Radu Campeanu said the meeting considered that local elections should take place before the legislative elections to be held in two years from now.

For the time being it is important to work out the constitution in which the liberals will take part through a constructive opposition. To this end, a working bureau was set up within the party, formed up of a team of jurists and economists specialized in constitutional, economic, social and trade union matters that should be highly dynamic and meet, through the solutions given, our requirements in the Parliament during the debates on the new constitution.

National Liberal Party Statements on Elections

AU2505121990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0938 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 25/5/1990—The National Liberal Party [NLP] released a statement which assesses that the May 20 poll meant a step ahead in the evolution of the Romanian democracy on the road opened by the december revolution, while criticizing the process of election campaign that proceeded "under the token of terror, aggression, violence, calumny and intimidation".

The radio and especially the television did not contribute enough to an impartial information and free expression of the various political options, the NLP considers, and the election return were impaired by the irregularities and abuses in the preparations for and unfolding of the elections.

After listing the faults found out, the statement mentions that these as well as the documents that bear evidence, are recorded in the complaint filed with the Central Electoral Bureau.

The statement reads in conclusion:

"We make a point of showing that, irrespective of the election returns, the National Liberal Party means to accept them and participate in the parliament proceedings in order to be able to express the view of a large section of public opinion. This is a requisite of democracy. However, this does not mean we can forget about the deeds that led to a misrepresentation of the Romanian electorate's options.

"Our stand remains the same. We will firmly contribute to the establishment of genuine democracy in Romania. We will collaborate with all forces joining in the struggle against totalitarian structures. We think a realistic parliamentary opposition must be formed.

"It is only those who try to preserve the old structures that are in opposition to the romanian people's interests. The Romanian revolution had an anti-communist character and it must peacefully but firmly go on the same way".

Hungarian Federation Chief Discusses Elections

LD2505234390 Budapest MTI in English 1357 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Bucharest, May 25 (MTI)—Geza Domokos, president of the Hungarian Democratic Federation in Romania (HDFR), has given an interview to MTI's Bucharest correspondent on the Romanian elections and the situation in the wake of the National Salvation Front's victory.

Mr Domokos attributed the front's landslide victory to major changes in the situation of the Romanian people during the past six months after the brutal dictatorship, including greater freedom and better living conditions.

Numerous socially crucial decisions have been taken which made for perceptibly improving public mood.

People tend to feel grateful to the Front and, personally, to Ion Iliescu.

On the other hand, opposition parties were not able to popularize their programmes, which, Mr Domokos feels, are not capable of meeting social requirements the way they should.

Also, these parties did not have enough time to get stronger, appoint suitable leaders, or run a proper election campaign.

Aggressive style was characteristic of almost every party, especially the Front, during the past few weeks.

Yet the excessive anti-communist feelings typical, for instance, of the Peasant Party papers, caused great consternation.

We should not forget that the Communist Party used to have four million members at least, and we should consider their families, relatives and friends.

People seemed to be more afraid of a witch-hunt than the occasional signs of possible regression.

Mr Domokos is of the opinion that the National Liberal Party, following in the footsteps of European liberalism, has good prospects.

This party is open to dialogue, but has not had sufficient time to build up mass support.

Mr Domokos said he was pleased with the election success of the HDFR, which was no surprise in view of its disciplined and conscious group of supporters.

He added it was depressing that the other parties fell so far behind the Front.

"This will make it very difficult for them to exert any influence in parliament and public life when the constitution and laws are drawn up," he said.

In connection with the fact that, despite its landslide victory, the Front has pressed for a coalition, Mr Domokos had the following to say:

Unfortunately, the National Salvation Front, the government and Iliescu himself sacrificed the relationship between the Hungarian ethnic community in Romania and the Romanians to election interests, even making things worse by halting the promising process of settling relations between Romania and Hungary.

It slowly got to be on good terms with the extreme forces represented by the Vatra Romaneasca.

This is so obvious and ignited such a great degree of distrust in the ranks of the Hungarian community of Romania, and naturally the HDFR, that it is very difficult to speak of any sort of coalition or cooperation at the moment.

Of course, politics has no place for hurt feelings, Mr Domokos added.

He does not think it unlikely that Hungarians will be among the government's independent experts in posts of deputy minister or even minister, if the Front sends a request to this end.

Incidentally, late this month, the HDFR Presidium is to hold a debate in Sfintu Gherghe [spelling as received] on the strategy to be applied in the new situation with the participation of members of parliament and senators.

Amid the current power relations, any type of coalition could be nothing but formal.

The Front has such a dominance that it can be easily lured by totalitarian ideas, said Mr Domokos.

"Although at a standstill in Romania, the East European processes will not stop at the border of the country and will definitely appear within one or two years."

"Romania faces severe economic problems and social tensions which were generally ignored during the campaign, with the government doing its utmost to apply makeup to the faults. Fill in the cracks and keep silent about the problems for the sake of appearances. They will have to pay for this. Such a policy cannot be pursued, as contradictions should be allowed to surface in order to track down solutions."

"I don't think that the Front on its own will be able to combat these difficulties, and I am quite sure that the elections in one or two years will have a completely different outcome."

As far as the near future is concerned, Mr Domokos had the following to say:

"I think emotions will be abating now, and the Front will not be so much exposed to the pressure of Romanian nationalism. This will make for an opening towards the nationalities. The dialogue started in January has been resumed, and I would like to believe, that will be the start of a dialogue with the Hungarian Government as well to find a compromise. This is what the European governments and public would really welcome."

"Realistic and fruitful dialogue has one condition only: guaranteeing minority rights and replacing words by drafting specific programmes."

"A hopeful sign was the bad election performance of the party founded by the Vatra Romaneasca. It shows that the organization lacks a mass support, and that the road to Romanians and Hungarians understanding each other is not blocked."

Hungarian Democratic Union's Domokos on Elections

AU2705162790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1454 GMT 27 May 90

["Political Life: The Electoral Process Was Generally Normal"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/5/1990—In a news conference held by the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR], Domokos Geza, chairman of the union, assessed that the election campaign in Romania proceeded in a calm and civilized manner. As for the electoral act, which disclosed the overwhelming adhesion of the Hungarian population in Romania to the HDUR platform program, it proceeded generally in normal conditions and there is no evidence so far of an atmosphere that might have influenced or intimidated the electorate, he noted.

Referring to the fact that the Hungarian minority voted to a great extent for Radu Campeanu, he showed that the Hungarian electorate's option was due to the fact that the NLP [National Liberal Party] understood the correctness and soundness of that minority's aspirations, while the National Salvation Front, Ion Iliescu in particular, had, especially in the period of the election campaign, an attitude of rejecting the claims.

Domokos Geza mentioned that the HDUR, its senators and deputies would work for the accomplishment of the legitimate aspirations of the Hungarian population in Romania.

Likewise he expressed disagreement with and protest against the provisions of the recent government decision on the organization and unfolding of the future school-year, an act which , he opined, does not meet the requirements of tuition in Hungarian and does not ensure the democratization of education in Romania.

National Liberal Party Campeanu News Conference

AU2605211190 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 26 May 90

[Report on news conference by National Liberal Party President Radu Campeanu at the Intercontinental Hotel press center in Bucharest on 26 May]

[Text] At the news conference, Mr. Radu Campeanu said, quote, although no offers were extended regarding our party's participation in the parliamentary life, by virtue of the election results, the party leadership has decided to take part in the work of this forum and this despite serious irregularities in the campaign and elections. [no reference to closing of quotation as heard] The speaker stressed that this participation is justified by the fact that a large segment of the public currently not represented in parliament should have its representation. Mr. Radu Campeanu also said that the National Liberal Party will evidently remain in the opposition but that this will be an opposition that rejects systematic criticism while only criticizing that which deserves being criticized, puts forward proposals for reforms, and takes a stand on all issues facing the country in the coming two years. The speaker's conclusion was that the main issues facing the new parliament are of a constitutional nature and that the participation of the National Liberal Party in this field will be a very active one. The need to draw up a law regarding the election of the new administration of municipalities, towns, and communes was underlined. The Liberal leader, at the same, stressed the need to draw up a new election law in accordance with the new constitution with a view to holding the next elections.

Newspaper Comments on Election's 'Moral Fraud'

AU0106090190 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 29 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Octavian Paler article: "Dangerous Victory"—part I]

[Text] The moral fraud began, without us realizing it, on 22 December itself, when a group of former Communist Party militants and "incidental" people—for lack of anything better, let us call them that until one can disentangle the threads of those obscure events—took advantage of the vacuum of power created, the notoriety of certain manifestations of opposition from within the party and Marxist ideology, and a certain candor of the general enthusiasm in order to take over power by claiming that it is the emanation of a revolution, which was actually anticommunist in its nature. Happy to have rid ourselves of Ceausescu, dizzy and overwhelmed by a huge feeling of relief, we forgot that Ceausescu—far from being a solitary aberration—was the product of a system; therefore, we failed to grasp, then and in the following days, the possible consequences. We limited ourselves to seeing in the figures that were appearing on our TV screens the proof of our escape from the nightmare of the dictatorship; we could not imagine that the future would raise so many problems. As a matter of fact, the succession of those persons, with their tricolor armbands, on the TV screens worked on our psychology without us realizing it, as the subversive TV advertisements of the decadent West. I recall how indignant I was when the French press "dared" come up with the idea of a possible coup d'etat, a coup prepared well in advance, which took advantage of the storm released by the revolution to carry out what it did not dare do until then, or did not even start daring to do! Crying with joy at being finally free, we failed to realize the direction in which we were being pushed. We also did not realize that the terrorists, the mysterious terrorists who tormented us for days and nights on end might have been—with the exception of some isolated fanatics who were putting up a bitter resistance—part of a scenario designed to keep the population in check and accumulate political capital from the gratitude of those who were being deceived. We also failed to realize that the famous evening of 12 January—when the demonstration in Victory Square was broadcast live by television and I was trembling for Mr. Iliescu's fate—was the crisis of the power struggle

within the group that took over the helm of the country and presented itself as the savior of the nation. Illusions began to crumble only at the end of January, when the [National Salvation] Front decided to declare its hand (could Shevardnadze's visit have played a part in this decision?) by retracting its first statements and admitting that it wants to participate in the elections. However, the stakes have already been laid down by now. The Communist Party has vanished like a desert river covered by sand. More exactly, the almost 4 million fee-paying party members found themselves in an ambiguous situation, which was taken advantage of later: Since they could not leave a party that vanished into thin air, they found themselves the victims of a well-fanned confusion, since the hatred against communism might also hurt them abusively. The Marxist ideology ceased to be official and it was even publicly repudiated. However, the state created and fashioned by the Communist Party—that is the state through which the Communist Party governed and confiscated the entire society for more than 40 years—was still standing. Hardly anything has been touched in the bureaucratic apparatus of the totalitarian state, which was the administrative and executive expression of the communist power, and the group that came to power took over this apparatus.

This was followed by a number of psychological "coups," which completed the initial fraud and again made actual the famous Roman adagio "divide et impera" ("divide and rule"), which Machiavelli was so fond of, and the Jesuit principle "the end justifies the means." We were dumbfounded to see how workers were set up against the intellectuals, miners against the Bucharest inhabitants, the old against the young, and the Romanians at home against those in exile. All this, together with the mistakes and gaffes of some parties, has led to the tearing up of Romanian society, to the poisoning of relations among ourselves, to the exacerbation of tensions, and to the unprecedented escalation of hatred and passions. It is hard to estimate the long-term damage done by the abrupt intoxication of our psychology; however, one could easily see that the most important role in the election campaign was played by phobias: the xenophobia conjured up with the help of the ghost of Ceausescu, whose stupid pronouncements about emigration and the West were seriously shouted and believed by many people; the phobia of the historical parties, a direct result of the long Marxist indoctrination; the phobia of destabilization, which refuses any arguments designed to shake a bit the prevalent confusion and disinformation; and the phobia of elitism, maintained by the well-known totalitarian method of making the people oppose inconvenient opinions.

It seems to me that what Livius Ciocarlie wrote in an article published in the "22" magazine is strictly true: that the communist system, mediocre and bankrupt as it may be, is very good at one thing, namely to make use of power without scruples. In Romania, after it was shaken at its foundations by an anticommunist revolution, it managed to acquire a new face—by changing its name and a number of persons—and to present itself as a savior to a large part of the population, while the historical parties, destroyed and hated by the dictatorship, were turned into obscure and dangerous forces. This operation of turning the truth upside down was, we must confess, a great success. It managed to poison and intoxicate the entire society, to squeeze all benefits from the passions it unleashed, and to make maximum capital out of our fear of the past and the future. Should we still wonder that many considered the unknown as a very risky proposition, like an adventure on quicksand, and that stability became a magic word? Livius Ciocarlie believes that there was only one thing that the operation failed to accomplish, namely to turn the country against those in the Bucharest University Square or in other places who took a stand against the aforementioned successes. My impression is that Liviu Ciocarlie is wrong here. I am afraid that the success was total. Unfortunately, I have enough proof to suspect that those who offended or derided the tragic minority that took to the streets with the illusion of being able to change something actually believed what they said. Moreover, we were witness to another paradox: The aggressive actions of an unbelievable psychological terrorism reminiscent of the hatred sessions in Orwell's "1984" novel—which spared nothing to create a collective hysteria and to intimidate and shut up all those who dared have a different opinion— were accompanied by calls for calm, reason, and the struggle of ideas! If critical voices were surrounded in the past by the kind of silence that one meets in a leper reservation, they were now accompanied by a hubbub of insults, indignities, and slanders. We were confronted with a true orgy of mudslinging. Consequently, on polling day we were traumatized and tired, and wanted quietude rather than changes.

There is now talk about irregularities, as the ballot frauds are politely called. God knows how many they were, small or large. Those of us who stayed in the polling stations only as long as it was necessary to cast our votes are in no position to know how true the accusations are. Likewise, the much more serious moral frauds, which influenced and falsified our options long before the votes were counted, are now important just as possible explanations for our "originality" in East Europe. It seems that we are haunted by a curse of "originality." We had the most primitive and brutal dictatorship in this part of the world, a dictatorship that was antinational and internationalist to begin with and ended up by being antinational and paranoiac (and two-headed too, on top of everything). We are now blessed with another kind of "originality." While all other countries sentenced to damnation at Yalta are shaking off the fateful misfortune that strangled them for 45 years, we have now subscribed to that fatality by legally continuing it in more relaxed and unorthodox forms and under another name. We will no longer be able to accuse others that they imposed Marxism on us. We ourselves have given our Marxists the mandate to lead us. Thus, instead of making a clear break with the past, like the other nations in East Europe did, we simply postponed the future. The reformed (how

much reformed?) old system continues in a democratic disguise. In order to realize this, it is enough to look at our neighbors in the East. Perestroyka has formally accepted both pluralism and the market economy, while Gorbachev continues to call himself a Communist. Therefore, one should not have too many illusions. More than just an economic doctrine, neocommunism is a way of thinking, an inability to rid oneself of the habit of the monologue and accept, with true tolerance, the critical spirit.

We have postponed the future but for how long? I cannot be a hypocrite and flaunt a sort of circumstantial optimism; neither do I want to believe that our past and the evil that set us at loggerheads in the last four months will condemn us to remaining the East's exception. Somewhere between the fear of the past and the fear of what may follow (what will I do if I cannot believe that neocommunism is a mere scarecrow?), I prefer to dwell on the immediate and foreseeable dangers. Because, I must say openly, the Front's crushing electoral victory is, in my opinion, a dangerous victory. "It is a countervictory that raises more problems than a defeat," a French journalist told me. I do not know if this is true. I will limit myself to calling it a dangerous victory. Tomorrow and the day after tomorrow I will try to explain this.

Neagu on Elections, International Relations

AU3105194690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1847 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 31/5/1990—Speaking at a news conference held at the Foreign Press Club in Bucharest on Thursday [31 May], Mr. Romulus Neagu, deputy minister of foreign affairs and spokesman for the ministry, referred to Romania's participation in international meetings that are to take place in the ensuing period.

In connection with the preparatory meeting of the conference on amending the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water due in New York over May 29-June 8, Romulus Neagu specified the Romanian delegation had the mandate to declare for a total ban on nuclear tests, with Romania accepting the phased-out attainment of such a goal. Romania is for the setting up of a special committee, at the disarmament conference in Geneva still this year, on banning nuclear tests and holding negotiations conducive to new openings and tangible steps toward an accord.

Mr. Romulus Neagu also informed that, in view of Romania's adherence to the Council of Europe, a team of high Romanian functionaries recently visited Strasbourg for a better knowledge of the possibilities of cooperation this European organization offers. In essence, attention concentrated on establishing cooperation forms whereby Romania could participate in the Council's activities, the accords and conventions adopted by the council it could ratify before and after adherence as well as the measures it should take for the Romanian legislation to allow for a faster democratization of the social, economic and political life in accordance with the statute and documents of the Council of Europe.

Referring to the meeting on human rights within the CSCE due in Copenhagen over June 5-29, Mr. Romulus Neagu said: in Conformity with the aims of the December 1989 revolution and with the orientations toward establishing a pluralist, democratic system and a state of law, the Romanian delegation will table at the meeting the measures taken on a domestic plane for the guaranteeing and exercise of the foremost human rights as well as the preoccupations of the future government for the elaboration of the new constitution and the adjustment of the Romanian legislation to the provisions of the CSCE documents.

Underscoring that the Romanian delegation will also work for the adoption of a declaration regarding the rights of the persons belonging to ethnical or religious minorities and the protection of their identity, the spokesman showed that the Romanian and Hungarian Governments would come to Copenhagen with common draft theses with a view to working out such a declaration specifying that was Romania's initiative.

Answering a question referring to the statement on the United States' viewpoint on the elections in Romania, set forth by Mrs. Margaret Tutwiler, spokesman for the Department of State, and to other statements made in Washington, Romulus Neagu, deputy minister of foreign affairs, said during a press conference held on Thursday: All this caused us serious disappointment as it runs counter to reality, it is unjust and unfair to the Romanian people. These statements, he said, do not serve the development of the democratic processes the United States says it supports in Romania and throughout the world. We express our hope, the spokesman for the Romanian Foreign Ministry said, that the definitive assessment by the U.S. Administration of the elections and of the situation in Romania in general will show a sense of realism and balance, lacking preconceived ideas or partisan influences. As for Romania, we reiterate our wish to work for the development of links with the U.S.A. on new bases, both in the political and economic areas, set on mutual confidence and respect, dignity and national option, Mr. Romulus Neagu also said.

Danger of Communist Ideal of Work Noted

AU3105191890 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 25 May 90 p 1

[B. Marian article: "Democracy of Work—A State of Mind"]

[Text] Well, if you ask what exactly is that "Romanian democracy" (Iliescu calls it "original," while the FSN-ists [National Salvation Front] call it "not American, not British, but one of our own!"), the only answer that you can get is..."work! to work, everybody to work!." That is, the democracy of work, the domination of blind labor,

the universalization and generalization of the act of producing, regardless of conditions. As Ceausescu would say: Build and produce until you wear yourself out, reproduce in an irresponsible way, and reproduce in a compulsory way! Erect useless enterprises and inhuman blocks of flats, and make at least five children per family (even if you do not have anything to feed them or clothes to put on them)!

Communism, and in his exemplary way, Ceausescu, have always had the ideal of producing opulence, quantities by all means, and irresponsible stockpiling. A masked imperialism and geographical expansion in the political area, a demographic explosion in the social area, useless mammoths in the industrial area, gigantic and useless enterprises in the economic area, and so on and so forth.

Much work, as much work as possible! And increased labor productivity! Everywhere, feeding on the idea of work—the noncreative work, which is incapable of a qualitative leap, except in words, the nonprogressive and unimaginary work, and work in vain—the cancer of communism has grown as a huge swell, which intoxicated minds and gobbling them up, detoured their progress.

It would be better if before starting to work, we stopped to think for a moment: How do we work, for what do we work, and for whom do we work? And then, we will not hurry to curse and send "to work" the one who is on strike or is claiming something through passivity. Then, we will not get so confused as to believe that we are clever only because we work, and we will realize that ignoring labor productivity can have its reasons.

If not, we will only trigger another form of despotism, we will only reinstate the Ceausescu-type despotism of labor productivity, and the proletariat-cult form that brought shame and misery to the Romanian people for 45 years.

Association Calls for UCY, RCP Dismantlement

AU2805190490

[Editorial Report] Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian on 23 May 1990 carries on page 1 a 500-word "Communique" signed by the 21 December Association of Bucharest announcing that the association issues "official documents testifying to the wish of former members of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] and of the Union of Communist Youth [UCY] to no longer belong to these organizations, thus leading to their dismantlement." The immediate purpose of this initiative is to "collect a number of half plus one of such documents" from former members, after which one can "officially demand the dismantlement" of the RCP and UCY.

Three-Fourths Majority for Bills Advocated

AU3005103290 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 24 May 90 p 1

[Dumitru D. Ifrim article: "About the Possibility of an Opposition"]

[Text] The solution we refer to is of a strictly legal nature. We will mention it briefly, due to more pressing events. Concerning other solutions of a different nature, we may deal with them at a later time.

As is known, a democracy is all the stronger when there is a real balance of power between those in power and those in the opposition. Moreover, a parliamentary system can operate better when the government has to face a strong opposition in the parliament.

Due to the crushing victory obtained by the National Salvation Front [NSF] on 20 May—as the polls of the election results indicate—the beginning of democracy in our country is so frail that it does not even exist at the level of the state's organization. In order to make one feel this beginning, we have in mind a solution that should be discussed by the parliament from the very first days. Of course, it is only one of the solutions that will be examined by the representatives elected by the people on 20 May to exert power and create the mechanism for the exercise of power.

Of course, the key problems of this mechanism will be solved by the constitution that will be adopted by the elected parliament. However, until the constitution is adopted, the parliament will adopt its organizational and operational regulations.

Therefore, in view of the fact that the NSF has won the elections with a crushing majority, we believe that—in order to facilitate the emergence of even a frail opposition in the mechanism of power exertion—the functioning regulations of the two-tier parliament (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) should stipulate a three-fourths majority of parliament members as the main requirement for adopting decisions, or at least draft bills, and other measures of great importance for Romania's fate.

Only thus will it be possible to take into consideration the will of other political groups represented in the parliament that form the opposition. Only thus will one be able to overcome the qualified two-thirds majority, which is now covered by the massive and crushing presence of the NSF representatives.

Of course, one can argue that the suggested solution is rather superficial and restrictive and that it can hamper and make harder the activity of the government and the ability to govern. Likewise, one may say that none of the known parliamentary democracies practice such a system. However, it is no less true that the current situation in our country is an exceptional one. If we want to make real progress toward democracy, our solution may become one of these frail starts.

I am afraid that, from a legal viewpoint, this may be the only solution.

Dec Events Not Viewed as 'External Plot'

AU3105122790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1134 GMT 31 May 90

["Agora: The Obsession of Yalta"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 31/5/1990—Daily ADEVARUL terms as impiety "the allegations in an article in French review LE POINT" reproduced by some Romanian publications, according to which what happened in Romania would have been "a blood-stained plot."

In an article in the daily's May 31 issue, publicist Dumitru Tinu terms as "at least ridiculous the tales told by LE POINT," which "fuel an insidious campaign started by some political quarters for ugly and mean reasons: Because among the active participants in the events of December were also some of their political opponents."

The author's argument is that the Yalta understandings are bygone: "Can one still mention Yalta after the storm that has turned Europe upside-down in less than two years?"

To say that the KGB or the CIA did not keep in their safe scripts of possible developments in Romania would mean to underrate them, he says maintaining also that if there really was an external plot, that was the plot of silence. To give an example, the Romanian publicist recalls that when Bessarabian writer Ion Druta questioned Mikhail Gorbachev in the Congress of People's Deputies, the latter declared "to our great dismay, that the data supplied by his ambassador in Bucharest did not allow him to assess the situation accurately." "I rather think," Dumitru Tinu writes, "that preoccupied with the events in his own country, the Soviet leader did not want to get involved even when the dictatorship, that had become so embarrassing for the Kremlin reformer, was spectacularly falling."

Tokes on Causes of Increased Emigration

AU3005194290 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 25 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Hungarian-Language Church University To Be Set Up in Romania?—Laszlo Tokes for Eliminating the Causes of Emigration"]

[Text] In one of his statements, Presbyterian Bishop Laszlo Tokes—who travelled to Temesvar [Timisoara] in the middle of this week—regarded the issue of Hungarian education in Romania and halting the emigration of national minorities as the most important tasks to be solved.

In connection with the issue of Hungarian higher education in Romania, the Board of Directors and Bishops Committee of the Kiralyhago Presbyterian Synod sent a letter to the Romanian education minister stressing the importance of restoring native-language education for the Hungarian minority living in Romania. "We cannot understand or idly view the opposing attitude of our country's government and of some Romanian circles in connection with this"—the letter stresses and adds that, finally, Bucharest should completely discard the educational policy of the Ceausescu dictatorship.

If the educational ministry and the government do not take immediate and effective measures to implement Hungarian-language education at all levels and if they do not allow the restoration of the Bolyai University," our church will establish a church university in cooperation with the Hungarian brother churches and with the support of other Hungarian institutions and organizations"—the letter published in Nagyvarad [Oradea] pointed out.

The Kiralyhago Presbyterian Synod published a statement in which it expressed alarm over the increasing emigration. The document signed by Bishop Laszlo Tokes and General Superintendent Ferenc Szatmary points out that the only effective way of halting emigration is to eliminate the causes the led to this wave of emigration. In addition to the general uncertainty of existence, the document mentions the following causes: Anti-Hungarian incitement that has spread all over the country following the events in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures], and the lack of a firm government stand against this; the anti-Hungarian historical ideology; the continuance of representatives of the old regime occupying the same positions and thus causing fear among the people; as well as the unsolved tensions and confrontations inherited from the previous bilateral state relations.

Laszlo Tokes held a lengthy telephone conversation with writer Andras Suto convalescing in the United States, and they agreed to establish the Transylvania Return Foundation. Bishop Laszlo Tokes will travel to Budapest to announce this and to provide information about the Foundation at an international news conference to be held on 30 May. The above information was supplied to us by the information office of this foundation.

Appeal for Dialogue To End Social Tension

AU0106180390 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1729 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 1/6/1990—The commission investigating the abuses that led to the violation of fundamental human rights and rehabilitating the victims of the dictatorship sent an appeal to ROMPRES signed by its chairman, Dacu Ciuceanu, which shows:

Taking into account the worsening health condition of those on hunger strike who so decided to call attention on the need for dialogue between public opinion and the leading political forces, and in consideration of the principles that have guided our commission's activity, we declare for the finding of an urgent solution apt to

end social tension and lead to establishing a climate of mutual confidence and assertion of democracy as part of national reconciliation.

Roman on FRG-Backed Project for German Minority

AU2405173390 Bucharest NEUER WEG in German 18 May 90 p 1

[Editorial article: "Surprising Statement on the Staying of Germans in Romania. Premier Petre Roman on Long-Term Project With Support From Federal Republic of Germany. The Provisional Government Sums Up Activity"]

[Excerpt] Bucharest (NEUER WEG)—A news conference was held on 16 May in the government building, during which Premier Petre Roman made an inventory of the activity carried out by the Romanian provisional government so far and made an—at the least—surprising statement for all Romanian and foreign journalists in connection with a "project for ethnic Germans to stay in Romania," whereby framework conditions will be created that will make remaining in their homeland more attractive for those who want to emigrate and induce people who have already emigrated to the FRG to return.

The projects involves FRG investments for setting up the "Saeger" Society, Machine Building Minister Adrian Pintilie explained. "An initial financial aid of 4,000 Deutsche marks for each German in Romania will be made available by the federal government, which is promoting a new immigration policy." By accepting these contributions, Romania becomes the administrator of these sums of money; however, this is an extremely difficult and pressing task that has emerged because some 80 percent of the 200,000 Germans still living in Romania have already applied for exit permits. "Even after the December revolution," Adrian Pintilie said, "on average, 150 Germans are leaving Romania for the FRG every single day. The project primarily envisions the introduction of new technologies in enterprises and undertakings in areas where ethnic Germans are living." This project is a long-term economic undertaking.

During the news conference, Prime Minister Petre Roman read a report on the activity of the provisional government. [passage omitted]

RMDSz Criticizes 'Trianon' Leaflet Affair

LD3105093190 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0900 GMT 31 May 90

[Text] The ROMANIAN PRESS AGENCY has reported that Hungarian-language leaflets were found on 30 May near Arad. The leaflet, prepared in a Miskolc printing works, appeals to believers to take part in a church service in front of the basilica on the 70th anniversary of the Trianon peace treaty. The signatory is the Trianon organizing forum of the National Christian Union [Nemzeti Kereszteny Unio Trianoni szervezesi foruma].

The Democratic Union of Magyars in Romania [RMDSz] has issued a statement in connection with the affair. In this it reports that it had already dissociated itself publicly, on Bucharest Television, from this irredentist organization. The union is of the view that on this occasion a provocation has taken place whose intention is to mar Hungrian-Romanian relations and that instigates ethnic tensions in Romania.

The official statement of RMDSz, which was signed by Geza Domilos, its president, appealed to the Magyars in Romania not to let themselves be used for objectives contrary to their interests.

Hungarian Peace Delegation's Visit Viewed

AU3105194990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1906 GMT 31 May 90

["Diplomatic Activity—Visit by a Delegation of the Peace Movement of Hungary"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 31/5/1990—A delegation of the peace movement of Hungary, led by Writer Miklos Hubay, member of the Presidium of the Hungarian Peace council, paid a visit to Romania over May 28-31.

The guests conducted talks with the chairman of the Peace Alliance of Romania, Academician Stefan Milcu, and had interviews with executives of the Writers' Union and of the Journalists' Association and at the Headquarters of the Romanian Cultural Foundation and of the Tirgoviste City Council of the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council].

During these interviews, the determination of the two peace movements was expressed to contribute to the consolidation of their cooperative ties, and emphasis was placed on the major contributinon they can make to the establishment and development of relations of mutual respect and understanding, to knowledge of the spiritual assets of the Romanian and Hungarian peoples.

U.S.-USSR Summit Centers on 'Civilian Themes'

AU0206174390 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Slavoljub Susic commentary]

[Text] The very fact that in the latest U.S.-Soviet dialogue, civilian themes, so to speak, stand before military problems, favors the assessment that the cold-war period, which prevailed for so many years, is finally over. It was a state of neither war nor peace, a state on the brink of war.

It is noted that President Bush and his guest, Soviet leader Gorbachev, have put at the focus of their attention the question of German unification, relations with a future united Europe, bilateral economic cooperation, and other questions. Such a sequence, of course, is encouraging, although one should not cherish any illusions that all the deposits of the past may be removed in a short time.

President Bush advocates that a united Germany should joint NATO, which intensifies the already noticeable asymmetry of the military might at the expense of the USSR condering the falling apart of the Warsaw Pact. This has been confirmed recently by the defense ministers of the Western military alliance with their statement that the Warsaw Pact no longer constitutes an immediate danger, and they announced that their military strategy will be adjusted to meet the new European reality.

The USSR's opposition to such a status for Germany is interpreted by some people as the Soviet's reluctance to renounce their presence in Berlin and East Germany as a symbol of their war achievements. One could say something similar for the other two European powers, Great Britain and France, in the Western hemisphere.

More agreement has been reached in the field of chemical disarmament, where a halt in the production, and the destruction of existing reserves by 80 percent is envisaged, and by 1998, chemical weapons would be reduced to two percent, and finally they would be completely eliminated from military arsenals on the basis of a comprehensive international treaty.

A ban on nuclear tests and a continuation of the negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe have also been agreed upon. By 1996, the two sides should also reduce their stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent, or rather, to 1,500 launch vehicles, and 6,000 warheads and nuclear bombs each. In the assessment of military experts, this would be quite sufficient to ensure a most successful retaliatory strike in case of a major conflict.

The two statesmen, it seems, have also removed the obstacle in the field of stopping the competition of the two military political alliances in conventional forces, on which negotiations have been conducted in Vienna for 17 years with longer and shorter interruptions.

In the European theater, NATO and the Warsaw Pact now have about 6 million soldiers, 75,000 tanks, about 60,000 large caliber and long-range guns, 18,000 combat planes, and 6,000 helicopters. Therefore one is justified in posing the question of their possible use in a very restricted and urbanized center of the old continent.

Detailed analyses of the results of the latest American-Soviet summit in the military field are yet to arrive, but it may be said even now that great new steps have been made.

Deemed 'Successful'

AU0306155590 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 3 Jun 90

[Special Washington correspondent Slobodan Kovacevic report on the "Sunday at 10" program]

[Text] The summit was successful. This will probably be the shortest assessment of the summit between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his U.S. counterpart George Bush who will hold a joint news conference later today.

During the news conference many reporters, as well as a large part of the world public, will wonder how it is possible for a summit to be successful when this meeting in Washington has not fulfilled the most important expectations: It did not find a solution to the German question, or, at least, indicate a way out of the impasse, and it did not offer something more tangible than the signing of statements on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. The statement on increasing the speed of the negotiations in Vienna for reducing conventional weapons and troops in Europe is still simply hanging in the air until the German question is ultimately resolved.

Despite this, the summit is successful thanks primarily to the political skills of the two statesmen who, immediately following their first working meeting, when it became clear that they were not coming closer let alone overcoming the differences concerning these essential questions, decided to shift the focus of the summit to the more realistic grounds such as bilateral relations, trade, and chemical weapons. Everything that has been achieved here in Washington in the last few days is, of course, of enormous importance for not only the fate of superpower relations, but also for the world as a whole.

The unresolved questions remain, however, unresolved. Awaiting the conclusion of the summit, the press and the media in general are widely commenting on individual aspects of the summit: whether the Soviets deserve such a trade agreement, considering Moscow's attitudes toward Lithuania; whether Gorbachev is the right person for talks, considering that he is decreasingly popular in his own country, and so forth. Nevertheless, everybody gives Gorbachev credit for being a very skilled politician and a special breed of statesman.

The commentators of THE NEW YORK TIMES compare him with the great General de Gaulle, who was

especially known for his ability to turn seemingly hopeless situations to his own advantage. However, the majority of commentators do not expect Gorbachev to have a long political future, especially considering Yeltzin's victory.

Notwithstanding the situation in his own country, Gorbachev demonstrated surprising cool-headedness with his seven-day absence from the USSR. This fact alone means a great deal to the experts.

Finally, before and during the summit, one was able to hear on several occasions that the Americans are the actual winners of the cold war. Of course, this logic of who is a winner and who is a loser has its bad sides, especially when accompanied with a note of malicious joy with regard to what is going on in the other camp. Democratization in the USSR is a process with a highly uncertain outcome and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact is perhaps only a co-phenomenon. However, the great question is what the future of NATO is under conditions characterized by the absence of a counterforce. Or, if this logic was applied in the cases of Japan and Germany, then these countries would be regarded as the winners of the entire peace period since the World War II.

Obviously, it is dangerous to search for winners and losers, whether in the period of detente or during a struggle for peace. This would sooner or later lead again to saber rattling. One must not forget that it was in fact here, in Washington, where the historic documents on the destruction of these arms were signed.

'Alternative' Militia Stations Formed in Kosovo

LD0206150890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1146 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Pec, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—We have learned today from competent workers of the security center in Pec that, on the orders of the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs, a special militia station has been set up in Pec composed of 22 militiamen of Albanian nationality who have been suspended or on stand-by since 24 March. These are mainly militamen who had placed themselves in the service of the Kosovo alternative movement and Albanian separatists, on account of which they had been removed from their posts.

The fact that they have been disciplined several times on various grounds testifies to the kind of militiamen that these men are. This militia station will be an alternative to the existing station formed by the [Serbian] Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs. The basic tasks of the new single-nation militia unit will be the security of buildings, officials, various events and meetings, and so on.

We were told in the Pec security center that a new militia station has also been set up in Decani with 11 previously suspended Albanian militiamen. Dzevad Ibraj, a formerly dismissed commander who has not completed his internal affairs high school studies, has been made commander of this single-nation station.

The setting up of these single-nation militia stations has aroused enormous anger and disappointment among members of the Serb and Montenegrin nationalities, and among other honest citizens of Pec and Decani. A protest meeting has been convened in this connection for 1700 [1500 GMT] today in the Karagas sports hall in Pec. It is being organized by the Metohija Association for the Return of Serbs and Montenegrins in Pec.

Serbia, Kosovo Issue Statement

LD0206132890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0853 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—The special militia units of the Serbian Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs will continue to carry out all the tasks taken over from the militia of the Kosovo provincial secretariat for internal affairs for as long as the decision of the Serbian Presidency is in force, or for as long as is merited by security implications. This is stressed in a statement from the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Autonomous Province [SAP] of Kosovo, which states:

"On the basis of the decision to take over the organization, execution, and implementation of tasks on the territory of the SAP of Kosovo in the sphere of public security in the interests of the Republic as a whole, and according to the law on internal affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs has formed special militia units.

"With the formation of these units all the tasks within the competence of militia stations were taken over from the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs, except for the provision of security for officials and buildings, assistance in the provision of security and the execution of tasks within the competence of other organs, organizations, and communities, and assistance in the prevention and removal of general danger and the detention of persons under the orders of another organ or according to another act of that organ.

"For the execution of tasks not taken over within the competence of the Kosovo Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs, militia workers of the Kosovo Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs will be engaged who have not been taken into the special units of militia of the Serbian Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, and only those against whom proceedings are not underway to establish work accountability and suitability for work in the internal affairs organs.

"The organizational forms and the number of workers who will be made available shortly for carrying out tasks not taken over, will depend on the volume and character of these tasks.

"The special units of militia of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia will continue to carry out all the tasks taken over from the militia of the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs of the SAP of Kosovo for as long as the decision of the Serbian Presidency is in force, or for as long as is called for by reasons of security. The republican secretary has adopted separate instructions which determine work relations between the special units of militia of the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the units of the Provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs which are carrying out tasks not taken over," the statement concludes.

Serbs, Montenegrins Protest

LD0206181390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1732 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Pec, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—About 5,000 Serbs, Montenegrins, and Muslims, embittered by the formation of single-nation militia units in Kosovo, decided at this evening's protest meeting, held in the Karagac Sports Hall in Pec, to send a telegram to the Serbian Presidency and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, of whom the demand is made that they urgently annul the decision to form such militia units, composed of the assistants of Albanian separatists or, in other words, the Kosovo alternative opposition. They are requesting that Radmilo Bogdanovic, the republican secretary for internal affairs, and Jusuf Karakusi, the provincial secretary for internal affairs, be replaced immediately, and that all Albanian separatists and nationalists be purged from the organs of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs, the judiciary, the Prosecutor's Office, and other state administrative organs.

Otherwise, demands were voiced at the meeting for criminal charges to be brought against Bogdanovic, Karakusi, and all those who have aided and abetted this absurdity—resulting, it was said, from the permission to form the Ballist militia units in Kosovo and Metohija. This decision represents yet another betrayal of the Serbian nation in Kosovo and Metohija by individual Serbian leaders, it was said at the protest meeting. The latest incident has destroyed the hope we had that better days were coming, several speakers stressed. Otherwise the meeting took place without excesses.

Independent Trade Union Federation Elects Leader

LD0206170290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1507 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—Momo Colakovic, a delegate of the provincial organization of the Vojvodina Trade Union Federation, was elected today as president of Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia (SSSJ). At a meeting of the SSSJ Council, held during a break in the congressional session, 72 members of the Council voted for Colakovic, in a secret ballot, while his opponent, Istvan Olah, also from Vojvodina, received six votes. The Council numbers 83 members in all, but 78 voted.

Nedjo Bjelica from the Bosnia-Hercegovina Trade Union organization (42 votes) was elected secretary of the Council. The other candidate for this post, Pasko Malenica from the Croatian Trade Union, received 35 votes.

Union 'Confederation' Adopts First Program

LD0206155190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—Delegates to the 11th Congress of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia today unanimously adopted their first program.

According to this program, the trade unions are becoming an interest-based, independent, and autonomous organization of workers, free and independent of all state organs and all political parties, organizations, and associations.

The trade unions will cooperate with all those who have as their objective the development of democracy, humanism, self-management, socialism, and the equality of citizens.

Independent Alliance Formed

LD0206194690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1637 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—Under a new programme adopted by the 11th Congress of Yugoslav Trade Unions, the Yugoslav Trade Union Organization has become an "interest-free and independent" workers' organization called the Alliance of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia.

Momo Colanovic has been elected president of the Independent Trade unions of Yugoslavia.

The transformed organization of Yugoslav trade unions will be independent from the state and all political parties, organizations and associations, as set out in the programme. It will cooperate with all who are for democracy, socialism, self-management and equality.

Under the new statute, the Alliance of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia can be joined by all trade union organizations in the country. The territorial principle of organization of the trade unions in the individual Yugoslav republic's and provinces has been rejected.

The new Yugoslav trade union organization, as specified in the programme, will work for higher pays, the financial and social security of workers, the elimination of

unemployment, the humanization of work, health protection and the like. All members of the Alliance will receive unemployment benefits and will have social security if left jobless.

The 11th Trade Union Congress was addressed today by Deputy Yugoslav Prime Minister Aleksandar Mitrovic, who lent support to the trade union organization's new orientation of being independent from the state and political parties.

Setting out that the introduction of a market economy in Yugoslavia was the only mean to resolving the crisis in the country, Mitrvic denied rumours according to which social property in the country is being sold, as part of the process of reprivatization of social property and the free import of foreign capital. Mitrovic specified that the social property in the country was now worth around 300 billion dollars. Social property will not be turned into a different type of property without adequate compensation, Mitrovic set out and urged the congress delegates to preserve Yugoslavia's unity.

Union Council Elects Presidium

LD0206213890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1613 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—Immediately following the 11th Yugoslav Trade Union Federation Congress, a further session was held of the Council of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, at which members of this body, in a secret ballot, elected a new Presidium.

This new Presidium, which, according to the trade union statute adopted today, is no longer a political but only an executive organ of the council, has 14 members—two each from the republics and one each from the provinces.

Two seats in the new Presidium are still vacant because the Slovene trade unions have not put forward their candidates for this body. They will do this at a later date, once the Slovene trade union organization adopts a decision on joining the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Yugoslavia.

'Peaceful Demonstration' in Belgrade Blocked

LD2605171990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1614 GMT 25 May 90

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 25 May (TANJUG)—Several hundred citizens who gathered on 25 May in Pionirski Park across from the SFRY Assembly failed to stage a peaceful demonstration against the "violation of human rights of Yugoslav citizens." The Movement for the Protection of Human Rights from Belgrade [Pokret za Zastitu Ljudskih Prava] organized this not-to-be protest. Movement Secretry Tomislav Krsmanovic, who was sitting on a park bench, advised citizens to go back to their homes because the Stari Grad Department for Public Security refused to approve the meeting, although the request for the approval had been submitted on time. Despite his explanation and the strong police presence, citizens gathered in Pionirski Park. Then, friendly persuasion, which lasted for almost 40 minutes, broke out between them and the patient policemen. [passage omitted: people renting from private landlords drew public attention to their unbearable situation at the meeting]

The Movement for the Protection of Human Rights secretary, Tomislaw Krsmanovic, said that adherance to the administrative ban does not mean that next week this organization will not continue to protest against violations of elementary civil rights in our country in response to the repression "of terrorists from the ranks of secret political police."

Socialist Alliance To Nominate Markovic

LD2605195490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1844 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Skopje, 26 May (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Socialist Alliance will propose to Prime Minister Ante Markovic to nominate him as its candidate in the forthcoming multi-party elections, it was said in a working-consultative meeting of representatives of the Socialist Alliance organizations in five Yugoslav republics and the two provinces and the leagues of socialists of Slovenia and Croatia, held today [26 May] in Skopje, Macedonia.

In an interview given to REUTERS and the B.B.C. yesterday, Prime Minister Markovic said the government intended to form a party of its own, which would contest the forthcoming elections.

The Socialist Alliance, which considers itself to be the only organized leftist political force in Yugoslavia, condemned in the sharpest terms in today's meeting the domestic parties and moves with nationalistic, chauvinistic and separatistic tendencies.

The Yugoslav Socialist Alliance, as a leftist political force, will re-establish contacts with all social democratic and socialist movements and parties in Europe, as well as with the Socialist International, it was also heard in today's meeting.

The representatives of Slovene socialists expressed their satisfaction with the course the multi-party elections in Slovenia had taken, despite their defeat, and stressed that they were already living in a parliamentary democracy characterized by a diversity of opinion.

The representatives of socialist [words indistinct] of the Republic of Croatia, who also failed to win the elections in their republic, said that democracy was also the rights of the minority.

Social Democratic Alliance Backs Democratization

LD2905100390 Zagreb Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 28 May 90

[Text] At its first constitutive session in Belgrade on 28 May, the Coordinating Committee and the Program Commission of the Social Democratic Alliance of Yugoslavia [Socijaldemokratski Savez Jugoslavije]—which at the moment consists of the following independent organizations that entered into an alliance of their own volition: the Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia, the Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia, the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercevogina, and the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro—endorsed a statement reiterating their resolute support for the process of democraticization that is spreading throughout the country steadily but unevenly. We resolutely oppose those who would like to halt this process of national or, as promoted by the highest state bodies, higher interests of our state, the joint statement says.

The Federal Executive Council, the SFRY Assembly, the executive councils and assemblies of the republics and provinces, which have yet to legalize newly formed political organizations and to hold free multiparty elections, are called upon to legalize all newly formed political organizations, prepare free multiparty elections, and guarantee all political parties free and equal access to the media. The statement also insists on all parties being allocated premises and financial means to organize election campaigns.

Mitrovic Views Political, Economic Issues

LD2705134690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1048 GMT 27 May 90

[Text] Vienna, 27 May (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Premier Aleksandar Mitrovic announced that the government was considering coming out with its own program at the upcoming multi-party and free federal elections in Yugoslavia. It still has not been specified whether this will be a separate party, coalition or movement, but in any case it will be a political synthesis of the struggle for Yugoslavia, Mitrovic announced.

In the meantime, Yugoslav Premier Ante Markovic announced, in an interview to REUTERS and the BBC, the possibility of he and his government forming an independent party. Mitrovic announced this in Vienna, where he is today [27 May] taking part in the working meeting of the deputy premiers of the regional "Pentagonal" Group for Cooperation which includes Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Mitrovic in a talk with Yugoslav businessmen in Vienna also spoke about political reforms in Yugoslavia and assessed that two thirds of the constitutional amendments, oriented to political pluralism and democratization, would be adopted at first.

The Yugoslav deputy premier said that the so far successful results of the Yugoslav reform—harnessing inflation, the convertibility of the dinar, higher exports and foreign exchange reserves and a reduction of the foreign debt—offer a real basis for the beginning of a phase of stable economic relations. However, according to Mitrovic, the further consolidation of the Yugoslav economy also assumes new moves and fresh efforts.

Mitrovic placed among the Yugoslav Government's list of priorities at the moment halting the drop in industrial production, i.e. the revival of all economic activities and increasing the social product. This will be achieved through further changes in the economic structure with greater foreign and private investments, recapitalization measures, the financial reorganization of the banking system and other moves, Mitrovic concluded.

New Government Publication on Reform Process

LD2605041890 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1650 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Belgrade, May 25 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government has begun to issue a new publication "SIV VAM ODGOVARA" ("THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ANSWERS YOUR QUESTIONS"), which will include answers to questions about the government reform put by Yugoslavs living in the country and abroad.

The fundamental economic reforms of the Yugoslav Government whose implementation began this year have awakened great interest in Yugoslavia and abroad. That is why the federal government formed a special group of experts who will answer all questions about the Yugoslav reform (taxes, foreign capital investments, the money market, rights of foreigners to real estate, etc.).

The working group will answer all questions individually, and any questions which might interest the more general public will be published in the new government edition.

The new publication will be printed 7-10 days after the questions are put to the federal government. Yugoslavs living abroad will send their questions through Yugoslav diplomatic-consular offices.

SUBNOR Adopts Declaration Outlining Stance

LD2605111990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1332 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Belgrade, 25 May (TANJUG)—The Federal Board of the Federation of Veterans' Associations of Yugoslavia [SUBNOR] will act as an independent and nonparty organization favoring a federal Yugoslavia, republican sovereignty based on the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, democratic socialism, and the preservation and development of national liberation and revolutionary traditions.

This is the essence of the program declaration adopted on 25 May, which is the main document for the 11th congress of the veterans' organization to be held, as decided, on 10-11 July in Belgrade.

The veterans today endorsed several other documents, among them the statute of the war veterans' organization and the report about SUBNOR work between the two congresses. They accepted Franc Hocevar's resignation from the Federal Board and the Yugoslav SUBNOR Presidium.

Youth Organization Disbanded, To Reform

LD2605192390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1555 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 26 May (TANJUG)—The 16-year-old Yugoslav Socialist Youth Federation (YSYF) is no more—the organization was disbanded at its 13th and last congress, which closed today [26 May].

Three new organizations will be formed from the dissolved YSYF in the next six months—the Youth Council, the Yugoslav New Forum and the Alliance of Students of Yugoslavia.

Accord about the new forms of the political, interest and professional organization of the Yugoslav youth was reached even before the congress at meetings of its organizing committee.

Serbian Party Rally Banned; Police Waver

LD2805025190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1411 GMT 27 May 90

[Summary] Nis, 27 May (TANJUG)—Despite an official ban on the Serbian Renaissance Movement's [Srpski Pokret Obnove] rally, scheduled to take place in Nis on 27 May, its champion, Vuk Draskovic, and some other members of its leadership nevertheless arrived in the town, where they were met by several hundred citizens demanding to be addressed by Draskovic. However, the police suggested to Draskovic that he leave the town. After two hours of negotiations, Draskovic was allowed to speak, provided he limited his address to five minutes. In his address, not exceeding the time limit, Draskovic denied that he had ever advocated hatred, division, and violence. The rally dispersed quietly after Draskovic promised that he would come back once his party's rally in the town had been sanctioned.

Serbian Leader Outlines New Constitution

LD0206125490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1953 GMT 1 Jun 90

[Text] Pec, 1 Jun (TANJUG)—After today's discussions with workers of the Dusan Mugosa agro-industrial combine in Pec, a delegation of the Socialist Republic of Serbia led by Serbian Presidency member Mihalj Kertes, visited the local community of Gorazdevac near Pec. On this occasion the residents of this village, in which about 2,000 Serbs and Montenegrins live, acquainted the guests with their minor problems.

Taking the floor, Mihalj Kertes stressed among other things that the Kosovo alternative opposition is now on a big offensive. However, its current actions represent its last convulsions. You will be convinced of this, he said, when we adopt the new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the law on political parties.

With the adoption of the new constitution of Serbia, the provinces will be cultural and historical creations without any of the elements of statehood. All laws and regulations will be uniform in the whole territory from Dragas to Horgos, Kertes stressed. If the unity of Yugoslavia is not preserved, Serbia has prepared a variation (of the Constitution setting out) how to survive as a free, democratic, European state, although this alternative is not being advocated by the Serbian leadership and the Serbian people.

Speaking about individual state institutions in Kosovo, Mihalj Kertes stressed that in the organs of the judiciary, the prosecutors' office and the state administrative organs, new people, who will come along very quickly, will ensure the functioning of the law-governed state. Likewise, everything will be done so that Pristina University is no longer a bastion of Albanian separatism. From 1 September over 150 lecturers from Serbia will be employed and over 1,000 students will be brought in, so that the university will be Yugoslav, or will not exist, Mihalj Kertes stressed at the end.

Archbishop on Clericalism, Reconciliation

AU2805095690 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 18 May 90 p 2

[Vasja Venturini report: "Ljubljana Metropolitan Rejects Making a Bogey out of Clericalism"]

[Text] Maribor, 17 May—"The theses about a revival of clericalism in Slovenia appeared even before the elections. But what does this word mean at all? If it means the misuse of the church, and especially of religious services and church premises, this indeed is clericalism. But this will never happen in Slovenia. However, clericalism in the shape of people presenting themselves as religious persons does appear, and this is not bad," Dr. Alojzij Sustar, archbishop and metropolitan of Ljubljana, said in a conversation in the Maribor Journalists Club yesterday evening, as the guest of the month.

The interesting conversation conducted by VECER journalist Mirko Lorenci, in which questions by the public simply rained on the guest, also concerned the question of Slovene reconciliation and the Slovene political emigres. Archbishop Sustar said about the reconciliation that clearing up the past is painful but necessary for the Slovenes. "The present is primarily a summary of the past, and the future is a summary of the present. Therefore matters must be put in their proper place. Everything must be truthfully said. If we determine the truth,

we must not use it for punishing people, because we support forgiveness. If possible, we must try to repair the injustices. Unfortunately this is very difficult to do. This question is particularly difficult for those who had suffered greatly because a psychological process is involved. These people must be helped. Unless we solve this in a peaceful way, we will not find the right road to the future," the Slovene metropolitan said.

The archbishop thinks that the motherland has been unfair to the political emigres. All the worst things were attributed to them here. He himself spent long years abroad and felt this himself. Many people who left for abroad because they did not agree with the system still do not believe, even after all these changes, that the changes are real.

To some extent they were pacified by the election of France Bucar as president of the Slovene Assembly, because Bucar is well known abroad because of his writing. This trust must be strengthened and our political and economic emigres must be shown that the Slovene spring is growing.

The questions of denationalization are also broached with the change of the political system. Much property was taken away from the church in the years after the war. Dr. Sustar thinks that it is not even in the interest of the church to regain possession of all this property because the times have changed much and the church even lacks people to manage all the property that formerly belonged to it.

Slovene Government Holds First News Conference

LD2605102990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2002 GMT 24 May 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 24 May (TANJUG)—The chief aim of the new Slovene Government is a sovereign republic, Slovene Premier Lojze Peterle, the leader of the Christian Democratic Party which is a member of the moderately rightist (?Christian Demos), said at a press conference here today [24 May].

The government advocates Slovenia's confederal status in Yugoslavia, Peterle reiterated the well-known stand of Demos, which took over power from the Communists at the first multi-party elections in fifty years in late March.

Premier Peterle said that Slovenia was prepared to take part in amending the federal constitution, but added that the republican constitution had priority.

Republican Secretary of the Economy Joze Mencinger told the press that the new government was [word indistinct] concerned with economic recovery. He admitted that not much could be done at once to improve the difficult economic situation.

Mencinger specified that the government's first step would be to put a stop to the drain of funds from the republic. Thus, there will be cuts in the outlays for the under-developed parts of the country and for the Yugoslav People's Army, he said.

Thousands Attend Tuzla Protest Meeting

LD2605171590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1654 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Tuzla, 25 May (TANJUG)—The citizens of Tuzla and surrounding villages said "no" on 25 May to the divisions in Yugoslavia, the attacks on Bosnia-Hercegovina, the unreasoned attacks on Josip Broz Tito, and the divisions in the Yugoslav People's Army. Such a large popular meeting, addressed by workers, scientists, veterans, and young people, has not been held in Tuzla for a long time.

Tuzla has been and will be an example of the living together of people of various nationalities and confessions, it was said at this public patriotic meeting, as the organizers called it, which was attended by several tens of thousands of citizens.

Bosnia-Hercegovina Party Chief Addresses Rally

LD2605093390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1920 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 25 May (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is one and indivisible, there will be no secession of any part of it, and we shall not allow any alteration of its border, republican Communist leader Nijaz Durakovic said at a popular rally in Sarajevo today [25 May].

The rally assembled tens of thousands of citizens of the republic, who expressed their opposition to manifestations of nationalism and negation of the unity of nations and nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia as a whole. Attempts by some political parties outside Bosnia-Herzegovina to re-draw the borders of the republic and Yugoslavia, as well as attacks on the late Yugoslav President Tito and his achievements, were also condemned.

Durakovic [word indistinct] that the concept of the Yugoslav federation which the republic was supporting did not mean that the time had come for an all-out race to carve up the country and grab what can be grabbed, and that the time was ripe for Yugoslavia to be broken up and proclaimed a historical mistake and a Comintern fabrication."

He expressed the conviction that a democratic, modern and federative Yugoslavia had a future as a state in which everybody was at home and decided his own fate.

Durakovic also said that the intentionally brutal criticism of Tito in fact represented attacks against the idea and practice of socialism and the historical meaning of Yugoslavia' popular liberation struggle and revolution.

Pointing out that Bosnia-Hercegovina and Yugoslavia were facing major tests and tasks, Durakovic said that

only in conditions of peace, liberty, and brotherhood and unity among the country's nations and nationalities could there arise favourable prospects for overcoming the current crisis.

'Real Chaos' in Bosnia Employment Situation

LD2805123990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1016 GMT 28 May 90

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, 29 May [as received] (TANJUG)—The number of unemployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina is approaching 300,000, it was said at a news conference in the community for employment of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was stressed at the news conference that real chaos prevails regarding employment in the republic because at the moment it is not known what the work of the state is, what the work of enterprises is, and what the work of the community is. [passage omitted]

Independent Party Urges Respect for Croats

LD2505232190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1505 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Belgrade, 25 May (TANJUG)—Representatives of the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party from the Republic of Croatia today [25 May] asked Yugoslav State Presidency President Borisav Jovic for the securing of full respect for the constitutional rights and freedoms of all citizens in Croatia.

The representatives of this party believe that the political and inter-ethnic situation in Croatia following the recent multi-party elections is disturbing and deteriorating.

The political orientation of the Yugoslav Independent Democratic Party is pro-Yugoslavia.

The nationalistic party the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) won the recent multi-party elections in (?Croatia). Several nationalistic incidents were recorded in this northwestern Yugoslav republic after the elections. The latest was a brutal attack on the leader of the local committee of the Serbian Democratic Party in [words indistinct] Croatian town Benkovac.

Democratic Action Party Holds Founding Congress

LD2705131490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Sarajevo, 26 May (TANJUG)—The Party of Democratic Action [Stranka Demokratske Akcije, SDA], which was formed on 26 May in Sarajevo at the founding assembly attended by 1,500 members and symphathizers, is a political alliance of Yugoslav citizens belonging to—as stated in its program declaration—Muslim cultural and historical traditions. However, the SDA is a party of other Yugoslav citizens who accept its program and objectives.

Alija Izetbegovic, a lawyer who is the chairman of the initiative committee for the founding of the SDA, submitted a report about the SDA aims and tasks. After the program declaration and party statute were presented, the founding assembly was greeted, on behalf of the Demos [Slovene Democratic Opposition] by its leader, Dr. Joze Pucnik; on behalf of the HDZ [Croatian Liberal Alliance (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica)] by Drazen Budisa.

Numerous telegrams from the entire country and world, in which Muslims from Yugoslavia welcome the formation of this party and wish it successful work, were read.

In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the situation is unsatisfactory in several areas, Alija Izetbegovic said in his report.

The economic situation is on the verge of collapse, and for a long time now a large number of people have been living at or below the minimum level for existence. The valley of the Bosna [river] as far as Tuzla has been affected by an ecological catastrophe, and Krajina [northwest Bosnia-Hercegovina] has experienced a severe setback from the obstacles placed in the way of a big project involving the hopes of thousands of people.

In this way, Izetbegovic said, we have named four groups of problems exerting pressure on Bosnia today: economic, social, ecological, and, specifically, the problem of Krajina-Agrokomerc.

Our party intends to form four specialist groups to tackle these questions and find and propose solutions. However, these are not the most serious problems facing Bosnia, Izetbegovic continued. Hovering over the country has been a danger that threatens its survival as an independent state and as a republic.

The first question that arises quite justifiably here is: How was it at all possible for this situation to come about? Bosnia has existed now for almost a thousand years as a separate political entity, with only two relatively short breaks: during the time of the old Yugoslavia and during the last war. The Kulin Ban [11th century ruler in Bosnia] charter is the oldest preserved state and legal document among Slav states in the Balkans, and as for the document, which is written in the vernacular, it is the oldest document of this kind among European peoples.

How, Izetbegovic wondered, has it now suddenly come about that our republic is being disputed and that plans to divide it and break it up into pieces are being made openly and self-confidently?

There are several reasons for this, and the most important one lies in the fact that over the past 40 years Bosnia has not belonged to its peoples but to the party bureaucracy. Thus, it has been left without a personality and identity, and thus also without much else. Now, as this bureaucracy, divided within itself and weakened, is losing the capability of preserving its possession, Bosnia

is becoming nobody's while ventures in increasingly large flocks are appearing over the unfortunate country, Izetbegovic said.

Demos [Slovene Democratic Opposition] Chairman Dr. Joze Pucnik said that everything that he has heard today at the founding assembly of the SDA, which is of historical significance for the people of Bosnia, is a sign that here too, democracy is being created in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

He said that the main task of Demos is to bring down the Communist authorities and the one-party system so that the situation in which one party usurps power and treats it as a private possession is never repeated again, and second, to see that the sovereignty of the Slovene people is restored.

Yugoslavia can exist as a confederation or not exist at all, the leader of Demos, Dr. Pucnik, stressed.

With this meeting in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Hercegovina, and also in Yugoslavia, he stressed, along with what has been achieved in the democratic elections in Slovenia and Croatia, a new period of history is beginning in Yugoslavia. He wished the SDA much success in its preelection and election campaign and expressed the conviction that this party will assume power in Bosnia-Hercegovina after the democratic elections.

Academic Dr. Dalibor Brozovic, vice chairman of the HDZ, greeting those present at the founding assembly in Sarajevo's Holiday Inn Hotel, recalled that he himself was born in Sarajevo, and afterward he set out the official standpoint of the HDZ, or rather the standpoint of the Socialist Republic of Croatia Assembly as it will be in two to three days time, in connection with the talk of and statements about the attacks on the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina and its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Brozovic said that the HDZ recognizes the country and statehood of Bosnia, which, by its Kulin Ban Charter of the 11th century is two centuries older as a state than Switzerland, whose first cantons united only in the 13th century.

He said that the HDZ, or rather the Croatian Assembly, will not accept, or take part in, the possible offers concerning the division of Bosnia. Furthermore, they will defend and affirm it everywhere.

Only, if Bosnia is attacked on the [river] Drina, we will defend Bosnia, together with it on the Drina, because Croatia too is defended on it, he stressed.

He said that this standpoint should not provoke any suspicion or anxiety amongst Serbian inhabitants in this area—something that only Zagreb and Sarajevo can agree on—because the Serbian people have been here longer than the Americans in America.

The founding assembly of the SDA resumes its work today up to 1600, when it is planned to conclude.

Split Assembly Leaders Elected in Croatia

LD2905084390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1816 GMT 29 May 90

[Summary] Split, 28 May (TANJUG)—At its first session after the multiparty elections in Croatia, the Split municipal assembly elected Onesin Cvitan as its president and Marian Mihanovic as its vice president. Both are members of the Croatian Democratic Community [Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ].

Kosovo Communists Support 'Democratic Socialism'

LD0206200190 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1555 GMT 2 Jun 90

[Text] Pristina, 2 Jun (TANJUG)—The communists of the Yugoslav troubled province of Kosovo maintain that their republic has a future as part of the republic of Serbia and of the Yugoslav Federation in which freedoms, equality and prosperity would be guaranteed to all nations and nationalities, it is set out in a statement released by the Presidency of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo which has summed up a public discussion on a document on the transformation of the provincial party.

The Communists of Kosovo, around 90 percent of whose inhabitants are ethnic Albanians, call for a League of Communists as a modern political party and for the development of democratic socialism in Yugoslavia. They are, at the same time, convinced that the introduction of a multi-party system will help the further democratization of society.

Emphasis has been placed in the public discussion on a transformation of the League of Communists of Kosovo in the new political conditions in the country on the need for the Communists to rely on the Yugoslav socialist ideas but, at the same time, to renounce some negative phenomena from the past.

Court Acquits Freedoms Committee's Cana

LD2605045690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1802 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Pristina, 25 May (TANJUG)—A court in Pristina, capital of Yugoslavia's southern Province of Kosovo, acquitted on Friday [25 May] Zekerijah Cana of a charge of spreading false rumors about the (?actions) of the police towards the ethnic Albanian population during an unrest in Kosovo earlier (?this year).

Cana, who is the secretary of the provincial Human Rights and Freedoms Committee, was accused of having been misinforming the press in January and February about the number of the killed in the ethnic Albanian demonstrations. According to the official figures, 28 ethnic Albanian demonstrators were killed in clashes with the Yugoslav police during the unrest in January and February of this year.

The Pristina court ruled that there was no ground for prosecution.

Macedonian Social Democrats Criticize Jovic

LD2605085990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1617 GMT 25 May 90

[Text] Skopje, 25 May (TANJUG)—The leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia, a recently founded opposition party, today said that the inadequate assessment by State Presidency President Borisav Jovic that the country is in chaos unnecessarily aggravated the political situation in the country.

The leadership of this opposition party in the southernmost Yugoslav republic also called on the federal parliament representatives of this republic to persevere in the struggle to "transform Yugoslavia into a parliamentary democratic society." Yugoslav parliament is to discuss the political-security situation in the country on Monday [28 May].

The Macedonian Social Democrats believe that the situation in the country is today better than a year ago, and they assess Jovic's recent speech as an attempt to stop democratic processes in Yugoslavia.

'Party of Yugoslavs' in Macedonia Founded

LD2605185990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1436 GMT 26 May 90

[Text] Skopje, 26 May (TANJUG)—The founding assembly of the Party of Yugoslavs in Macedonia opened in Skopje this morning [26 May] to an audience of over 300 party members, sympathizers, and guests.

The party will act within a unique Party of Yugoslavs which is based in Zagreb, and it will rally all citizens who have opted for Yugoslavia, regardless of their national and religious affiliation.

The participants in the founding assembly underscored that they would fight for the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country and its faster development in many areas, including the economy and culture.

Bar Independent LC Created in Montenegro

LD2905084890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1631 GMT 28 May 90

[Text] Bar, 28 May (TANJUG)—At the initiative of an expert department of the unbanned Bar League of Communists [LC] municipal committee, an independent LC organization was formed on 28 May. Decisions of the Montenegrin LC Central Committee [CC] will not be binding on this organization.

The newly formed independent Bar LC organization will link up, as decided by its founders, with like-minded people throughout Montenegro and will join the work of the Democratic Forum [Demokratski Forum] in Titograd.

After the 28 May meeting, the adherents of the disbanned Bar LC municipal committee, as announced, will present an initiative for establishing the responsibility of the Montenegrin LC CC and its Presidium to other municipal committees throughout the republic.